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CHAPTER I 
 
AGENCY PROBLEMS OF CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This study investigates corporate charitable contributions, an important form of 
discretionary corporate expenditures. While corporate charitable contributions are frequent and 
often substantial,1  there is no clear evidence in the literature on whether these expenditures have 
positive effects on firm revenues or performance or on shareholder wealth. Proponents assert that 
corporate giving is consistent with shareholder value maximization since it is a channel for firms 
to promote their image to customers and to enhance their standing with regulatory agencies and 
legislators (Navarro, 1988; Brown, Helland and Smith, 2006). Counter-arguments suggest that 
corporate giving can often reflect conflicts of interests between shareholders and managers, 
where managers support their personal preferences toward charities with corporate funds or 
enhance their personal reputation and social networks.2 Because it is difficult to measure the 
benefits that accrue to a firm from charitable contributions, these decisions can reflect the 
personal preferences of corporate managers and thus, substantially depart from firm value and 
shareholder wealth maximization. The ambiguity surrounding the benefits of corporate giving has 
attracted the attention of the popular media (see Monks and Minow, 2004) and prompted 
legislators and government agencies to call for greater disclosure of contributions where a 
connection to company executives or directors exists (see Appendix 1.A and Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 1992). 
                                                          
1Total U.S. corporate giving in 2010 is $15.29 billion (Giving USA 2011 report). 
2The classic example of corporate giving was at Occidental Petroleum where the founder, Armand Hammer, decided to 
build his own museum funded by the company, now known as the Armand Hammer Museum of Art and Culture 
Center or the Hammer Museum. In the case of one shareholder suit, Occidental agreed to limit the spending to $60 
million for the construction of the museum and $35 million more for an annuity to be paid over 30 years. See Monks 
and Minow (2004) for more details. 
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Although several studies evaluate these competing hypotheses by focusing on the 
associations between corporate charitable contributions and other explanatory variables, no 
existing study has measured the relation between these contributions and the private preferences 
of CEOs, assessed the impact of corporate giving on company valuation or performance, or 
analyzed the channels through which corporate giving affects firm value. By addressing these 
issues, this study helps to identify the relative importance of these two alternative hypotheses 
concerning corporate giving decisions. 
Our analysis begins with a multivariate analysis of the associations between corporate 
giving and measures of firm profit motives and agency theory. Our findings offer limited support 
for the conventional idea that corporate giving is profit-enhancing.  Specifically, when we model 
the likelihood of corporate philanthropy as a function of a firm’s profit motive, CEO attributes 
and corporate governance variables, we find insignificant coefficient estimates for variables 
related to profit motives. However, modeling the determinants of amount of charitable giving, we 
find significant associations with measures of a firm’s intellectual property investment, visibility, 
and membership in a highly regulated industry. Although existing theoretical and empirical 
studies, e.g., Navarro (1988), consider advertising one of the main motivations for corporate 
giving, our results fail to support the predicted relation between corporate giving and a firm’s 
propensity to advertise. On the other hand, we uncover substantial evidence supporting agency 
theory. More specifically, Jensen and Meckling (1976) predict that CEO private benefits should 
be positively related to their tastes and preferences, but negatively related to their firm ownership 
levels. Consistent with Jensen and Meckling (1976), we find that CEO charity connections – a 
measure of CEO’s personal preference for charity – increase the likelihood and the amount of 
corporate giving by 21.4% and 1.5% respectively, whereas CEO ownership reduces the 
likelihood and the amount of giving by 40% and 3% respectively. 
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We use the 2003 dividend tax cut as a natural experiment to provide an exogenous source 
of variation about key CEO attributes. This tax reform reduced the individual dividend tax rate 
from a maximum rate of 35% to 15% (Chetty and Saez, 2005) and thus increased the cost of 
CEOs pursuing their private preferences toward charitable giving that reduces a firm’s share 
value, especially when CEO ownership levels are high. Consistent with the implication of this 
Tax Reform Act for CEO incentives, we find that corporate giving significantly declines after 
2003, and this effect becomes stronger as CEO ownership increases. 
In further analysis, we test whether corporate giving is incrementally beneficial for a 
sample of firms with relatively large expenditures on advertising and R&D, as these firms are 
often assumed to benefit most from charitable contributions. We find no evidence to support this 
corporate giving incentive: in fact the relationships with advertising and R&D expenditures are 
statistically insignificant, while CEO ownership and personal charity connections remain 
significant in explaining a firm’s level of corporate giving. On the other hand, we identify a more 
muted effect of CEO ownership and a more pronounced effect of charity connections in 
subsamples of firms where managers are entrenched or able to avoid board discipline. These 
results indicate that although agency problems of corporate giving are widespread, they are more 
severe in firms exhibiting weaker corporate governance. 
To measure which hypothesis has the most explanatory power, we next explore how 
corporate giving affects firm value through its impact on cash holdings. Cash generally represents 
an important proportion of a firm’s total asset, enabling firms to make investments without 
having to access external capital markets. Therefore, cash holding helps avoid transaction costs 
and asymmetric information costs associated with external financing. However, such corporate 
liquidity comes at a price. Cash reserves may provide funds for managers to invest in projects that 
offer private benefits, but destroy shareholder value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As a result, 
shareholders may discount the dollar value of cash retained by corporations that make larger 
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charitable contributions, and impose a greater discount on the cash holdings of firms having 
weaker board oversight. Using the methodology developed by Faulkender and Wang (2006), we 
find that corporate giving has a substantial impact on firm value through its impact on cash: the 
estimated marginal value of cash is 8.1 cents lower if a firm raises its corporate giving from the 
sample median to the 75th percentile level. For firms with non-independent boards where board 
oversight is expected to be weaker, the negative impact of corporate giving on firm value more 
than doubles. These findings are consistent with the argument that shareholders anticipate the 
misuse of cash reserves at giving companies, and therefore place a lower value on them. 
To provide a more direct and causal link between corporate giving and shareholder 
wealth, we (again) use the 2003 Tax Reform Act as a natural experiment. Earlier, we found that 
corporate giving declines after 2003. Now, we examine whether subsequent reductions in 
corporate giving lead to dividend increases. Specifically, by focusing on firms that make 
charitable contributions in 2002, we investigate how changes in charitable contributions affect 
dollar dividends in 2004. We find that a $1 million reduction in corporate giving after the tax-cut 
year is associated with at least $5.3 million increase in dividends. Thus, our experiment shows 
that dividend (or alternatively, shareholder wealth) increases following the Tax Reform Act of 
2003, consistent with senior managers reducing their consumption of the private benefits of 
control. 
Having documented that corporate giving represents an agency problem, we conduct a 
series of tests to address why and how corporate giving destroys firm value. First, we examine 
whether corporate giving offers opportunities for managerial rent extraction by investigating the 
frequency and level of corporate contributions to charities where CEOs hold positions as trustees, 
directors or advisors (henceforth, CEO-affiliated charities). We find that approximately two out 
of three firms contribute to CEO-affiliated charities. Moreover, the average cost to a company 
from such contributions is larger than the combined costs of CEO corporate jet use and other 
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perks (Yermack, 2006) and is comparable to a CEO’s promised cash severance payments 
(Rusticus, 2006). Furthermore, CEO-affiliated charities decline if CEO financial interests are 
more aligned with the interests of shareholders. These findings suggest that corporate giving is 
not solely determined by firm value maximization, but instead is a channel that serves managerial 
private interests. Second, we conduct an event study of the first disclosure by a corporation of 
“charity awards” to gauge how investors perceive charitable contributions where the charities 
have ties to company executives and directors. In revising the disclosure rules on compensation in 
1992, the SEC recognized such awards as a form of compensation and mandated that firms report 
them in proxy statements. We document a three day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of -
0.87% (p-value = 0.014) for firms that report charity awards for the first time during 1993 – 2010. 
This wealth loss exceeds the nominal value of the announced charitable award programs, 
suggesting that shareholders reduce their assessment of the quality of a firm’s overall governance 
or for expected future contributions on these announcements. 
Third, we separately analyze the determinants of annual corporate giving to charities and 
contributions to charitable foundations to evaluate the seriousness of an agency problem 
associated with these two channels of corporate giving. Foundations are tax-exempt nonprofits 
that receive irreversible donations from their sponsoring companies. The critical factor for these 
foundations is the separation between the economic affairs of shareholders and those of 
foundations.3 This separation negates any shareholder claim on any donations transferred to the 
foundations, and therefore poses a classic agency problem for firms that make charitable 
contributions through foundations. In further empirical analysis, we find that giving to 
foundations increases with both a CEO’s charity connections and weaker corporate governance, 
while annual giving to charities increases with stronger corporate governance. These results 
                                                          
3Consider the case of Lehman Brothers Foundation, for example. Although its sponsoring company was liquidated in 
2008, the foundation still exists under the name of The Neuberger Berman Foundation. In the year of liquidation, the 
foundation had a market value of assets of $23.4 million, which was not distributed to company shareholders. As of 
November 2012, the foundation still uses that asset for philanthropic reasons. 
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suggest that the adverse impact of corporate giving on firm value is largely due to large 
irrevocable donations to corporate charitable foundations. 
Thus far our results indicate that CEOs realize personal benefits from corporate giving. 
However, these benefits could still be part of an optimal compensation contract. Specifically, if 
boards reduce manager compensation for any corporate contributions that benefit them, then this 
evidence would weaken the case for the agency hypothesis.4 So in our fourth line of analysis, we 
study the relation between CEO compensation and corporate giving. Because corporate giving is 
endogenous in the specified CEO compensation regression, we employ an instrumental variables 
framework to identify a causal effect rather than just an association.5 By using natural disasters in 
the state where a firm’s headquarter is located as an instrument for corporate giving, we 
document that a 10% increase in giving is associated with a $523,500 rise in CEO compensation. 
This result contradicts the prediction of the optimal contracting hypothesis and indicates that the 
probability of a company paying excess CEO compensation is significantly higher when these 
companies have larger amounts of corporate giving.  
The last round of analysis studies a specific channel of entrenchment that aims to help 
explain the above relationship between corporate giving and excess CEO compensation. Cespa 
and Cestone (2007) argue that CEOs use corporate resources strategically to build ties with 
stakeholders to receive favorable treatment during future contract renewal or turnover decisions, 
but we propose that a more direct form of entrenchment occurs if CEOs allocate firm donations to 
accommodate independent director charitable interests.6 Specifically, we examine whether 
charitable causes supported by corporate giving overlap with independent director charitable 
interests and then evaluate the effect of this alignment on CEO compensation. Consistent with the 
                                                          
4This is in the spirit of Fama’s (1980) ex post settling up argument, under which boards would adjust compensation 
downward for corporate contributions that benefit managers.  
5An endogenously determined level of CEO power could affect the relation between CEO compensation and corporate 
giving. 
6This analysis is motivated by the giving practices at Enron. Lay’s foundation (named after the company CEO, Kenneth 
Lay) and the Enron corporate foundation jointly donated money to research centers that employed two members of 
Enron’s board, John Mendelson and Charles LeMaistre. 
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agency hypothesis, we find a 69% overlap with the interests of independent directors, indicating 
that a strategic use of corporate giving is to serve independent director charity interests and 
thereby strengthen their ties to a CEO. In further regression analysis, we find that this particular 
alignment of charitable interest is positively associated with excess CEO compensation. These 
results suggest that CEOs allocate corporate charitable contributions to advance their own 
interests. 
While our evidence is consistent with the predictions of agency theory, it is likely that in 
many instances corporate giving does benefit shareholders. However, such cases appear to be less 
frequent and the benefits are more indirect and difficult to measure, while these contributions 
definitely represent a direct cost to shareholders. Taken together, the results of this study 
document another important mechanism for managerial rent extraction and entrenchment. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The next section presents a brief 
overview of theories of corporate philanthropy and develops predictions for our two main 
competing hypotheses. Section 3 presents sample construction and a description of the data. 
Section 4 presents empirical results and robustness tests. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Theories and hypotheses 
  
We consider two theories of corporate giving. The first theory posits that corporate giving 
is motivated by shareholder wealth maximization, whereas the second views corporate giving as a 
manifestation of private benefits of control. The following subsections present these theories and 
describe variables used to test each theory. 
 
2.1.  Profit maximization theory 
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The profit motive perspective on corporate giving is based on the assumption that 
corporate giving improves company financial performance, leading to the following hypothesis: 
H1 (a): Corporate giving is positively related to financial performance. 
Two popular ways to measure financial performance are operating performance and stock 
price performance. To test the above hypothesis, we focus on stock returns because operating 
performance is backward looking and is frequently considered a determinant of corporate giving 
(see Petrovits, 2006 and Galaskiewicz, 1997). In addition, the endogeneity issue of corporate 
giving is less of a problem when the dependent variable of a regression analysis is a market-based 
measure. Short-term stock returns also reflect investor reactions to firm announcements related to 
corporate giving. Furthermore, we use the changes in dividends around a major reduction in 
personal taxes to gauge the impact of corporate giving on shareholder wealth. 
In one model of corporate giving consistent with shareholder wealth maximization, 
Navarro (1988) specified three dimensions of corporate giving, namely revenue enhancement, 
cost reduction, and tax minimization. Revenue enhancement represents corporate philanthropy 
that is part of an overall advertising strategy designed to promote a firm’s image to raise demand 
for a firm’s product. This perspective predicts a positive relation between a firm’s giving-to-sales 
ratio and its propensity to advertise. Under a cost reduction scenario, firms can use charitable 
contributions to reduce expected costs of government regulatory and enforcement actions. 
Because firms that rely more heavily on intangible assets or intellectual property and firms in 
highly regulated and out-of-favor industries are more vulnerable to regulatory and litigation costs, 
they have greater incentives to maintain a good public image and thus make larger charitable 
contributions. Lastly, Navarro (1988) argues that the existence of a corporate tax rate does not 
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affect the level of corporate giving since a marginal corporate income tax rate only transforms the 
firm’s profit function linearly.7 
Some corporate social responsibility actions can be viewed as similar to making 
corporate charitable contributions. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) literature makes several 
predictions about when firms pursue CSR actions, which are rooted in firm profit enhancement or 
shareholder wealth maximization. For example, Bernea, Heinkel and Kraus (2008) argue that the 
marginal impact of CSR expenditures is greater for firms in out-of-favor industries, suggesting a 
greater level of social expenditures for firms in these industries. Similarly, Benabou and Tirole 
(2010) propose a greater prevalence of investor-demanded CSR practices among more visible 
firms.8 These arguments lead to the following hypothesis: 
H2 (a): Corporate giving is positively related to a firm’s advertising level, intellectual property 
investment, general visibility, and sales in out-of-favor industries, but is insensitive to the 
corporate tax rate. 
 To test this hypothesis empirically, we construct several variables that serve to proxy for 
the firm’s profit motive. Following Navarro (1988) and Brown, Helland and Smith (2006), we 
formulate ad-to-sales and R&D-to-sales ratios to measure a firm’s propensity to advertise and its 
intellectual property investment, respectively. We define assets (log), number of employees (log), 
and number of shareholders (log) to measure a firm’s overall visibility and indicator variables for 
sin and non-environmentally-friendly industries to identify its presence in out-of-favor industries. 
We also include indicator variables for industries that are expected to make larger charitable 
contributions for several reasons. Financial, regulated and pharmaceutical industries face strong 
regulatory oversight, so giving is a cost reduction motive since it may result in more favorable 
regulatory treatment. On the other hand, image is an important asset for retail industries, so firms 
                                                          
7However, company-sponsored foundations can help firms optimally time tax deductions for charitable contributions. 
That is, firms are able to record larger deductions if they transfer contributions to foundations when their marginal tax 
rate is high. The empirical literature (see Table 3 in Petrovits, 2006) however finds a weak positive relation between 
foundation giving and corporate tax rates, probably because the costs overweigh the benefits.  
8Fisman, Heal and Nair (2006) also predict more giving in competitive industries, but they fail to empirically support 
their claim. 
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in these industries are likely to contribute more to charities out of a revenue enhancement motive. 
To measure corporate tax rate, we define marginal tax rate following Graham and Mills (2008).9 
Appendix 1.C contains the definitions of these variables. 
 
2.2.  Agency theory 
Looking at corporate giving as an agency problem, assumes that such giving does not 
yield greater revenue or lower costs, but instead represents a diversion of corporate resources, 
which reduces firm value on a dollar for dollar basis. Corporate giving can also be symptomatic 
of broader governance problems at the firm. These arguments lead to the following hypothesis: 
H1 (b): Corporate giving is negatively related to financial performance.10 
In their seminal paper, Jensen and Meckling (1976) consider agency costs as a necessary 
element in any agency relation. They observe that when the owner-managers reduce their firm 
ownership below 100%, incentives increase for utility-maximizing managers to consume more 
corporate resources. Thus, a clear prediction of their model is that the private benefits of 
corporate giving will vary inversely with CEO ownership. Jensen and Meckling (1976) also note 
that “agency costs … will depend on the tastes of managers, [and] the ease with which they can 
exercise their own preferences” (p. 328). So, private benefits of corporate giving should be 
positively related to a CEO’s personal preference for charity and negatively related to the strength 
of a firm’s corporate governance, which places constraints on exercising CEO preferences. The 
agency theory view also predicts a positive relation between corporate giving and corporate tax 
rate, as the cost to managers of corporate giving declines with corporate tax rates. 
The CSR literature also offers agency theoretic motivations for corporate giving. For 
example, Cheng, Hong and Shue (2011) argue that managers with a low ownership stake invest 
                                                          
9We thank Professor John R. Graham for generously providing data on marginal tax rates. 
10For reasons discussed earlier, we use stock returns to measure company performance and dividend changes to gauge 
the impact of corporate giving on shareholder wealth. 
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more in CSR activities (pet projects in their model). These arguments lead to the following 
hypothesis: 
H2 (b): Corporate giving is positively related to a CEO’s personal preference for charity and the 
corporate tax rate, but negatively to a CEO’s fractional ownership of the firm and the 
strength of its corporate governance. 
To measure a CEO’s personal preference for charity, we define a variable called CEO 
charity connection that takes the value of one if the CEO is personally affiliated with nonprofit 
organizations and zero otherwise.11 To measure a manager’s fractional ownership, we define 
CEO ownership as the sum of the CEO’s percentage of stock ownership and the percentage of 
shares exercisable from options times the option’s delta, which is the first derivative of the Black-
Scholes option value with respect to stock price. 
Following Jensen (1993), Yermack (1996), Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), and 
Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009), we consider board size, board independence, CEO-chairman 
duality, the E-index and director ownership in the firm as factors that affect a firm’s governance 
structure. Board size is the logarithm of total number of directors on the board, while the 
independent board indicator takes the value of one if independent directors represent at least 70% 
of the board.12 The E-index is the sum of six antitakeover defense indicators: that take a value of 
one for firms with staggered boards, limits on shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, 
golden parachutes, supermajority requirements for mergers, and supermajority requirements for 
charter amendments. Lastly, director ownership is the sum of director percentage shareholdings 
in the company. Appendix 1.C presents the definitions of the variables. 
 
 
                                                          
11A separate literature that focuses on individual charitable contributions finds that social connectedness plays an 
important role (see List and Price, 2008). While these studies consider individual backgrounds such as race as measures 
of connectedness, we opt for CEO participation in nonprofit organizations. Thus, our measure should be a cleaner 
proxy to assess an individual’s preference for charity. 
12We consider a high cut-off for the surge in board independence after SOX. 
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3. Sample 
 
3.1. Data 
We focus on the Fortune 500 companies as of April 17, 2006 and hand-collect giving 
data from the National Directory of Corporate Giving (NDCG). To ensure accuracy, the NDCG 
only includes corporate giving that are verified by companies themselves or compiled from 
reliable public records based on 440-PF filings with the IRS for foundation giving.13 For direct 
giving, these are voluntarily disclosed by the corporations to the public or to the NDCG upon its 
request. Using all directories between 1997 and 2007 to construct a database that spans the period 
1996 to 2006, we collect data on corporate contributions to charities and foundations. We then 
  
 
Figure 1.1: Charitable contributions in the USA 
Charitable contributions of Fortune 500 firms and all corporations in the USA. Data on Fortune 500 firms 
is collected from the National Directory of Corporate Giving, while data on all corporate contributions is 
from the Giving USA reports. 
 
                                                          
13Corporate giving data from NDCG includes grants to individuals, employee matching gifts and in-kind gifts. The 
individual items are often not separately available. 
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add these amounts to obtain total contributions (see Appendix 1.B for details). Figure 1.1 shows 
that Fortune 500 firms contribute a significant percentage of the total corporate charitable 
contributions.14 This percentage ranges from 16% in 2000 with 238 Fortune 500 contributing 
firms to 32.2% in 2003 with 351 Fortune 500 contributing firms. We hand match firm-level 
contributions data with PERMNOs and GVKEYs (company identification numbers in CRSP and 
Compustat, respectively) for all our sample firms. 
We next require that all necessary data be available in CRSP, Compustat, Execucomp, 
and RiskMetrics. In particular, firm assets, sales, leverage, number of employees and 
shareholders, advertising and R&D expenses, return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s q, free cash flow, 
and Fama-French 48 industry classifications are taken from Compustat. One-year cumulative 
stock returns and volatility are taken from CRSP. Information on CEO shares, exercisable 
options, unexercisable options, and total compensation is from Execucomp, while information on 
board size and its independence, ownership of independent directors, CEO-chairman duality, and 
the E-index is from RiskMetrics. 
Of the companies in the Fortune 500 universe, we identify 32 private firms without the 
necessary data. After removing these companies and merging all databases with the hand-
collected contribution data, the final sample has 2,421 firm-years representing 406 firms over the 
1996-2006 sample period. 
 
3.2.  Descriptive statistics 
Panel A and B of Table 1.1 present the distribution of giving and its determinants, most 
of which are explained in Section 2. We consider two additional measures of CEO attributes and 
several other firm characteristics. Additional CEO attributes are based on reputation, because 
reputational damage from being identified by the media may exceed any gain that a highly 
                                                          
14In Figure 1.1, we exclude the first four years of our sample because of data availability. Total corporate contributions 
data is not available before 1997 while NDCG directories were not issued in 1998 and 2000. 
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reputed CEO can accrue from corporate giving.15 Following Milbourn (2003), we define tenure 
and outside appointment to measure a CEO’s tenure with the company and outside recruitment 
status, respectively. Firm-level control variables include asset/employee, leverage, ROA, Tobin’s 
q, and a free cash flow indicator. Leverage can also be thought of as a governance variable that 
mitigates the problems associated with free cash flows (Jensen, 1986), while also creating a 
creditor monitor. Detailed descriptions on the formulation of these variables are provided in 
Appendix 1.C.  
Panel A of Table 1.1 reports that the average amount of corporate giving to charities for 
our sample firms, including firms making no contributions, is $2.5 million per year while the 
average amount of corporate donations transferred to foundations is $6.5 million per year. Adding 
these two sources, the total amount of corporate giving is $9 million per year, slightly less than 
the amount documented in Brown, Helland and Smith (2006).16 
For CEO attributes, we find that 71% of the Fortune 500 CEOs are connected with 
nonprofits or charitable organizations. This suggests that most CEOs have active interests in 
charities. The typical CEO has stock and option ownership of 1.8%, which is slightly higher than 
that reported by Yermack (2006), who only consider stock ownership. In addition, the typical 
CEO has worked for the firm for 17 years and is likely to be recruited internally. We find that 
only 21.5% CEO appointments are made from outside the firm, similar to that reported in 
Milbourn (2003). 
Turning to the firm’s corporate governance, the median company has a board with 11 
members, a majority of whom are independent, and a CEO who is chairman of the board. The 
firm also has an average of two out of six major antitakeover provisions included in the Bebchuk- 
                                                          
15For example, when a pro-life activist group boycotted Berkshire Hathaway, its CEO Warren E. Buffett cancelled its 
corporate giving program, which through its funding to the Buffett Foundation frequently supported organizations that 
promoted population control. Source: The Chronicle of Philanthropy (July 24, 2003). 
16The difference could be due to stricter data collection procedure of this paper (see Appendix 1.B). Excluding firms 
making no charitable contributions, the average amounts of corporate giving to charities and to a firm’s sponsored 
foundation are $22.8 million and $12.3 million, respectively. 
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Table 1.1 
Descriptive statistics 
Summary statistics and industry distribution of Fortune 500 firms during 1996 to 2006. Variable definitions are 
presented in the Appendix 1.C. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance based on two sides tests at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level, respectively. Total number of firm-year observations is 2,421. 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
Variable 10th 25th Mean Median 75th 90th 
Program contribution (million) 0 0 2.470 0 0 0.185 
Foundation contribution (million) 0 0 6.514 0.046 4.000 13.525 
Total contribution (million) 0 0 8.984 0.406 5.480 17.600 
CEO attributes 
      CEO charity connection 0 0 0.714 1 1 1 
Ownership (%) 0.142 0.318 1.760 0.666 1.477 3.333 
Tenure (years) 3 7 18.022 17 28 35 
Outside appointment 0 0 0.215 0 0 1 
Governance variables 
      Board size 8 9 11.252 11 13 15 
Independent board 0 0 0.575 1 1 1 
Director ownership (%) 0.002 0.022 0.778 0.072 0.226 0.746 
CEO-chairman duality 0 1 0.873 1 1 1 
E-index 0 1 1.575 2 2 3 
Profit maximizing variables 
      Ad-to-sales 0 0 0.012 0 0.013 0.040 
R&D-to-sales 0 0 0.020 0 0.019 0.062 
Assets (log) 7.928 8.527 9.481 9.381 10.233 11.278 
Number of employees (log) 2.116 2.717 3.416 3.401 4.078 4.812 
Number of shareholders (log) 1.068 2.166 3.231 3.329 4.223 5.204 
Marginal tax rate 0.300 0.347 0.333 0.350 0.350 0.355 
 Firm characteristics 
      Leverage 0.025 0.071 0.182 0.148 0.268 0.370 
ROA 0.035 0.084 0.135 0.127 0.184 0.236 
Tobin’s q 1.058 1.168 1.902 1.455 2.139 3.237 
Free cash flow indicator 0.000 1.000 0.863 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
Panel B: Industry distribution 
Name No. % of sample Name No. % of sample 
Agriculture 3 0.12% Shipbuilding, Railroad equipment 7 0.29% 
Food 84 3.47% Defense 8 0.33% 
Soda 12 0.50% Precious metals 5 0.21% 
Beer 34 1.40% Non-metallic & industrial metal mining 7 0.29% 
Smoke 13 0.54% Coal 6 0.25% 
Toys 8 0.33% Oil 103 4.25% 
Fun 0 0.00% Utilities 224 9.25% 
Printing and Publishing 21 0.87% Communication 60 2.48% 
Consumer goods 71 2.93% Personal services 8 0.33% 
Apparel 23 0.95% Business services 101 4.17% 
Healthcare 30 1.24% Computers 79 3.26% 
Medical equipment 34 1.40% Electronic equipment 92 3.80% 
Pharmaceutical products 73 3.02% Measuring and control equipment 13 0.54% 
Chemicals 76 3.14% Business supplies 60 2.48% 
Rubber and Plastic products 0 0.00% Shipping containers 9 0.37% 
Textiles 7 0.29% Transportation 63 2.60% 
Construction materials 31 1.28% Wholesale 100 4.13% 
Construction 57 2.35% Retail 260 10.74% 
Steel works 32 1.32% Restaurants, hotels, motels 44 1.82% 
Fabricated products 0 0.00% Banking 152 6.28% 
Machinery 87 3.59% Insurance 142 5.87% 
Electrical equipment 27 1.12% Real estate 0 0.00% 
Automobiles and trucks 57 2.35% Trading 36 1.49% 
Aircraft 34 1.40% Other 28 1.16% 
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Panel C: Univariate comparisons of giving and non-giving firms 
 Contribution = 0 Contribution > 0 Difference  
p-value of 
difference 
 Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.    
CEO attributes        
CEO charity connection 0.565 0.496 0.815 0.388 -0.250 *** 0.000 
Ownership (%) 2.179 4.03 1.471 3.67 0.708 *** 0.000 
Tenure (years) 17.293 11.99 18.524 11.97 -1.231 ** 0.013 
Outside appointment 0.231 0.42 0.204 0.40 0.027 0.120 
Governance variables       
Board size 10.673 2.57 11.651 2.53 -0.978 *** 0.000 
Independent board 0.545 0.50 0.596 0.49 -0.051 ** 0.013 
Director ownership (%) 1.070 4.97 0.577 3.33 0.493 *** 0.007 
CEO-chairman duality 0.857 0.35 0.884 0.32 -0.027 * 0.053 
E-index 1.580 1.11 1.572 1.13 0.008 0.868 
Profit maximizing variables       
Ad-to-sales 0.010 0.02 0.014 0.03 -0.004 *** 0.000 
R&D-to-sales 0.018 0.04 0.022 0.05 -0.004 * 0.062 
Assets (log) 9.084 1.15 9.754 1.36 -0.670 *** 0.000 
Number of employees (log) 3.133 0.98 3.610 1.09 -0.477 *** 0.000 
Number of shareholders (log) 2.804 1.58 3.525 1.52 -0.721 *** 0.000 
Marginal tax rate 0.329 0.06 0.335 0.06 -0.006 ** 0.013 
Firm characteristics       
Leverage 0.185 0.14 0.180 0.14 0.005 0.442 
ROA 0.133 0.07 0.136 0.08 -0.003 0.288 
Tobin’s q 1.816 1.06 1.961 1.39 -0.145 *** 0.004 
Free cash flow indicator 0.840 0.37 0.879 0.33 -0.039 *** 0.008 
Number of observations 987 1434    
% of observations 40.77% 59.23%    
 
Cohen-Ferrell (2009) E-index. In addition, directors together hold 0.78% stock ownership of a 
typical sample company. 
Turning to firm attributes, the average sample company has approximately 29,500 
employees, 24,000 shareholders, $13.11 billion of assets, and an average marginal tax rate of 
33%. Moreover, it annually spends 1.2% and 2.0% of sales on advertising and R&D expenses, 
respectively. These statistics are similar to those documented in Brown, Helland and Smith 
(2006). Moreover, the average company has a leverage ratio of 18.2%, an ROA of 13.5% and a 
Tobin’s q of 1.9, while approximately 14% of the free cash flow observations in the sample are 
negative. Panel B of Table 1.1 shows the distribution of firms across the Fama-French 48 industry 
classification scheme. We find that Fortune 500 firms are clustered across retail (10.7%), utilities 
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(9.3%), banking (6.3%), insurance (5.9%), oil (4.3%), business services (4.2%), and wholesale 
industries (4.1%). 
Panel C of Table 1.1 presents univariate comparisons between giving and non-giving 
firms. Giving firms, which represent 59.2% of the sample, have greater visibility when measured 
by asset size and the number of employees or shareholders. In addition, these firms spend a 
greater fraction of their sales on advertising and R&D expenses. These results are consistent with 
the profit maximization theory. On the other hand, a significantly greater percentage of CEOs in 
giving firms have preferences for charitable contributions as measured by CEO charity 
connections. These CEOs have lower (stock and option) ownership, are less likely to be recruited 
from outside the firm, and are more likely to be board chairmen. These firms are also 
characterized by larger boards (although slightly more independent), lower ownership of 
directors, and higher Graham and Mills (2008) measure of marginal corporate tax rates. 
Moreover, a greater percentage of these firms have positive free cash flows. These facts are 
consistent with the agency cost theory and suggest potential governance or agency problems in 
giving firms. 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1.  Determinants of corporate giving 
This section evaluates the profit maximization and agency cost theories of corporate 
giving by focusing on firm-level data. We estimate the following regression: 
Corporate givingi,t+1 = α + β.(profit motives i,t) + γ. (CEO attributes i,t) + δ.(governance i,t) + ζ.Xi,t 
+ yt + εi,t,                  (1) 
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where profit motives, CEO attributes, and governance are as described in the previous section.17 
The subscripts i and t refer to firm and year, respectively. The vector X includes firm level 
characteristics while yt denotes the year fixed effects. 
We report the results of logit and tobit specifications to assess the likelihood and the 
amount of corporate giving, respectively. To standardize giving data across firms, we follow 
Navarro (1988) and divide corporate giving by company sales. We then take the natural logarithm 
of one plus scaled corporate giving to address the right skewness of giving data. Since giving is a 
small fraction of sales, we also multiply the logarithmic function by 103. Therefore, the dependent 
variable in the tobit specification is log(1 + corporate giving / sales) x 103, which we designate as 
the giving ratio. For the tobit models, this corporate giving ratio is (left) censored at zero. 
Panels A and B of Table 1.2 present the results of the logit and tobit regressions, 
respectively. The first two models of each panel test the profit maximization and agency theories 
separately, while the third model jointly investigates which theory is more descriptive of the data. 
In the last column of both panels, the marginal effects of logit and tobit regressions are presented 
based on model 3. We find that the likelihood and the amount of corporate giving decline with 
more shareholder aligned CEOs and increase with a CEO’s personal preference for a particular 
charity. Specifically, a 10% increase in CEO ownership from its sample mean reduces the 
likelihood of giving by 40% and the giving ratio (conditional on being positive) by 3%, whereas 
CEO charity connection increases them by 21.5% and 1.5%, respectively.18 Other CEO attributes, 
i.e., tenure and outside appointment, do not have significant explanatory power to explain the 
likelihood or the amount of corporate giving with sufficient statistical significance. 
 
                                                          
17For profit motives, we consider two additional variables. Since Compustat has missing data for advertising and R&D 
expenses, we define two indicator variables, i.e., ad indicator and R&D indicator, that take the value of zero if the data 
is missing and one otherwise (Flannery and Rangan, 2006). 
18The coefficient estimates of CEO ownership and CEO ownership2 have opposite signs, implying a diminishing 
marginal effect of CEO ownership on corporate giving. We calculate that the sign changes at about 14.07% ownership 
level. 
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Table 1.2 
Corporate giving decisions 
The sample considers corporate giving of Fortune 500 firms during 1996 to 2006. We use logit and tobit regressions to 
explain firm’s likelihood and amount of giving, respectively. All regressions are estimated with an intercept term. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance based on two sides 
tests at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Variable definitions are in Appendix 1.C. 
Panel A: Logit models of corporate giving 
 Dependent variable: Corporate giving = 1 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Estimates p-value Estimates p-value Estimates p-value dy/dx 
CEO attributes        
CEO charity connection   1.031*** 0.000 0.890*** 0.000 0.215 
CEO ownership (%)   -0.240*** 0.000 -0.170*** 0.003 -0.040 
CEO ownership2   0.008*** 0.000 0.006*** 0.004 0.001 
Tenure (years)   0.006 0.419 0.003 0.668 0.001 
Outside appointment   0.159 0.450 0.133 0.536 0.031 
Governance        
Board size   0.060 0.105 0.001 0.982 0.000 
Independent board indicator   0.034 0.804 -0.004 0.979 -0.001 
Director ownership (%)   -0.029 0.248 -0.018 0.427 -0.004 
CEO-chairman duality   -0.020 0.915 -0.176 0.364 -0.041 
E-index   0.036 0.632 0.126 0.110 0.030 
Profit maximizing variables        
Ad-to-sales 3.224 0.443   2.948 0.489 0.699 
Ad indicator -0.190 0.383   -0.155 0.483 -0.037 
R&D-to-sales 0.760 0.746   0.827 0.733 0.196 
R&D indicator 0.158 0.490   0.061 0.793 0.015 
Assets (log) 0.269** 0.032   0.200 0.129 0.047 
Number of employees (log) 0.284** 0.013   0.282** 0.016 0.067 
Number of shareholders (log) 0.134** 0.038   0.060 0.358 0.014 
Marginal tax rate 0.596 0.505   0.668 0.478 0.158 
Firm characteristics        
Leverage 0.597 0.398 0.560 0.410 0.647 0.378 0.153 
ROA 1.386 0.344 0.460 0.751 1.101 0.448 0.261 
Tobin’s q 0.083 0.298 0.149* 0.085 0.120 0.155 0.028 
Free cash flow indicator 0.126 0.483 0.121 0.510 0.082 0.655 0.020 
Asset/employee 0.000 0.675 0.000 0.582 0.000 0.752 0.000 
Industries        
Financial 0.504 0.210 0.642* 0.074 0.658 0.113 0.145 
Regulated -0.066 0.858 -0.304 0.293 -0.129 0.731 -0.031 
Pharmaceuticals -0.151 0.774 -0.244 0.599 -0.378 0.482 -0.092 
Retail 0.217 0.437 0.232 0.334 0.275 0.320 0.064 
Sin 0.798 0.313 0.651 0.419 0.672 0.427 0.144 
Non-environmentally-
friendly 0.419 0.233 0.150 0.654 0.314 0.390 0.072 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -1466.435 -1449.097 -1406.175 
Pseudo R2 0.104 0.111 0.137 
Observations 2421 2413 2413 
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Panel B: Tobit models of corporate giving 
 Dependent variable: Corporate giving ratio = log(1 + corporate giving / sales) x 
103 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
 Estimates p-value Estimates p-value Estimates p-value dy/dx 
CEO attributes        
CEO charity connection   1.022*** 0.000 0.881*** 0.000 0.015 
CEO ownership (%)   -0.265*** 0.000 -0.197*** 0.000 -0.003 
CEO ownership2   0.009*** 0.000 0.007*** 0.000 0.000 
Tenure (years)   0.002 0.786 0.001 0.905 0.000 
Outside appointment   -0.095 0.666 -0.133 0.557 -0.002 
Governance        
Board size   0.048 0.144 0.013 0.724 0.000 
Independent board indicator   0.065 0.623 -0.001 0.993 0.000 
Director ownership (%)   -0.034 0.185 -0.023 0.303 0.000 
CEO-chairman duality   0.194 0.292 0.032 0.854 0.001 
E-index   0.075 0.391 0.165* 0.073 0.003 
Profit maximizing variables        
Ad-to-sales 0.410 0.922   0.390 0.921 0.006 
Ad indicator 0.028 0.901   0.065 0.763 0.001 
R&D-to-sales 5.881* 0.053   6.045** 0.044 0.100 
R&D indicator 0.152 0.593   0.044 0.869 0.001 
Assets (log) 0.189* 0.087   0.117 0.296 0.002 
Number of employees (log) 0.089 0.356   0.087 0.367 0.001 
Number of shareholders (log) 0.177** 0.011   0.099* 0.097 0.002 
Marginal tax rate 0.120 0.888   0.085 0.915 0.001 
Firm characteristics        
Leverage 0.838 0.208 0.575 0.319 0.902 0.167 0.015 
ROA 2.201 0.114 0.674 0.631 1.777 0.186 0.029 
Tobin’s q 0.164 0.147 0.289** 0.014 0.204* 0.073 0.003 
Free cash flow indicator 0.168 0.364 0.076 0.685 0.135 0.449 0.002 
Asset/employee 0.000 0.752 0.000 0.918 0.000 0.574 0.000 
Industries        
Financial 1.028** 0.024 0.932*** 0.006 1.133** 0.014 0.019 
Regulated 0.066 0.842 -0.124 0.593 0.030 0.926 0.000 
Pharmaceuticals 1.847* 0.057 2.182** 0.035 1.641* 0.082 0.027 
Retail 0.358 0.265 0.291 0.301 0.418 0.211 0.007 
Sin 0.557 0.258 0.372 0.431 0.516 0.328 0.009 
Non-environmentally-
friendly 0.298 0.289 0.071 0.772 0.207 0.449 0.003 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -3786.802 -3757.987 -3734.286 
Observations 2421 2413 2413 
Left censored observations 987 980 980 
 
In contrast to previous studies (Navarro, 1988; Brown, Helland, and Smith, 2006), we 
find that the ad-to-sales ratio, one of the main variables associated with the profit maximization 
hypothesis, is insignificant. This variable is only significant in models where robust standard 
errors are not clustered at the firm level.19 We also find that firms in sin and non-environmentally-
                                                          
19The result suggests a strong time-varying firm effect, which may be due to the sample construction. In contrast to 
previous studies, this study is based on NDCG database and considers more firms and a wider time range. Moreover, it 
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friendly industries do not give more, which is evidence that does not support the prediction that 
firms in the out-of-favor industry gives more (Bernea, Heinkel, and Kraus, 2008). However, there 
is some evidence consistent with the value maximization hypothesis. For example, firms that are 
relatively visible (Benabou and Tirole, 2010), invest more in R&D (Brown, Helland and Smith, 
2006), and firms in financial and pharmaceutical industries are associated with more giving. 
However, these results are not robust as the statistical significance of these variables is not stable 
across different regression specifications in Panels A and B of Table 1.2. Lastly, consistent with 
the profit maximization theory, we find that the coefficient of the marginal tax rate is 
insignificant. 
Governance variables have little success in explaining the likelihood and the amount of 
corporate giving. Only the E-index is found to increase the giving ratio statistically. However, its 
economic effect is much lower than that of CEO charity connection. Finally, most firm level 
control variables (except Tobin’s q) do not predict corporate giving successfully. 
 
4.1.1.  A natural experiment 
A common critique of the above finding is that CEO attributes, especially ownership, are 
endogenously determined. In this section, we address this issue using a natural experiment. We 
use the 2003 dividend tax cut, which reduced the tax rates on the dividend income of individuals. 
Specifically, the dividend tax rate was reduced from the highest rate of 35% to 15% (Chetty and 
Saez, 2005). Since a manager’s choice of private benefits is positively affected by the individual 
income tax and negatively to her share ownership in the firm, the Tax Reform Act increased the 
cost of pursuing private benefits, especially for managers with high ownership in the firm.20 
                                                                                                                                                                             
considers total contributions while previous studies (e.g., Brown, Helland, and Smith, 2006) consider cash 
contributions. 
20Consider that a manager has the following value function. 𝑉 ≡ 𝜆(1 − 𝑒)(1 − 𝜏𝑐)(1 − 𝜏𝑑) + 𝛼𝑒 − 𝛾𝑒2 2� , where λ is 
her fractional ownership, e is discretionary expenses, τc is corporate income tax, τd is individual income tax, 𝛼 ∈ [0,1] 
is a manager’s fraction of gains from discretionary expenses, and γ ∈ [0,1] is the quality of governance. Solving this 
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Table 1.3 
A natural experiment using the 2003 individual dividend tax cut 
The sample considers corporate giving of Fortune 500 firms during 1996-2002 and 2004-2006. It excludes year 2003 
corporate giving data as the tax reform was officially signed into law at the end of May 2003. Regressions include all 
independent variables of Table 1.2, an intercept term and year fixed effects, all of which are suppressed for brevity. 
Post2003 takes the value of 1 for the year 2003 and onwards (2003 being the dividend tax cut year) and 0 otherwise. 
Post2002 is similarly defined. Panel B considers firms with CEO charity connections (model 1) and firms with higher 
than sample mean dividend distributions (model 2). Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, ** and * 
denote statistical significance based on two sides tests at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Variable definitions 
are in Appendix 1.C. 
Panel A: CEO ownership 
 Dependent variable: Corporate giving ratio = log(1+corporate giving/sales) x 
103 
 2003 dividend tax cut Placebo 
 Estimates p-value dy/dx Estimates p-value dy/dx 
Post2003 -0.081 0.618 -0.001    
Post2002    -0.093 0.619 -0.001 
CEO ownership (%) x Post2003 -0.088** 0.034 -0.001    
CEO ownership (%) x Post2002    -0.050 0.308 -0.001 
CEO ownership (%) -0.154** 0.012 -0.002 -0.158** 0.030 -0.002 
CEO ownership2 0.006*** 0.003 0.000 0.006*** 0.006 0.000 
Log likelihood -3255.186  -3256.271 
Observations 2067  2067 
Left censored observations 833  833 
 
Panel B: Dividend payouts and CEO charity connections 
 Dependent variable: Corporate giving ratio = log(1+corporate giving/sales) x 
103 
 CEO charity connections (1) Dividend payouts (2) 
 Estimates p-value dy/dx Estimates p-value dy/dx 
Post2003 -0.053 0.769 -0.001  0.086 0.852  0.000 
CEO ownership (%) x Post2003 -0.035 0.348 -0.001 -1.217** 0.035 -0.011 
CEO ownership (%) -0.138** 0.035 -0.003  1.212 0.112  0.011 
CEO ownership2  0.005*** 0.011   0.000 -0.217 0.145 -0.002 
Log likelihood -2443.155 -996.600 
Observations 1475 491 
Left censored observations 466 141 
 
In Panel A of Table 1.3, we compare corporate charitable contributions before and after 
2003 as a function of CEO ownership. The main variable of interest is CEO ownership x post2003, 
where post2003 is the post-tax reform variable. We include post2003 as a separate variable in 
addition to year fixed effects.21 Consistent with the implication of this tax reform, we find that 
corporate giving declines after 2003, and this effect is stronger as CEO ownership increases. This 
                                                                                                                                                                             
function w.r.t. e gives 𝑒∗ = [𝛼 − 𝜆(1 − 𝜏𝑐)(1 − 𝜏𝑑)] 𝛾⁄ . Therefore, we obtain 𝜕𝑒∗ 𝜕𝜏𝑑� = 𝜆(1 − 𝜏𝑐) 𝛾� > 0, and 
𝜕2𝑒∗
𝜕𝜏𝑑𝜕𝜆
� = (1 − 𝜏𝑐) 𝛾� > 0. 
21Results are similar when we consider the experiment without year fixed effects. 
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is an economically important effect where the impact of CEO ownership on corporate giving 
increases by 50% after 2003. In model 2, we repeat the analysis with a placebo period where the 
event year is assumed to be 2002 rather than 2003. The insignificant coefficient of CEO 
ownership x post2002 reinforces the result from model 1. In both models, the coefficient of the 
post2003 or post2002 is negative, although not statistically significant. 
A possible concern with the natural experiment is that our results may be due to 
confounding macroeconomic effects occurring contemporaneously with the 2003 Tax Reform 
Act. To address this concern, we conduct an analysis of two subsamples where tax effects are 
predicted to be stronger or weaker and not differentially affected by concurrent economy-wide 
changes. So, we should expect an estimate of CEO ownership x post2003 that is similar to the 
estimate in the whole sample under the cynical view, but a different estimate if the Tax Reform 
Act has had a distinct impact on corporate giving. 
Specifically, in Panel B we test the incremental effect of ownership after the Tax Reform 
Act in subsamples of firms with CEO charity connections or with high dollar dividend payouts. 
The 2003 Tax Reform Act would have a less pronounced impact on corporate charitable 
contributions if the marginal benefits of corporate giving for CEOs with charity connections 
continue to exceed the cost of their private benefits. On the other hand, the effect of the Tax 
Reform Act should be more pronounced for firms that pay large dividends. Consistent with the 
predictions, model 1 shows that the coefficient of CEO ownership x post2003 is not statistically 
significant, suggesting that the incremental effect of ownership after the individual dividend tax 
cut is less pronounced for CEOs who have preferences for charity.  
For firms that distribute dividends that exceed the sample average, we document in model 
2 a large negative coefficient of CEO ownership x post2003, which is also statistically significant. 
This result indicates that the main effect of CEO ownership after the Tax Reform Act is driven by 
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large dividend-paying firms, as these firms are more likely to realize the benefits of the Tax 
Reform Act by substituting more dividends in place of corporate giving. 
 
4.1.2. Subsample analyses 
In this subsection, we consider subsamples of firms based on whether they are prone to 
governance problems or are likely to benefit from corporate giving to measure the incremental 
effect of CEO incentives or profit motives, respectively. 
First, we consider subsamples of firms with stronger or weaker governance structures 
based on managerial entrenchment (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009) and board independence 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). This analysis predicts more (less) severe agency problems 
associated with corporate giving in samples of firms where shareholder rights are at risk (upheld). 
Panel A of Table 1.4 presents the results. In the first model, which considers firms with three or 
more antitakeover defenses, we find a more pronounced positive effect of CEO charity 
connection and a muted (positive, but statistically insignificant) effect of CEO ownership. 
Moreover, corporate giving in this sample increases with the E-index and decreases with director 
ownership. In contrast, for firms with fewer than three antitakeover defenses, the effects of CEO 
charity connection and CEO ownership are similar in magnitude to the earlier results in model 3 
of Panel B, Table 1.2. The third and fourth regression models in Panel A examine the subsample 
of firms without and with independent boards respectively. Results based on this governance 
criterion are similar to those based on the E-index. Taken together, subsample analysis suggests 
that agency problems of corporate giving are a broad based problem, but are more serious in 
poorly governed firms. 
Second, in Panel B of Table 1.4 we consider firm observations with non-missing data on 
advertising and R&D expenses as these firms are thought to benefit most from corporate giving. 
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The marginal effects of CEO charity connection and CEO ownership are 1.6% (p-value = 0.004) 
and 0.26% (p-value = 0.071), which are similar to their estimates considering the whole sample.  
Table 1.4 
Subsample analyses based on firm governance and profit motives 
The sample considers corporate giving of Fortune 500 firms during 1996 to 2006. Regressions include all independent 
variables of Table 1.2, an intercept term and year fixed effects, all of which are suppressed for brevity. Robust standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance based on two sides tests at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. Variable definitions are in Appendix 1.C. 
Panel A: Subsamples based on managerial entrenchment and board independence 
 Dependent variable: Corporate giving ratio = log(1 + corporate giving / sales) x 103 
 E-index ≥ 3 E-index < 3 Board 
independence = 0 
Board independence 
= 1 
 Estimates p-value Estimates p-value Estimates p-value Estimates p-value 
CEO attributes         
CEO charity connection 1.279** 0.016 0.756*** 0.000 1.052*** 0.000 0.648*** 0.006 
CEO ownership (%) 0.052 0.823 -0.181*** 0.000 -0.103* 0.057 -0.277*** 0.009 
CEO ownership2 -0.023*** 0.256 0.006*** 0.000 0.004** 0.015 0.006 0.163 
Tenure (years) 0.017*** 0.539 0.000 0.981 -0.007 0.491 0.004 0.754 
Outside appointment 0.251* 0.610 -0.062 0.769 -0.272 0.322 -0.086 0.761 
Governance         
Board size 0.065 0.550 -0.004 0.917 0.047 0.337 -0.019 0.679 
Independent board 
indicator 0.573 0.199 -0.165 0.225     
Director ownership (%) -0.049* 0.096 -0.020 0.399 -0.010 0.745 -0.027 0.269 
CEO-chairman duality 0.382 0.591 -0.026 0.876 -0.067 0.752 0.179 0.465 
E-index 0.682* 0.091 0.108 0.221 0.054 0.558 0.249* 0.066 
Log likelihood -910.981 -2718.026 -1429.520 -2260.879 
Observations 535 1878 1024 1389 
Left censored obs. 213 767 446 534 
Panel B: Subsample of firms with positive advertising and R&D expenses 
 Dependent variable: Corporate giving ratio = log(1 + corporate giving / sales) x 
103 
 Advertising and R&D expenses > 0 
 Estimates p-value 
CEO attributes   
CEO charity connection 1.867*** 0.009 
CEO ownership (%) -0.308 0.108 
CEO ownership2 0.009 0.146 
Tenure (years) -0.045 0.198 
Outside appointment -0.986 0.219 
Governance   
Board size -0.271 0.113 
Independent board indicator 0.176 0.718 
Director ownership (%) 0.030 0.757 
CEO-chairman duality 0.018 0.977 
E-index -0.089 0.732 
Profit maximizing variables   
Ad-to-sales -6.312 0.419 
R&D-to-sales 6.346* 0.090 
Assets (log) -0.149 0.723 
Number of employees (log) 0.970** 0.049 
Number of shareholders (log) 0.021 0.912 
Marginal tax rate 0.013 0.997 
Log likelihood -741.658 
Observations 386 
Left censored observations 123 
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In addition, we find that ad-to-sales and R&D-to-sales ratios, the two main variables of the value 
maximization theory, are statistically insignificant. These results cast further doubt on the claim 
that corporate giving is positively related to firm profit maximization or equivalently shareholder 
wealth creation. 
Overall, the results of Table 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 are more consistent with the hypothesis that 
corporate giving is a manifestation of agency problem and are inconsistent with corporate giving 
being motivated by firm value maximization. 
 
4.2.  Corporate giving and financial performance 
4.2.1. Equity value of corporate cash holdings 
To measure the impact of corporate giving on firm value through its impact on cash 
holding, we build our analysis on Faulkender and Wang (2006). They regress yearly excess stock 
returns, ri,t - RBi,t, on changes in firm’s cash holdings, ∆Cit , and other control variables and 
designate the coefficient of changes in cash as a measure of the value investors place on an 
additional dollar of liquid assets. Faulkender and Wang (2006) find that the marginal value of 
cash declines with larger cash holdings, higher leverage, better access to capital markets and a 
firm’s preference for cash dividends over stock repurchases. We augment their model with a 
measure corporate giving. Specifically, we estimate the following regression: 
ri,t - RBi,t= α + β.(corporate giving ratioi,t) + γ.(∆Cit/Mi,t-1 x corporate giving ratioi,t) + 
δ.(∆Cit/Mi,t-1) + θ'.Xi,t + εi,t.                  (2) 
The dependent variable in equation (2) is firm i's excess stock return over fiscal year t. As in 
Faulkender and Wang (2006), we calculate excess returns by deducting the Fama-French size and 
book-to-market portfolio returns (RBi,t) from the firm’s raw stock returns (ri,t). As an alternative 
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measure, we also calculate excess returns by subtracting the portfolio returns for the firm’s Fama-
French 48 industry (RIndi,t) from the raw stock returns. 22 
The explanatory variables are corporate giving ratio which is defined as log(1 + 
corporate giving / sales) x 103, ∆Ci,t which represents the changes in cash from year t-1 to t, and 
Mi,t-1 which is the l-year lagged market value of equity. Consistent with Faulkender and Wang 
(2006), the vector X includes changes in earnings (∆Et), changes in net assets (∆NAt), changes in 
R&D (∆RDt), changes in dividend (∆Dt), changes in interest (∆It), 1-year lagged cash holdings 
(Ct-1), leverage (Lt), and net equity and debt financing (NFt). All of these latter variables except 
leverage are scaled by Mi,t-1. Vector X also includes interactions of changes in cash with cash 
holding and leverage. The main coefficient of interest in (2) is γ, which is expected to be negative 
if corporate giving entails inefficient use of cash and offers managers an opportunity to extract 
greater rents. 
Panels A and B of Table 1.5 present summary statistics and regression results, 
respectively. Summary statistics are based on the Fortune 500 firms for which data is available in 
Compustat and CRSP. Because the sample focuses on larger firms, the summary statistics in 
Panel A are somewhat different from those of Faulkender and Wang (2006). For example, in this 
sample the change in cash divided by market value of equity at the beginning of fiscal year has a 
mean (median) of 2.8% (0.6%), whereas in Faulkender and Wang (2006), it has mean (median) of 
0.4% (-0.01%). 
Panel B presents regression results, which are based on two alternate formulations of 
excess returns. Model 1 defines excess returns by subtracting the Fama-French size and book-to-
market portfolio returns from firm raw stock returns, whereas model 2 defines excess returns by 
deducting the Fama-French 48 industry portfolio returns from the firm’s raw returns. Examining  
                                                          
22We consider the universe of Fortune 500 firms to calculate average industry returns based on the argument that they 
constitute the sample of closest comparables. Later in robustness tests, we also consider the universe of firms listed in 
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ exchanges. These results are very similar. 
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Table 1.5 
Equity value of cash holdings and corporate giving 
The sample considers corporate giving of Fortune 500 firms during 1996 to 2006. All variables except leverage are 
scaled by 1-year lagged market value of equity, Mt-1. The regression specifications, including variable constructions, 
follow along the lines of Faulkender and Wang (2006). Corporate giving ratio is equal to log(corporate giving / sale) x 
103. Regressions in Panel B controls for Fama-French 48 industry and year fixed effects, and are estimated with an 
intercept term. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance based 
on two sides tests at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Variable definitions are in Appendix 1.C. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variable 10th 25th Mean Median 75th 90th 
r – RB -0.609 -0.356 -0.121 -0.122 0.075 0.298 
r - RInd -0.336 -0.172 -0.014 -0.027 0.117 0.295 
∆C t -0.051 -0.010 0.028 0.006 0.038 0.108 
Ct-1 0.008 0.022 0.226 0.061 0.155 0.417 
∆E t   -0.055 -0.009 0.012 0.009 0.030 0.080 
∆NA t -0.143 -0.007 0.156 0.047 0.180 0.567 
∆RD t   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 
∆I t -0.007 -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.010 
∆D t 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.005 
Lt 0.026 0.072 0.186 0.154 0.274 0.377 
NFt -0.100 -0.043 0.015 -0.007 0.034 0.143 
Panel B: OLS with industry and year fixed effects 
Dependent variable (model): r - RB 
(1) 
r – RInd 
(2) 
 Estimates p-value Estimates p-value 
Corporate giving ratiot  x 
∆C t 
-0.197 0.021** -0.199 0.007*** 
Corporate giving ratiot 0.006 0.205 0.005 0.068* 
Ct-1 x ∆C t -0.153 0.001*** -0.128 0.000*** 
Lt x ∆C t -0.018 0.961 -0.125 0.720 
∆C t 0.797 0.000*** 0.690 0.001*** 
∆E t 0.654 0.000*** 0.522 0.000*** 
∆NA t 0.027 0.170 0.028 0.103 
∆RD t -0.092 0.961 0.799 0.644 
∆I t  -1.450 0.035** -1.126 0.073* 
∆D t 1.410 0.285 0.472 0.688 
Ct-1 0.068 0.028** 0.038 0.178 
Lt -0.115 0.125 -0.065 0.351 
NFt -0.219 0.004*** -0.208 0.003*** 
Adjusted R2 30.66% 8.14% 
Observations 2671 2671 
 
Panel B, the coefficient of the corporate giving interacted with the change in cash is negative and 
highly statistically significant in both specifications of the firm’s excess stock returns. The 
relation is also economically important. For example, in model 1 the equity value of cash is 
approximately 8.1 cents lower if a firm changes its total giving from the sample median to the 
75th percentile level. Untabulated analysis shows that the impact of corporate giving on firm value 
more than doubles, from -$0.081 to -$0.199, for a sample of firms with non-independent boards 
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where board oversight is expected to be weaker. These results suggest that managers extract 
private benefits from corporate cash holdings when firms make charitable contributions. Because 
investors perceive such benefits negatively, they place a lower value on each extra dollar of cash 
the company holds. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that corporate giving reduces a 
firm’s financial performance. Other explanatory variables in Panel B have similar signs and 
explanatory power to those documented in Faulkender and Wang (2006). 
In the above analysis, corporate giving is set equal to zero if firms do not disclose direct 
giving voluntarily and do not contribute through their foundations. Doing so may not be 
inappropriate if non-reporting firms contribute negligible amounts or do not contribute at all in 
reality. This is a likely assumption because 1) the NDCG database only contains charitable 
contributions that are verified by the companies themselves or complied from reliable public 
records and 2) contribution recipients are typically tax-exempt institutions that must disclose 
revenue sources in the IRS’s Form 990-PF, which is available for public inspection. 23 
Nevertheless, we perform two robustness tests to validate the earlier findings. First, we assign the 
sample median or average value for the corporate giving ratio whenever it is missing. Results of 
this analysis are similar to the earlier findings. For example, the coefficient of the interaction term 
between corporate giving ratio and ∆Cit/Mi,t-1 is -0.197 (p-value = 0.022) when stock returns are 
adjusted for size and book-to-market portfolio returns (i.e., model 1) and missing corporate giving 
values are replaced with their sample median. Second, since there is substantial uncertainty as to 
whether a firm contributes or not, whenever corporate giving ratio is missing, we exclude these 
observations. In the reduced sample of 1,541 firm-year observations, the results continue to be 
similar to the main analysis. For example, the coefficient of the interaction term is -0.192 (p-value 
                                                          
23When collecting data, we find that firms use direct giving very infrequently. For example, Coca-Cola contributed 
$37.48 million and $7.52 million in 2003 and 2004 respectively, and Microsoft contributed $107.12 million and 
$246.90 million in 1998 and 2002 respectively. For these firms, it is reasonable to assign zero direct giving for the 
other years. 
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= 0.036) for size and book-to-market adjusted stock returns. These additional robustness checks 
also suggest that sample selection issues are less problematic for our firm performance analysis. 
 
4.2.2. Dividends and corporate giving 
In subsection 4.1.1, we find that corporate giving declines after the 2003 Tax Reform 
Act. However, we do not investigate whether subsequent reductions in corporate giving lead to 
increased dividend payments. We perform this analysis in this section. Specifically, we specify a 
dividend regression model similar to Chetty and Saez (2004), except that we add the firm’s 
charitable contributions and its interaction with the post2003 indicator variable. Under an agency 
theoretic view of corporate giving, the interaction term total contributions ($) x post2003 is 
predicted to have a negative coefficient in this specification. 
 
Table 1.6 
Dividends and corporate giving 
The sample focuses on Fortune 500 firms that make charitable contributions in year 2002. Sample years include two 
years around the 2003 Tax Reform Act. All regression variables are in millions of dollars. Regressions are estimated 
with an intercept term. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance 
based on two sides tests at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: Dividends ($) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value 
Post2003 109.057* 0.100 -47.790 0.331 
Total contributions ($) 17.442*** 0.000 10.288*** 0.001 
Total contributions ($) *post2003 -8.930** 0.042 -5.373* 0.072 
After tax earnings ($)   0.154** 0.016 
Total assets ($)   0.002*** 0.002 
Adjust R2 0.238 0.638 
Observations 668 668 
 
By focusing on firms that make charitable contributions in 2002, Table 1.6 shows how 
changes in contributions affect dollar dividends after 2003. Specifically, we find that the 
coefficient of total contributions ($) x post2003 is negative and statistically significant in models 
with and without control variables, consistent with the agency theory prediction. Economically, a 
$1 million reduction in corporate giving after the Tax Reform Act is associated with $5.3 million 
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to $8.9 million increase in dividends. Therefore, our experiments are consistent with the 2003 
dividend tax cut having a significant impact on curbing managerial consumption of private 
benefits and provide support that dividend increases after the 2003Tax Reform Act in part reflect 
a reduction in managerial consumption of private benefits of control. 
Turning to the control variables, we see in regression model 2 that they have signs 
consistent with prior research and are generally statistically significant. Similar to Chetty and 
Saez (2004), we find that the coefficient of post2003 is positive and statistically significant only 
when the regression model excludes the control variables.24  We do find that the coefficients of 
total contributions ($) and its interaction with the post2003 indicator continue to be statistically 
significant. 
 
4.3.  The channels of value destruction 
Thus far the evidence suggests that corporate giving is a manifestation of agency problem 
that is instrumental in reducing firm value. In this section, we examine the specific channels 
through which corporate giving destroys firm value. 
 
4.3.1. CEO-affiliated contributions 
CEO-affiliated contributions refer to the amount of money a firm contributes to nonprofit 
organizations where the CEO is a director, trustee, advisor, or hold some other official position. 
The following analysis requires the names of CEO-affiliated charities and the amount of 
corporate contributions to these charities during the CEO’s tenure in office. The primary data 
sources for CEO affiliated charities are the biographical sections of annual reports, Businessweek 
and Forbes. The main data source for the charity names and levels of corporate giving is the 
Foundation Directory Online database, which is available from 2004. This database tracks all 
                                                          
24Chetty and Saez (2005) argue that high dividend paying firms are extremely concentrated, making the estimate of the 
tax response fragile when control variables are added. 
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donations distributed by firm-sponsored foundations, but includes only limited amount of 
donations distributed to charities by corporations as disclosure is voluntary. Therefore, a caveat of 
this analysis is that the calculated affiliated contribution would underestimate the actual affiliated 
contribution. Because this two-way data matching is labor intensive, we focus on Fortune 100 
CEOs as of 2006.25 
Table 1.7 presents the evidence on CEO affiliated corporate giving. Panel A reports that 
about 82% of CEOs are affiliated with one or more nonprofit organizations while 62% (or 76% 
conditional on a nonprofit affiliation) distribute firm donations to their affiliated organizations, 
indicating that corporate contributions to CEO-affiliated charities are widespread. Panel B 
examines whether such contributions are economically large. We find that the average (total) 
affiliated contribution is $2.5 ($154.4) million during a CEO’s tenure between 2004 and 2010, 
which equals 15.7% (15.7%) of average (total) annual CEO compensation and represents an 
annual cost to the corporation of approximately $675,000. Comparing this result with existing 
studies, we find that such contributions are greater than the combined costs of corporate jet use 
and other perks (see Table 2 in Yermack, 2006) and similar in magnitude to CEO personal 
donations through their family foundations (Yermack, 2009) and CEO cash severance payments 
(Rusticus, 2006).26 In Panel C, we estimate a tobit regression of CEO-affiliated contributions on 
CEO attributes, firm size and industry indicator variables. The analysis indicates more affiliated 
giving in firms where CEO ownership is low or equivalently, where CEO financial interests are 
less aligned with shareholders. The regression results also suggest more CEO-affiliated giving in 
relatively larger firms and firms in the regulated industry. 
                                                          
25To illustrate data collection on affiliated contributions, consider the case of Mr. Miles D. White, the CEO of Abbott 
Laboratories. Mr. White is on the board of trustees at The Field Museum in Chicago, the Museum of Science and 
Industry, the Lyric Opera of Chicago, Joffrey Ballet of Chicago, The Culver Educational Foundation, Art Institute of 
Chicago, and Northwestern University. After indentifying these affiliated nonprofits, we search the Foundation 
Directory Online database to check whether they receive donations from Abbott. We find that all nonprofits except The 
Culver Education Foundation received a total of $15.2 million from 2003 to 2010. 
26Yermack (2009) reports that CEOs and chairmen donate an average of $1.7 million through their family foundations 
over the two and a half year period, whereas Yermack (2006) documents annual perk consumption of $216,000 that 
includes jet use, financial counseling, car transportation, club fees, etc. 
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Table 1.7 
Firm contributions to charities affiliated with CEOs 
CEO-affiliated charities refer to nonprofits where CEOs hold positions of directors, trustees, advisors, etc. Affiliated 
donations indicate firm donations directed to CEO-affiliated charities. Data on CEO-affiliated nonprofits is collected 
from annual reports, Businessweek and Forbes. Data on affiliated donations are extracted from the Foundation 
Directory Online database. The sample considers CEOs of 2006 Fortune 100 firms during their tenure between 2004 
and 2010. Panel C estimates a tobit regression of CEO-affiliated corporate giving on CEO attributes and other control 
variables. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance based on 
two sides tests at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Variable definitions are in Appendix 1.C. 
 
Panel A: CEO affiliations with nonprofit organizations 
 Number Percentage 
Total number of CEOs 105 100.00 
CEOs with affiliated organizations (a) 86 81.90 
CEOs with affiliated donations (b) 65 61.90 
(b)/(a)  75.58 
Panel B: Magnitude of affiliated contributions 
 
Obs. 
Dollar 
value Mean Std 
Affiliated donations ($mil) (a) 63 154.44 2.45 4.55 
Average CEO compensation ($mil) (b) 63 982.53 15.60 6.95 
(a)/(b)   15.72% 15.72%  
Panel C: Regression analysis of CEO affiliated contributions 
 Dependent variable: Affiliated corporate giving 
(‘000) 
 Estimates  p-value 
CEO attributes    
CEO stock ownership -2.702 ** 0.031 
Tenure (years) -21.136  0.347 
Outside appointment -485.513  0.391 
Control variables    
Assets (log) 521.917 * 0.067 
Financial 1240.391  0.111 
Regulated 1259.598 * 0.063 
Pharmaceuticals 1821.895  0.118 
Retail -40.330  0.945 
Sin 277.512  0.693 
Non-environmentally-
friendly 
334.091  0.585 
Log likelihood -1815.437 
Observations 514 
Left censored observations 326 
 
In summary, the evidence on CEO-affiliated contributions documents a new form of rent 
extraction. Earlier studies document rent extraction through, for example, excessive 
compensation (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004), option backdating (Heron and Lie, 2007), and the use 
of a corporate jet (Yermack, 2006). Although CEO-affiliated contributions are economically large 
and managers accrue private benefits from these contributions, which together raise clear 
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conflict-of-interest concerns, currently the SEC does not require firms to disclose this information 
to shareholders. 
 
4.3.2. Charity awards 
As a part of its proxy reform rules on compensation, the SEC mandated that public firms 
disclose the names of executives and directors associated with charitable awards or legacy 
programs beginning in October 1992. We use the data generated by this reporting change to study 
how shareholders reacted to charity awards. If shareholders believe that firms can attract desirable 
executives and board members who are instrumental in safeguarding their interests, we would 
expect stock price to react positively. Alternatively, if shareholders perceive that charity awards 
are symptomatic of waste and entrenched boards, we would expect a negative stock price 
performance when firms report charity awards in proxy statements for the first time after 1992. 
Since the SEC’s EDGAR web site reports proxy statements from 1994, we rely on 
microfiche files stored at Vanderbilt University for the year 1993 to gather data on proxy filing 
dates. In our sample of Fortune 500 firms, 53 firms disclose charity awards for at least one 
director during 1993 – 2010. We focus on these companies to study the stock price reactions 
when a charity award is first disclosed to shareholders.27 
Abnormal stock returns are presented in Figure 1.2 and Table 1.8. We use a firm’s proxy 
filing date as the event day. If a firm files a preliminary proxy statement before the final filing, 
then the preliminary statement filing date is used (Yermack, 2006). Firm-level abnormal returns 
are calculated using standard event-study methodology with a Fama-French-Carhart four factor 
model. Figure 1.2 presents average CARs for the ten trading days (or two weeks) prior to the 
                                                          
27Research on executive compensation and managerial rent extraction frequently scrutinize proxy statement disclosures 
for questionable items. For example, Fich and Shivdasani (2005) study stock option plans of outside directors, Wei and 
Yermack (2011) analyze CEO inside debt, and Yermack (2006) examines CEO personal use of corporate jets. Yermack 
(2006) also finds that proxy statement release dates on average lead to a weakly positive rise in share price, probably 
because managers strategically disclose favorable news in these documents. 
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event day through to ten trading days after the event. The abnormal returns for the sample are 
distributed around zero up to the proxy filing date and then begin to trend downward.28 The mean 
  
 
Figure 1.2: Stock market reactions to charity awards 
Cumulative average abnormal returns for the first disclosure of charity awards. The sample consists of 53 
firms whose proxy statements are investigated during 1993 – 2010. Abnormal returns are calculated using 
the Fama-French-Carhart four factor model. 
 
CAR over [+1, +3] window period, as shown in Panel A of Table 1.8, is -0.87% and is 
statistically significant with a p-value of 0.014. In untabulated analysis, we exclude nine firms 
that made other major news announcements over [-4, +4] window period and find a three day 
CAR of -1.11% (p-value = 0.003).29 These results indicate that shareholders react negatively to 
insider-affiliated giving. The economic loss far exceeds the value of charitable award programs 
and is likely to indicate the market’s revised assessment of the quality of a firm’s governance 
(particularly, board effectiveness). 
In Panel B of Table 1.8, we present regression analysis of stock price reactions to charity 
awards as a function of CEO ownership and a firm’s classified board status. We document a 
                                                          
28Yermack (2009) also documents price declines on event day one when investigating shareholder stock returns around 
the dates of executive stock gifts. 
29Major news includes new director appointment, elimination of classified board and cumulative voting, debt issuance, 
tender offer, introduction of two stock classes, downward earnings revision by analysts, quarterly loss, and sale of a 
portion of the business. 
-1.00%
-0.80%
-0.60%
-0.40%
-0.20%
0.00%
0.20%
0.40%
0.60%
-10 -5 0 5 10
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
A
ve
ra
ge
 A
bn
or
m
al
 R
et
ur
n 
Event Days Relative to Proxy Filing date 
36 
 
statistically significant negative estimate for the CEO ownership variable, indicating that negative 
reactions to charity awards are mitigated if CEO interests are relatively more aligned with 
shareholder interests. 
 
Table 1.8 
Stock price reactions at the first disclosure of charity awards 
Panel A presents mean cumulative abnormal returns of 53 firms that disclose charity awards for the first time during 
1993 – 2010. Abnormal returns are calculated using standard event-study methodology with a Fama-French-Carhart 
four factor model. The event date zero is the firm’s proxy filing date with the SEC. Panel B shows regression analysis 
of firm-level CARs as a function of an intercept, CEO ownership and a firm’s classified board status.  
Panel A: Event study results 
Event window Observations Mean CAR t-Statistic p-Value 
[1, 3] 53 -0.869% -2.466 0.014 
Panel B: OLS regression analysis with CARs 
 Estimate p-value 
CEO ownership -0.971** 0.044 
Classified board -0.005 0.604 
Adjusted-R2 4.55% 
Observations 53 
 
4.3.3. Donations to charities versus donations to company-sponsored foundations 
Firms can contribute to charities or alternatively transfer donations to their sponsored 
foundations. In both cases, firms are not required by the SEC, state or federal laws to disclose 
giving information (Kahn, 1997). However, foundations are obligated to report to the IRS all data 
regarding their activities annually on Form 990-PF, which is available for public scrutiny. Thus, 
databases (Foundation Directory online and NDCG) on foundation giving contain complete 
information on contributions transferred to foundations. Data on individual firm’s direct giving is 
from the NDCG directory, since it only reports contributions that are verified by companies 
themselves or compiled from reliable sources. With this data, we examine the intensity of agency 
problems in the two channels of corporate giving. 
Agency problems are likely to be more severe for contributions transferred to foundations 
for several reasons. First, company-sponsored foundations cannot redistribute its assets back to  
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Table 1.9 
Donations transferred to foundations and donations to charities 
The sample considers corporate giving of 2006 Fortune 500 firms during 1996 to 2006. All regressions include an 
intercept term. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance based 
on two sides tests at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Variable definitions are in Appendix 1.C. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent variables: Program giving =  log(1 + prog. cont. / sales) x 103 
Foundation giving =  
log(1 + found. cont. / sales) x 103 
 Estimates p-value dy/dx Estimates p-value dy/dx 
CEO attributes       
CEO charity connection 0.236 0.604 0.001 0.788*** 0.000 0.019 
CEO ownership (%) -0.473*** 0.010 -0.003 -0.136*** 0.007 -0.003 
CEO ownership2 0.015*** 0.005 0.000 0.004*** 0.006 0.000 
Tenure (years) 0.045*** 0.012 0.000 -0.004 0.673 0.000 
Outside appointment 0.960* 0.060 0.006 -0.237 0.293 -0.006 
Governance       
Board size -0.116 0.174 -0.001 0.032 0.314 0.001 
Independent board indicator 0.624* 0.082 0.004 -0.097 0.409 -0.002 
Director ownership (%) 0.067* 0.080 0.000 -0.049* 0.060 -0.001 
CEO-chairman duality 0.970** 0.043 0.006 -0.035 0.821 -0.001 
E-index 0.080 0.631 0.000 0.161* 0.059 0.004 
Profit maximizing variables       
Ad-to-sales 10.857 0.187 0.067 -2.307 0.570 -0.056 
Ad indicator 0.494 0.301 0.003 -0.048 0.803 -0.001 
R&D-to-sales 7.935 0.138 0.049 3.719 0.185 0.090 
R&D indicator -0.472 0.344 -0.003 0.136 0.605 0.003 
Assets (log) 0.581* 0.076 0.004 0.050 0.634 0.001 
Number of employees (log) 0.201 0.372 0.001 0.042 0.627 0.001 
Number of shareholders (log) -0.118 0.332 -0.001 0.114** 0.048 0.003 
Marginal tax rate -0.784 0.720 -0.005 -0.060 0.934 -0.001 
Firm characteristics       
Leverage 0.074 0.960 0.000 0.743 0.231 0.018 
ROA -0.677 0.845 -0.004 1.496 0.239 0.036 
Tobin’s q 0.184 0.354 0.001 0.176* 0.092 0.004 
Free cash flow indicator 0.747 0.106 0.005 0.043 0.801 0.001 
Asset/employee 0.000 0.193 0.000 0.000 0.910 0.000 
Industries       
Financial 0.248 0.789 0.002 1.022** 0.022 0.025 
Regulated 0.683 0.387 0.004 -0.062 0.838 -0.002 
Pharmaceuticals 0.558 0.631 0.003 1.089 0.183 0.027 
Retail -0.805 0.154 -0.005 0.514 0.121 0.012 
Sin -1.171 0.218 -0.007 0.658 0.154 0.016 
Non-environmentally-friendly 0.161 0.824 0.001 0.102 0.696 0.002 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -1109.857 -3196.803 
Observations 2413 2413 
Left censored observations 2151 1129 
 
company or its shareholders, so any foundation donations represent a loss of firm assets for 
uncertain future returns, which can harm shareholders. Second, the economic and accounting 
effects of foundation giving do not occur simultaneously. The economic effect of foundation 
giving takes place when foundations contribute to charities, whereas the accounting effect takes 
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place when firms transfer donations to foundations. This difference offers opportunistic managers 
an opportunity to time the transfer of funds to foundations by managing corporate earnings 
(Petrovits, 2006). Third, monitoring activities in foundations are performed by the representatives 
of sponsoring firms (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Absent residual claimants and external monitoring, 
but with considerable control over foundations (Carter and Werbel, 2002), managers are likely to 
use foundation assets in ways that are not consistent with value maximization, i.e., to benefit their 
preferred charities. Finally, the public may discount the firm’s contributions, given that a firm is 
only indirectly involved in the actual distribution of charitable giving, so the positive publicity 
gains are likely to be small. 
Table 1.9 presents the results of firms participating in direct giving and foundation giving 
where these two forms of giving are separately analyzed in two separate tobit regressions 
following the specification in equation (1). The model 1 estimates show that firms with more 
reputable CEOs (in terms of tenure and outside appointment) and better governance structures 
(independent board indicator and director ownership) are more likely to donate directly to 
charities annually. Moreover, we find that CEO charity interests are not likely to be associated 
with a firm’s choice of direct giving recipients. On the other hand, model 2 reports that in firms 
where CEOs have charity interests and weaker corporate governance exists (director ownership 
and the E-index), management tends to engage in foundation giving. Interestingly, the marginal 
effects of CEO ownership are similar for both direct and foundation giving. Taken together, this 
evidence indicates that transfers of corporate resources to foundations are more prone to agency 
conflicts than publicly disclosed donations to charities. 
 
4.3.4. Corporate giving and CEO compensation 
The evidence uncovered thus far is consistent with managerial rent extraction as a 
motivation for corporate giving. However, this argument may be weakened if firms adjust the 
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compensation contracts of the senior executives benefitting from corporate charitable 
contributions (Fama, 1980). To explore this question, we estimate the following fixed effect 
model of the relation between CEO compensation and corporate giving. 
log(CEO compensationit) = α + β.(corporate giving it) + γ.Xit + fi + yt + εit ,          (3) 
where i and t refer to firm and year, respectively. For the dependent variable, we calculate the 
natural logarithm of CEO compensation (total of salary, bonus, restricted stocks, Black-Scholes 
value of stock options, long-term incentives, etc.) to reduce the right skewness in the variable. 
The main explanatory variable of interest is corporate giving, which is described earlier. The 
covariate X is a vector consisting of firm-level characteristics (logarithm of assets, stock return, 
ROA, volatility), CEO attributes (tenure as CEO and outside appointment), and firm-level 
governance characteristics (board size, independent board indicator, director ownership, and the 
E-index). The terms fi and yt refer to firm and year fixed effects, respectively. 
The main problem with this specification is that corporate giving is highly endogenous. 
For example, suppose that the level of CEO excess compensation is a good measure of CEO 
power. Under the managerial power hypothesis, firm contributions are determined by CEO 
compensation, a situation that raises reverse causality issues. To mitigate this concern, an 
instrumental variables (IV) model is estimated with three exogenous instrumental variables 
measured at the state level in the firm’s headquarters state. The instruments are the state level 
density of high net worth individuals, average individual charitable contributions as a fraction of 
gross income, and recent natural disasters in the firm’s headquarters state, all of which are 
described below. 
Firms and individuals are two alternate sources of charity contributions. Since the density 
of high net worth individuals and their individual contributions at the state-level are likely to 
reduce the demand for corporate giving without directly affecting CEO compensation, we use 
them as instrumental variables. Following Becker, Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2010), we collect 
40 
 
data on the number of high net worth individuals from the Statistics of Income program at the 
IRS and calculate the state level density for every year in the sample.30 Data on individual 
contributions is collected from the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS). It provides 
state level average gross income (AGI) and average charitable giving data as reported on the IRS 
tax return Form 1040, Schedule A, by households who itemize deductions. NCCS provides data 
on AGI and average charitable giving for 1997 and 2004-2006. We replace missing year data by 
observations in the nearest year where data is available. We then divide state level average 
individual contributions by state level AGI. We find that these two instruments have a correlation 
of approximately 0.2. 
 
4.3.4.1. Natural disasters as an instrumental variable 
For the third instrument, we focus on natural disasters. Firms often donate generously 
after disasters. For example, our sample of firms donated over $223 million within the first month 
of hurricane Katrina. A firm’s visibility, headquarter location, and whether its operations are 
interrupted are likely to affect the likelihood of its giving after natural disasters. This source of 
exogenous variation affects corporate giving without directly influencing CEO compensation. 
Therefore, natural disasters are likely to satisfy the relevancy and exclusion requirements of an 
instrumental variables approach. 
Natural disasters that generate damages of at least $500 million in the affected states are 
treated as significant events. We collect this data from the Center for Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the Université Catholique de Louvain. Panel A of Table 
1.10 presents information on the types of natural disasters, total damages, and the number of 
affected states. Droughts, earthquakes, extreme temperatures, floods, storms and wildfires are six 
                                                          
30This source reports state level data on high net worth individuals for 1995, 1998 and 2001. In 1995, net wealth ranges 
from $0.6 to $10 million. For the latter two years, the lower limit is increased to $1.0 million and the ceiling is 
removed. 
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different types of natural disasters having total damages ranging from $3.6 billion in 2000 to 
$157.53 billion in 2005 (when hurricane Katrina affected the Gulf coast area). These disasters 
affected a minimum of 6 and a maximum of 34 states during 1996-2007. The state of New York 
is not included among the affected states in 2001 since the events associated with 9/11 
represented a terrorist attack rather than natural disaster.31 
 
Table 1.10 
CEO compensation and corporate giving 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of natural disasters across USA states during 1996 to 2006. This panel 
presents information on natural disaster types, its monetary damages and the states it affected. Panel B to D present 
results on instrumental variables approach, which mitigates the endogeneity problem of corporate giving. The sample 
considers 2006 Fortune 500 firms during 1996 to 2006. Both stages of regressions consider firm and year fixed effects, 
and are estimated with an intercept term. We define giving ratio as log(1 + corporate giving / sales) x 103.  Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance based on two sides tests at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Variable definitions are in Appendix 1.C. 
Panel A: Natural disasters 
Year Type of natural disasters Total value of damage (in $mil) Number of states affected 
1996 Flood, storm 6,100 25 
1997 Flood, storm 8,000 27 
1998 Extreme temperature, storm 12,880 24 
1999 Drought, extreme temperature, storm 12,860 33 
2000 Drought, Wildfire 3,600 19 
2001 Earthquake, storm 8,000 8 
2002 Drought, flood, storm 9,200 19 
2003 Storm, wildfire 17,970 27 
2004 Flood, storm 55,300 28 
2005 Storm 157,530 6 
2006 Flood, storm 4,400 19 
2007 Flood, storm, wildfire 7,800 34 
 
To identify firms whose contributions are likely to be affected by disasters, we define a 
variable called natural disaster that takes the value of one if natural disasters occur in a given 
year in the state where the firm’s headquarters is situated. We interact this variable with end-of-
the-year firm size and firm performance measures to identify how both visible firms and firms 
that are not operationally affected contribute to these natural disaster causes, respectively. Of 
course, the timing of the corporate giving after natural disasters is important to define. Many 
firms contribute immediately after natural disasters while others participate in the later rebuilding 
                                                          
31However, our results are robust to the inclusion of 9/11. 
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of community infrastructure. To consider both of these possibilities, we assume that natural 
disasters occurring in the fourth quarter of a year will affect a firm’s contribution both in the 
current and the following year. A drawback of this IV method is that it relies for its power on the 
set of firms that are headquartered in states affected by natural disasters. 
 
4.3.4.2. First-stage regressions 
We first match the instruments with each firm’s headquarters state. We hand-collect 
historical data on firm headquarters from the NDCG. We then estimate the following 
specification as the first stage regression. 
log(corporate givingit) = a + b'.(Zit) + c.Xit + fi + yt + uit,            (4) 
where Z is a vector of instruments: density of high net worth people, individual 
contributions/AGI, and natural disaster. Other variables and notations are as described earlier. 
For a firm with given characteristics, CEO attributes, and governance structures, these 
instruments are likely to add exogenous variation to the average corporate giving. 
Panel B of Table 1.10 presents regression estimates of total corporate giving and 
separately on program giving and foundation giving. Although the density of high net worth 
people and individual contributions/AGI ratio have anticipated signs, they are not statistically 
significant. However, natural disaster is negative and highly significant, implying that firms 
contribute less when the state affected by a natural disaster also houses the firm’s headquarters. 
This suggests that the firm operations are disrupted and that we need to control for this outcome. 
Many arguments can be offered in favor of this result. Firms reduce community 
assistance programs if their operations are adversely affected, if they expect sales declines, etc. 
On the other hand, operationally unaffected firms that are headquartered in a state hit by a 
disaster are likely to contribute more. Specifically, we find that a 10% increase in ROA of a firm 
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Table 1.10 (Continued) 
CEO compensation and corporate giving 
 
 Panel B: First stage, fixed effect regressions 
 Model 1 
Total giving ratio 
Model 2 
Program giving ratio 
Model 3 
Foundation giving ratio 
 Estimates p-value Estimates p-value Estimates p-value 
Density of high net worth people -2.535 0.261 -1.223 0.402 -1.316 0.443 
Individual contribution/AGI -0.119 0.332 -0.105 0.191 -0.014 0.888 
Natural disaster  -1.796*** 0.006 -1.001* 0.052 -0.798** 0.043 
Natural disaster * log(assets)  0.160** 0.011 0.087* 0.058 0.073* 0.080 
Natural disaster * ROA  3.327** 0.015 1.917* 0.057 1.414* 0.063 
Natural disaster * Stock return  -0.169 0.174 -0.051 0.604 -0.118 0.156 
Log(assets) -0.285** 0.050 -0.051 0.599 -0.234** 0.022 
Stock return 0.146* 0.091 0.032 0.384 0.114 0.112 
ROA -1.610 0.220 -1.588* 0.059 -0.027 0.972 
Volatility 0.993 0.456 0.878 0.231 0.115 0.913 
Tenure as CEO 0.006 0.432 0.005 0.169 0.001 0.832 
Outside appointment -0.066 0.496 -0.035 0.476 -0.031 0.608 
Board size 0.000 0.989 -0.001 0.925 0.001 0.934 
Independent board indicator -0.032 0.701 0.053 0.266 -0.085 0.158 
Director ownership (%) 0.006 0.125 0.003 0.102 0.002 0.450 
E-index 0.049 0.419 0.038 0.375 0.010 0.825 
Adjusted R2 43.51% 19.89% 55.31% 
Observations 2381 2381 2381 
Panel C: Second stage, fixed effect regressions 
 
Model 1 
Total compensation 
Model 2 
Total compensation 
Model 3 
Total compensation 
 Estimates p-value Estimates p-value Estimates p-value 
Total giving ratio (predicted) 0.352* 0.080     
Program giving ratio (predicted)   0.638* 0.071   
Foundation giving ratio (predicted)     0.744* 0.096 
Log(assets) 0.312* 0.065 0.242 0.227 0.389*** 0.004 
Stock return 0.068 0.664 0.085 0.572 0.050 0.761 
ROA 0.656 0.680 1.070 0.449 0.176 0.924 
Volatility -1.656 0.176 -1.850 0.145 -1.401 0.230 
Tenure as CEO -0.007 0.192 -0.008 0.163 -0.006 0.242 
Outside appointment 0.219*** 0.003 0.217*** 0.004 0.221*** 0.003 
Board size -0.008 0.497 -0.007 0.527 -0.009 0.464 
Independent board indicator -0.036 0.661 -0.081 0.432 0.016 0.796 
Director ownership (%) -0.005 0.389 -0.005 0.376 -0.005 0.410 
E-index 0.045 0.434 0.038 0.518 0.054 0.338 
Adjusted R2 56.56% 56.56% 56.55% 
Observations 2381 2381 2381 
Panel D: Distribution of log(total compensation), total compensation is in thousand dollars 
 10th 25th Mean Median 75% 90% 
log(tdc1) 7.614 8.250 8.775 8.813 9.930 9.996 
 
in a state hit by a disaster raises the total giving ratio by 33.3%. Firm visibility in the disastrous 
state has a meaningful, but lower economic impact. In the next two columns of Panel A, we 
estimate similar regressions but consider program and foundation giving separately to identify the 
relative impacts on the two forms of corporate giving. The evidence suggests that program giving 
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is more generous following natural disasters. Relative to program giving, foundation giving falls 
to a greater extent (by 25.5%).32 In addition, firms not adversely affected by disasters are likely to 
be 35.6% more responsive with program giving.33 This result on program giving is consistent 
with the views of industry experts, and is suggestive of the strength of natural disaster as an 
instrument.34 
 
4.3.4.3. Second-stage regressions 
The predicted values of corporate giving are used to estimate the CEO compensation 
model specified by equation (3). Panel C of Table 1.10 presents the results for CEO 
compensation. In all three statistical models, the estimated coefficients of corporate giving are 
positive, ranging from 0.35 to 0.74, and are consistently statistically significant at the 10% level 
or better. The lowest coefficient estimate implies a 3.5% rise in CEO compensation for a 10% 
increase in the predicted total corporate giving. For the same increase in total corporate giving, 
we estimate that CEO compensation increases by 8.09% (3.5%/43.5%, where 43.5% is the 
adjusted R2 of the first-stage regression). Economically, a 10% increase in total corporate giving 
raises CEO compensation by $523,542 (from its mean $6.5 million). This evidence contradicts 
optimal contracting hypothesis and supports the managerial power hypothesis, which states that 
CEOs have power to extract excess rents. The fact that a marginal increase in foundation giving 
(model 3) raises CEO compensation by a greater amount suggests that managerial agency 
problems are more serious at firms that contribute directly to foundations. This supports our 
earlier findings on donations transferred to company-sponsored foundations. Consistent with 
existing studies, we also find that CEO compensation is significantly and positively related to 
                                                          
32We calculate the difference between the coefficients of natural disaster in model 2 and 3 in Table 1.10, and divide the 
difference by the smaller estimated coefficient. That is (1.001-0.798)/0.798=25.45%. 
33Here, we consider (natural disaster x ROA) and calculate (1.92-1.41)/1.41=35.6%. 
34For example, Mr. Matthew Nelson, Managing Director at the Council on Foundations, said that “companies have the 
ability to respond to immediate needs, such as disasters, because they can get volunteers from employees, match 
donations and give away product”. Source: The Wall Street Journal (Dec 10, 2007). 
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CEO’s outside recruitment status and firm size. Other control variables are insignificant after 
controlling for the predicted level of corporate giving. In summary, the evidence in this section 
substantiates Bebchuk and Fried’s (2004) managerial power hypothesis and shows corporate 
giving can represent a form of rent extraction. 
 
4.3.5. Board member charitable interests and corporate giving 
In this section, we analyze the relation between independent director charity interests and 
corporate giving. The existing literature suggests that managers build reputation with stakeholders 
through the use of corporate giving and CSR activities. For example, Galaskiewicz (1985, 1997) 
finds that CEOs make valuable connections with local elites when their firms make charitable 
contributions, and Cespa and Cestone (2007) assert that CEOs use CSR activities strategically to 
build relations with social and environmental activists, who offer CEOs favorable treatment 
during future turnover decisions. We argue that a more direct form of entrenchment occurs when 
CEOs strategically allocate firm donations to serve independent director charitable interests. For 
this purpose, we analyze whether the charities supported by corporate giving match independent 
director charitable interests and then evaluate the effect of this alignment on CEO compensation. 
This analysis is similar in spirit to Hwang and Kim (2009), who find that a CEO’s social ties with 
independent directors result in excessive CEO compensation. The analysis here differs from 
theirs in the sense that this study considers the social ties that are created by corporate giving. 
Due to data limitations, we focus on Fortune 500 firms during 2005-2006 and obtain 
information on independent directors’ charitable affiliations from the proxy statements filed in 
these two years.35 Results examining the link between independent director charity interests and 
corporate giving causes are presented in Panel A of Table 1.11. We find that 64% of independent 
directors with charitable affiliations are associated with educational institutions, 47% with 
                                                          
35We exclude CEOs and non-independent directors for this analysis. 
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Table 1.11 
Alignment of independent director interests with causes supported through corporate giving 
Information on independent directors’ charity interests for Fortune 500 firms is retrieved from 2005 and 2006 proxy 
statements. The sample is conditional on positive director charity affiliations. The causes of corporate giving exceeding 
$1 million are based on philanthropic activities during 2005-2006. The source of this information is the Foundation 
Directory Online database. The fixed effect (industry) regressions in Panel B control for all control variables in Panel 
C, Table 1.10 as well as year fixed effects. The sample in Panel B considers firms with independent boards (model 1) 
and non-independent boards (model 2) separately. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, ** and * 
denote statistical significance based on two sides tests at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Director interests and corporate giving causes 
Interests of independent directors Corporate giving causes (first three) 
Purpose % of directors Purpose % of firms 
Agriculture/food 0.00 Agriculture/food 1.05 
Animals/wildlife and environment 11.81 Animals/wildlife and environment 2.53 
Arts & culture 22.15 Arts & culture 18.11 
Civil/human rights 10.34 Civil/human rights 0.63 
Community development and employment 4.64 Community development and employment 4.63 
Crime/law enforcement 1.05 Crime/law enforcement 0.00 
Education 63.71 Education 32.42 
Health centers and research institutes 25.53 Health centers and research institutes 3.79 
Housing/shelter 1.69 Housing/shelter 2.11 
Health and human services 3.80 Health and human services 28.00 
International/foreign affairs 14.35 International/foreign affairs 5.05 
Philanthropic organizations 46.62 Philanthropic organizations 23.58 
Recreation 7.38 Recreation 0.63 
Religion 2.95 Religion 0.42 
Research centers & think tanks 18.35 Research centers & think tanks 1.05 
Safety/disasters 1.48 Safety/disasters 1.47 
Science/social science 4.85 Science/social science 1.47 
Youth development 12.24 Youth development 3.37 
Match between the interests of directors and the first three causes supported through corporate giving is 68.80%. 
Panel B: Fixed effect (industry) regressions with a year indicator 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Total compensation Total compensation 
 Estimates p-value Estimates p-value 
Director supported cause 0.295** 0.035 0.145 0.372 
Controls Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 26.45% 77.51% 
Observations 564 177 
 
different types of philanthropic organizations, 22% with arts and culture, etc. For the same set of 
firms, we identify individual firm’s top three charitable causes receiving corporate contributions 
of at least $1 million in 2005 and 2006 using the Foundation Directory Online database. Of all 
firms making charitable contributions, 32% contribute to educational institutions, 28% contribute 
to health and human services, 24% contribute to philanthropic organizations, and 18% support 
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arts and culture as one of their top three charity recipients. After combining these two data 
sources, we find a match between a firm’s director interests and a firm’s top three causes 
receiving charitable contributions for 68.8% of the sample of corporations making charitable 
contributions. 
We evaluate the effect of the link between independent director charitable interests and 
corporate contributions on CEO compensation in Panel B of Table 1.11 for two years where data 
is available (2005 and 2006) to assess whether corporate giving benefits CEOs. Specifically, we 
regress CEO compensation on director supported cause by considering a sample of firms with 
and without independent boards. Director supported cause takes the value of one if the causes of 
corporate giving match at least one independent director’s charity interests, and zero otherwise. If 
CEOs do not benefit from pursuing independent director causes, we would expect no association 
between compensation and director supported cause. Contrary to this prediction, we find in 
model 1 of Panel B that the coefficient estimate of this variable is positive and statistically 
significant (p-value = 0.035) for the sample of firms with independent boards. However, we do 
not find similar result for model 2, which considers firms without independent boards. Thus, our 
increased entrenchment story is only applicable to firms with independent boards, as it should be. 
This evidence suggests a strategic use of corporate giving to build social ties between the CEO 
and independent directors, which compromises director independence and leads to further CEO 
benefits such as excess compensation. 
 
4.4.  Robustness 
As robustness checks, we re-estimate all of the regression specifications with Compustat, 
CRSP, RiskMetrics and Execucomp data winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. The statistical 
significances of CEO charity connection and CEO ownership remain unchanged from the logit 
and tobit regression models reported in Table 1.3. Moreover, there is evidence of a greater impact 
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of CEO ownership on contributions transferred to foundations (relative to the model 2 of Table 
1.9). We also estimate a cross-sectional model of the amount of corporate giving by averaging the 
dependent and independent variables from Table 1.2 over the sample period. Our results continue 
to support the agency theory hypothesis. In further robust analysis, we exclude firms in the 
financial industry as these firms often sponsor local charities as a form of advertising. We find a 
more pronounced effect of CEO ownership on corporate giving in the reduced sample of 2,083 
firm-year observations. 
We also consider whether a firm has dual class shares, a CEO who founded the firm or 
who is a member of the founding family, a completely independent nominating committee, and 
an independent director-blockholder as additional corporate governance measures.36 The analysis 
yields statistically insignificant coefficients for all of these measures. We also replace the 
independent board indicator with the percentage of board independence and a firm’s E-index 
with its classified board status. These control variables also yield insignificant coefficient 
estimates. 
The evidence on equity value of cash holdings is re-evaluated taking two different 
approaches. First, excess returns are calculated from the Fama-French 48 industry portfolio 
returns where the whole Compustat universe of firms is used. The coefficient of ∆Cit/Mi,t-1 x 
corporate giving ratioi,t (γ) is -0.203 and remains significant with a p-value of 0.011. Second, it 
could be argued that unobserved risk components of giving firms are different from those of firms 
that do not give to charitable causes. We re-estimate the regression model of excess returns with 
firm fixed effects to control for unobserved idiosyncratic risks. The estimated coefficient γ is -
0.17 and is significant with a p-value of 0.026. 
Finally, the compensation regressions in Table 1.10 are re-estimated using winsorized 
data. We document a 1.94% (versus 3.52% when data is not winsorized) increase in CEO 
                                                          
36CEO-founder data is hand-collected, while the remaining data is drawn from RiskMetrics. A director-blockholder is a 
director who owns at least 5% of the firm’s stock. 
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compensation for a 10% increase in the predicted total corporate giving. This implies that the 
coefficient of corporate giving in the CEO compensation regression is influenced by very large 
corporate charitable contributions. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This study clearly shows that CEOs gain from corporate giving. The data indicates that 
62% of firms contribute to CEO-affiliated charities, with more affiliated contributions in firms 
where CEO financial interests are less aligned with shareholders. CEOs opportunistically transfer 
contributions to foundations, and this transfer reduces shareholder cash flow rights. Furthermore, 
CEOs substitute cash dividend increases for corporate giving when a dividend tax cut increases a 
CEO’s cost of consuming private benefits of control. CEOs also use corporate giving strategically 
to support charities that are aligned with independent director interests. Various forms of 
regression analysis confirm that corporate giving is not purely a firm value maximizing tool, but 
is a manifestation of managerial agency problem where managers have considerable influence on 
how and where corporate contributions are channeled. Such forms of corporate giving serve the 
interests of CEOs by compromising the independence of the board and result in lower stock 
returns. 
The results in this study shed doubt on principal-agent models where both principals and 
agents have ambiguous objectives for discretionary spending where public disclosure is not 
required. One implication of this study is that an SEC requirement to promptly disclose insider-
affiliated corporate giving could benefit outside minority shareholders. Several avenues of 
research remain unexplored. First, many firms have employee matching grant programs while 
others do not. Do such programs enable firms to hire and retain higher quality employees? If yes, 
then does this increase firm profitability? Or are matching programs part of a long held tradition 
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that corporations are reluctant to change? Second, legal professionals tend to differentiate 
corporate giving from CSR activity while many companies “claim to have embraced CSR and 
then point to the glossy reports of their company foundation to demonstrate the degree of their 
commitment” (Altschuller, 2010). Future research could examine whether shareholders 
understand such distinctions and demand firms to pursue activities which better position them 
competitively. 
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Appendix 1.A: List of legislatorial proposals for corporate giving disclosure 
There have been several efforts by legislators to enforce disclosure of corporate giving data. We 
list such events below. 
i. Republican Congressman Paul Gillmor introduced H.R. 944 and H.R. 945 to the House of 
Representatives in 1997. This bill excluded disclosure requirements for contributions made to 
educational institutions and local charities. However, this bill empowered shareholders to vote on 
corporate giving. 
ii. After the collapse of Enron, WorldCom and other companies, some policymakers tried to enforce 
stringent disclosure requirements on corporate giving. Consequently, the first draft of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 passed by the House required firms to disclose such information 
(Petrovits, 2006). 
iii. On February 13, 2002, Paul Gillmor again introduced a bill, H.R. 3745. This bill required 
disclosure requirements for substantial contributions made to insider-affiliated charities.  
iv. Later in February 2002, Democrat John LaFalce introduced H.R. 3818 that restricts firms from 
providing charitable contributions to any group affiliated with directors. This bill also required 
information disclosure for officers and their immediate family members if they sit on the boards of 
nonprofit organizations, independent of whether the organization received any charitable 
contributions from these firms. 
v. Eventually, corporate giving disclosure clauses were added in the Corporate and Auditing 
Accountability, Responsibility and Transparency Act (CAARTA), sponsored by Republican 
Michael Oxley. Faced with opposition from the Council on Foundations and the Independent 
Sector, this aspect of firm disclosure was dropped in the final version of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(Cohen, 2002). 
  
52 
 
Appendix 1.B: Criteria for coding of corporate giving data 
We maintain the following criteria for coding purposes. 
i. If the directory only reports information on a firm’s giving program or its foundation without 
stating the amount of giving, the contribution through program or foundation is recorded as zero. 
ii. A firm may have several foundations which can transfer money among themselves. Since such 
transfers are not new donations, we exclude them from the total amount of money foundations 
receive in a year. 
iii. Company-sponsored public foundations are not included as they usually have other donors and the 
total amount of giving for a specific firm cannot be easily separated from that of others. 
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Appendix 1.C: Definition of variables 
Variable Definitions 
Determinants of corporate giving decisions 
CEO charity connection Equals 1 if the CEO is related to nonprofit organizations, e.g., academic 
institutions, arts and culture, animal/wildlife and environment organizations, 
nonprofit charitable organizations, civil rights organizations, think tanks, and 
research centers. Source: biographical sections of annual reports, 
Businessweek, Forbes and www.nndb.com. 
 
CEO ownership 𝑁𝑜.  𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝑁𝑜.  𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎. Calculation follows 
Core and Guay’s (1999) methodology. 
 
Tenure The current fiscal year minus the year when the CEO joined the company. 
Source: Execucomp; when missing, Businessweek and www.nndb.com. 
 
Outside appointment Equals 1 if the CEO is recruited from outside. 
Board size The logarithm of total number of board members. 
Independent board indicator Takes the value of 1 if at least 70% of board members are independent. The 
calculation omits gray or linked directors. 
Director ownership The summation of share ownership by all directors at a firm. 
CEO-chair duality An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if CEO is also the chairman and 
0 otherwise. 
E-index This is as defined in Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009) and comprises of 
classified board, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pill, golden 
parachute, supermajority requirements for mergers, and charter amendments. 
Ad-to-sales Advertising expenses / sales. 
Ad indicator Equals 0 if the data is missing in Compustat and 1 otherwise. 
R&D-to-sales R&D expenses/sales. 
R&D indicator Equals 0 if the data in Compustat is missing and 1 otherwise. 
Asset Log(1 + firm’s asset) where firm asset is expressed in millions. 
Number of employees Log(1 + number of employees) where the number of employees is in 
thousands. 
Number of shareholders Log(1 + number of shareholders) where the number of shareholders is in 
thousands. 
Marginal tax rate Simulated corporate marginal tax rates. See Graham and Mills (1998) for 
detail. 
Leverage Total long-term debt / assets. 
ROA Operating income before depreciation/assets. 
Tobin’s q (Total assets – total common equity + annual closing price (fiscal) x common 
shares outstanding) / total assets. 
Free cash flow Income before extraordinary items + depreciation and amortization – capital 
expenditure. 
54 
 
Free cash flow indicator Equals 1 if free cash flow is greater than 0. 
Assets-to-employee Assets/number of employees. 
Financial industry Banking + insurance + trading. 
Regulated industry Utilities + communication. 
Pharmaceutical industry Medical equipments + pharmaceutical products. 
Sin industry Beer & liquor + tobacco products + defense. 
Retail industry Food products + consumer goods + apparel + retail. 
Non-environmentally-friendly 
industry 
Steel works + non-metallic and industrial metal mining + coal + petroleum 
and natural gas + SICs between 0800 and 0899 (forestry) + 2810 and 2819 
(industrial inorganic chemicals) + 2400-2439 (lumber and wood products). 
Post2003 Equals 1 for years 2003 to 2006 (dividend tax cut years) and 0 otherwise. 
CEO compensation and corporate giving 
Total giving ratio Log(1 + corporate giving / sales) x 103. Program and foundation giving ratios 
are similarly calculated. 
Total compensation Log(TDC1) where TDC1 = salary + bonus + restricted stocks + stock options 
(Black-Scholes value) + long-term incentives + others. 
Density of high net worth people State level density of individuals with net wealth of at least $1 million. 
Individual contribution/AGI State level itemized charitable contributions (as reported on the IRS tax return 
Form 1040) divided by state level average gross income. 
Natural disaster Equals 1 if natural disasters occur in the firm’s headquarters state. We 
consider natural disasters generating damage of at least $500 million in the 
same calendar year or the last quarter of the prior year. 
Log(assets) Log(1 + firm’s asset) where firm asset is expressed in millions. 
ROA Operating income before depreciation/assets. 
Stock return The cumulative stock return during the year. 
Volatility 1-year variance of stock returns. 
Tenure as CEO Equals current year – appointment year as CEO. 
Outside appointment An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is recruited from 
outside. If CEO’s joining year precedes the year of employment as CEO, we 
calculate outside as 1. 
Board size The logarithm of total number of board members. 
Independent board indicator Takes the value of 1 if at least 70% of board members are independent. The 
calculation omits gray or linked directors. 
Director ownership The summation of share ownership by all directors at a firm. 
E-index This is as defined in Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009) and comprises of 
classified board, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pill, golden 
parachute, supermajority requirements for mergers, and charter amendments. 
Corporate giving and the value of cash 
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r Cumulative stock returns over a year. 
RB Fama-French size and book-to-market matched yearly portfolio returns. 
Source: Kenneth French’s website. 
RInd Fama-French 48 industry portfolio returns. 
∆C t Changes in cash.. 
Ct-1 Level of cash. 
∆E t   Changes in earnings before extraordinary items. 
∆NAt Changes in net assets. 
∆RD t   Changes in R&D. 
∆I t Changes in interests. 
∆D t Changes in common dividends. 
Lt All debt / Market value of total assets. 
NFt New equity issues + Net new debt issues. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
OFFICERS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND ACQUISITION OUTCOMES 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Fiduciary duties for CEOs and senior executives (henceforth jointly referred to as 
“officers”), together with shareholder lawsuits, are considered one of the corporate governance 
mechanisms that align the interests of officers and shareholders (Becht, Bolton and Röell, 2003). 
Yet the literature on officers’ fiduciary duties (OFDs) has received very little attention. Johnson 
and Millon (2005) and Thomas and Wells (2011) argue that corporate officers in the U.S. often 
hold corporate board memberships for which they owe fiduciary duties in their capacity as 
directors, so a lawsuit against a board for the breach of fiduciary duties generally includes 
officers. This overlapping responsibility of corporate officers restrained the need to develop a 
separate theory of officers’ fiduciary duties and left the legal role of officers unrecognized.37 As a 
consequence, most public firms provided their officers in-house legal counseling in their capacity 
as directors, but not in their capacity as officers (Garvis and Johnson, 2009). This omission 
caused officers to underestimate their personal liability exposure. 
A recent Delaware case law has revived our attention by elucidating officers’ distinct 
fiduciary duties.38 In Gantler v. Stephens (2009), the Delaware Supreme Court held that officers 
owe the same fiduciary duties of care and loyalty as do directors.39 Such ratification is legally 
                                                          
37Until recently, the Chancery Court, which is one of Delaware’s three constitutional courts, did not have jurisdiction 
over officers who were not directors (see Johnson and Millon, 2005). 
38From time to time, Congress, the SEC, the NYSE and the NASDAQ have also imposed rules on the functions of 
officers and directors. However, these rules either do not distinguish the duties of officers and directors or are imposed 
at the same time, making it difficult to identify the significance of OFDs. 
39The court ruling is available at http://courts.state.de.us/opinions/download.aspx?ID=116710. Although Delaware 
court clarified officers’ fiduciary duties in Gantler v. Stephens, it is yet to decide whether officers should be more 
exposed to liability for breach of fiduciary duties than corporate directors (Hampshire Group, Limited v. Kuttner, 
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important because officers are not eligible for exculpation for monetary damages for breach of 
fiduciary duties as are directors. In addition, officers do not enjoy protections of company 
indemnifications or the coverage of liability insurance for breach of loyalty.40, 41 Consequently, 
officers are liable for court settlements, substantial attorney fees, and bear the risk of 
unemployment or underemployment for wrongful conduct. By improving the corporate 
governance structure, this court decision (the Rule) reduces conflicts of interest between officers 
and shareholders, especially at firms where officers are entrenched, or equivalently, firms where 
officers are protected from market discipline. This leads to the following hypothesis on OFDs: 
Since the Rule increases their liability exposure and awareness of fiduciary duties, ceteris 
paribus, officers insulated from market discipline are less likely to consider value-decreasing 
corporate decisions after the court ruling on OFDs. 
Employing this 2009 legal event as a natural experiment, I evaluate the importance of 
officers’ fiduciary duties on the efficiency of major corporate investment decisions. Specifically, I 
compare the merger and acquisition (M&A) performance of firms with entrenched officers to that 
of firms with non-entrenched officers before and after the court ruling on OFDs. Because it is 
widely regarded as an indisputable form of entrenchment, I use the presence of a classified board 
to measure whether a firm has entrenched officers (see for example Faleye, 2007 and 
Kadyrzhanova and Rhodes-Kropf, 2011). 
I expect M&A transactions to provide the cleanest and strongest test of the court ruling 
on OFDs for several reasons. First, they are among the largest corporate investment decisions 
where transaction data is a matter of public record. Second, acquisitions are long-term 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2010). There is also an ongoing unresolved academic discussion on this issue (see for example Hamermesh and Sparks, 
2005, and Johnson, 2005). 
40An exculpatory agreement excludes officers or directors from the legal liability (e.g., compensation to shareholders) 
after they have caused some damages, whereas an indemnity agreement covers their liability when sued by 
shareholders. 
41Directors also do not enjoy coverage of indemnifications or liability insurance for breach of loyalty. However, the 
business judgment rule provides a strong line of defense to independent directors, making it extremely difficult for 
shareholders to prove disloyalty (Becht, Bolton and Röell, 2003). Further, it was uncertain after the Gantler case 
whether the protections of business judgment rule would be extended to company officers (Thomas and Wells, 2011). 
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discretionary investments that intensify the agency conflicts between officers and shareholders. 
For example, Jensen (1986) states that officers endowed with free cash flow engage in empire 
building. Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991) test this hypothesis and find that firms with surplus 
cash but low investment opportunities undertake value-destroying acquisitions. Third, officers’ 
liability exposure from violation of fiduciary duties in M&A transactions should be relatively 
substantial compared to their personal wealth.  
I also expect the court ruling to affect all firms with entrenched management regardless 
of their state of incorporation, because a majority of states (i) model their corporate laws on the 
precedents set by Delaware and (ii) do not extend exculpatory protections to officers, similar to 
Delaware.42, 43 Moreover, this ruling was one of the rare cases where the Delaware Supreme Court 
reversed and remanded the Court of Chancery’s dismissal of claims against the defendant officers 
and directors, instigating considerable debate and analysis about the Rule’s implications within 
the legal community. Therefore, it is likely that M&A legal counselors would advise CEOs, 
CFOs and senior executives of firms across all states about officers’ heightened level of personal 
liability after the Rule. This line of reasoning is similar to Edmans, Fang and Zur’s (2011) view 
that the “threat of governance, not just actual governance, can discipline [officers]”. 
Using a sample of 1,441 M&A transactions (including 499 transactions after the Rule), I 
find that firms where officers are insulated from market discipline experience greater acquisition 
efficiencies after the legal event than firms where officers are not protected from market 
discipline. Specifically, acquisitions initiated after the court decision by firms with classified 
boards generate an additional 1.5% abnormal bidder stock return. For the average (median) 
acquirer with a classified board, this increased abnormal stock return corresponds to a gain of $77 
($40) million in shareholder value. This result is obtained after controlling for time-variant deal 
                                                          
42For example, Romano (2006) notes that vast majority of states adopted Delaware’s version of limited liability charter 
amendments within a short period of time. 
43Seven states that allow exculpatory provisions for officers are Louisiana, Maryland, Nevada, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, Utah and Virginia (Follett, 2010). 
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features, firm characteristics and year effects as well as time-invariant industry and firm effects, 
so it measures the incremental effect of OFDs. Furthermore, the result is robust in a sample where 
firms with classified boards are matched to firms without such boards on different observable 
firm characteristics, providing strong support for the hypothesis on OFDs. 
In further analysis, I find that announcement effects are even stronger for several subsets 
of acquirers with classified boards where officers do not have access to liability insurance, bear 
greater wealth risk, face less product market competition, are insulated from the market for 
corporate control, or are able to avoid board monitoring (1.6%, 2.2%, 2.6%, 2.6%, and 2.2%, 
respectively). These results are consistent with my hypothesis since the incentive to increase 
acquisition efficiencies is higher for officers in those subsets of firms. I also find that acquirers 
with classified boards engage in more synergistic acquisitions (as measured by the weighted 
acquirer plus target abnormal announcement-period returns), but do not pay higher premiums 
after the Rule. I again interpret this result as consistent with my hypothesis as it reflects a restraint 
on value-decreasing investment decisions. 
I next seek to understand the sources of value creation after the Rule. Amihud, Lev and 
Travlos (1990) and Faccio and Masulis (2005) argue that officers who value control will be 
reluctant to dilute their shareholdings, and therefore have incentives to select cash financing over 
stock financing for acquisitions. In the context of this article, the court ruling is expected to 
reduce entrenched officers’ willingness to preserve control (since it improves corporate 
governance structure and reduces private benefits of control), and as such, I expect the use of cash 
financing to decline. In the empirical analysis, I find that acquirers with entrenched officers do 
use less cash to finance the payment after the Rule. 
As diagnostic tests, I examine whether the directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability 
insurance premium and the frequency of acquisitions change in response to the court ruling on 
OFDs. If the Rule significantly increased officers’ liability exposure among firms with entrench 
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officers, its implication would be impounded in the liability insurance premium and the frequency 
of value-reducing acquisitions of these firms. Consistent with the predictions, Figure 2.1 shows 
that D&O insurance premium (as a fraction of acquisition transaction value) was the same across 
firms with and without classified boards before the Rule, whereas it was higher after the Rule for 
both groups of firms. Moreover, firms with classified boards experienced 42% greater increase in 
liability insurance premium after the Rule than firms without classified boards, suggesting that 
firms with entrenched officers perceived a greater level of liability exposure after the court 
decision on OFDs. This result provides confidence in the validity of my identification strategy, 
which argues that officers’ liability exposure in some firms, but not all, increased at a greater pace 
after the Gantler court ruling. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance premium 
Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance premium limit as a fraction of deal size between January 2004 
and June 2012. The sample consists of 367 firms for which SDC and RiskMetrics report insurance 
premiums and classified board statuses, respectively. The darker (lighter) column presents insurance 
premium before (after) the court ruling on OFDs. 
 
For acquisition frequency, I find that relative to the pre-Gantler period, firms with 
entrenched officers completed 27% fewer acquisitions of public targets (which are 
unambiguously associated with negative announcement-period abnormal stock returns) 
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semiannually than firms without entrenched officers in the post-Gantler period. Figure 2.2, which 
plots the frequency of acquisitions as a percentage of total number of firms, shows a clear parallel 
trend before the Rule. For firms with classified boards, the sharp decline in the percentage 
numbers following the court ruling suggests that these firms avoided value-reducing acquisitions 
of public targets. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Frequency of value-reducing acquisitions 
Frequency of acquisitions as a percentage of total number of firms between 2001 and 2011. The graph 
consists of 1,058 acquisitions of public targets made by firms in the RiskMetrics database. The darker 
(lighter) line shows the percentage numbers for firms with (without) classified boards. The shaded region 
represents the post-Rule period. 
 
Overall results of this study make two major contributions to the literature on corporate 
governance. First, it is the first empirical study that examines the effect of officers’ fiduciary 
duties on an important corporate decision. Existing studies, in contrast, do not separate officers’ 
duties from those of directors.44, 45 Second, this paper contributes to the literature that examines 
                                                          
44For example, Becker and Strömberg (forthcoming) take advantage of a 1991 Delaware case law, which ruled that 
directors owe fiduciary duties to all stakeholders (including creditors) when firms operate in the vicinity of insolvency, 
to assess the conflicts between debtholders and shareholders. Related studies on liability insurance also do not 
discriminate between the duties of officers and directors (see for example Lin, Officer and Zou, 2011). 
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how different disciplinary mechanisms interact. In particular, it demonstrates that a firm is more 
likely to benefit from OFDs if it has officers who (i) are not board members and thus, do not have 
access to D&O insurance, (ii) have substantial wealth risk, (iii) face less product market 
competition, (iv) are protected from the market for corporate control, or (v) are able to avoid 
board monitoring. Several other studies also report evidence that corporate governance 
mechanisms do not act in isolation. For example, Cremers and Nair (2005) find that external and 
internal governance mechanisms (as measured by antitakeover provisions and equity ownership, 
respectively) play a complementary role in explaining the long-term abnormal stock returns, and 
Giroud and Mueller (2011) find that firms in noncompetitive industries benefit more from good 
corporate governance (as measured by antitakeover defenses) than do firms in competitive 
industries. This study is also related to Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), Faleye (2007), and Bereskin 
and Cicero (forthcoming) as it analyzes the effect of classified boards on corporate 
value/decisions. Aside from providing evidence on the effectiveness of officers’ fiduciary duties, 
a broader implication of this analysis is that state court decisions affect the way resources are 
allocated in the economy. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the role of 
officers in corporate governance and the court ruling in Gantler v. Stephens. Section 3 explains 
sample construction while Section 4 describes key variables and their summary statistics. Section 
5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Officers’ fiduciary duties and the court decision in Gantler v. Stephens 
 
An agency relation explains how officers fit into the standard model of corporate 
governance. Officers owe fiduciary duties as agents of the corporation where any breach of duties 
                                                                                                                                                                             
45A separate literature on law and finance argues that corporate insiders in non-common law countries extract a greater 
level of rents than their counterparts in common law countries. However, this literature does not distinguish the duties 
of officers and directors. 
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creates a legal claim belonging to shareholders, the principal. In companies with widely-dispersed 
ownership, shareholders elect a board of directors who are responsible for monitoring officers’ 
duties. However, boards are often captured by officers, and therefore cannot perform their 
monitoring role (see for example Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; 
Garvey and Milbourn, 2006 and Morse, Nanda and Seru, 2011). In such instances where a firm’s 
governance structure is relatively weak, shareholder lawsuits against officers can provide an 
effective corporate governance mechanism to discipline officers. 
Empirically, however, officers do not appear to be sued in their capacity within the firm 
(Johnson and Millon, 2005; Thomas and Wells, 2011). One main reason is that CEOs and senior 
executives in the U.S. often hold board memberships (see Faleye, 2007 and Kim and Lu, 2011 for 
CEO-chairman duality, and Masulis and Mobbs, 2011 for non-CEO insider-directors), for which 
they owe fiduciary duties in their capacity as directors. So, a lawsuit against a board usually 
includes senior officers. Such overlapping responsibilities of director-officers left the legal role of 
officers unrecognized. In fact, the Chancery Court did not have jurisdiction over officers until 
January 2004, and therefore could not process legal charges against officers who were not 
directors.46 Because of this legal shortcoming, the main focus of shareholder lawsuits was based 
on the breach of directors’ fiduciary duties. As a consequence, firms provided director-officers 
legal counseling in their capacity as directors, but not in their capacity as officers (Gravis and 
Johnson, 2009). 
In reality, legal action for breach of directors’ fiduciary duties is of limited use. 
Exculpatory provisions, indemnification clauses and liability insurance provide layers of 
protections to directors, limiting their company-specific liability exposure. On the other hand, 
officers are neither exculpated from monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duties nor 
protected by company indemnifications and liability insurance for breach of loyalty. Hence, 
                                                          
46Del. Code Ann. tit. 10 § 3114(b) (2012). Also see Johnson and Millon (2005) and Follett (2010) for a discussion. 
67 
 
shareholder lawsuits against officers could be an effective corporate governance mechanism if 
OFDs are legally recognized. 
The 2009 Delaware Supreme Court decision in Gantler v. Stephens has resolved this 
legal impasse. The Gantler case involved shareholder-plaintiffs of First Niles who alleged, among 
other things, that its directors, CEO and chairman (William L. Stephens), and a non-director 
officer (Lawrence Safarek) breached their fiduciary duties by self-servingly sabotaging an 
opportunity to sell the company. The complaint particularly focused on two bidders, Cortland 
Bancorp and First Place Financial Corp., for which the board authorized the management to 
conduct the due diligence process. After reviewing Cortland’s request, Stephens and Safarek 
agreed to provide the due diligence materials, but never did. Subsequently, Cortland withdrew its 
offer. Although Stephens resisted to provide the due diligence materials to First Place, he finally 
submitted them after Cortland had withdrawn its offer. First Place proceeded with the due 
diligence and raised its offer twice. Although First Niles’s financial advisor recommended that 
the revised offers were within an acceptable range, its board voted to reject the bid in a special 
meeting without any discussion or deliberation. After the vote, the board discussed Stephens’s 
privatization plan that was later approved. 
The defendants argued that the complaint should be dismissed because the alleged facts 
were legally deficient to overcome the business judgment rule. In 2008, the Chancery Court 
credited defendants’ arguments and dismissed the suit. It also concluded that more stringent 
standards, i.e., enhanced security and entire fairness, did not apply. In reviewing the decision, the 
Delaware Supreme Court decided that defendants’ facts were sufficient to establish that the board 
acted disloyally, which rebuts the business judgment presumption. Most importantly, the 
Supreme Court held that “officers of Delaware corporations, like directors, owe fiduciary duties 
of care and loyalty, and . . . the fiduciary duties of officers are the same as those of directors”. As 
a result, the Supreme Court reviewed officers’ and directors’ conduct separately and found 
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substantial facts for breach of duties in both cases under the stringent entire fairness standard. 
Stephens was accused for violation of his fiduciary duties as an officer and a director, whereas 
Safarek was accused in his capacity as an officer. 
The Gantler case received widespread attention in the legal community. Because 
corporate officers in most states are not shielded by the exculpatory provision, legal counselors 
were advised to inform their officers the increased level of liability exposure (Reese, 2009; 
Kaufer and Radell, 2009). Many academics also debated whether officers would be able to invoke 
some of the protective rules available to directors, e.g., the business judgment rule (see Thomas 
and Wells, 2011; Garvis and Johnson, 2009). In addition, it was not decided whether officers 
should be more exposed to liability for breach of fiduciary duties than directors. Overall, the case 
clarified OFDs but created a lot of uncertainty about how differently courts would treat officers 
from directors, attracting attention from corporate officers, legal scholars and practitioners, 
liability insurance providers, etc. 
 
3. Data 
 
I extract the acquisition sample from the SDC’s U.S. Merger and Acquisition database. 
The sample period spans from January 2001 to December 2011. Following existing studies (e.g., 
Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2005, Masulis, Wang and Xie, 2007 and Harford, Humphery-
Jenner and Powell, forthcoming), I consider public, private and subsidiary targets and maintain 
the following sampling criteria: 
i. The acquisition is completed. 
ii. The acquirer controls less than 50% of the target at the announcement date and obtains 
100% after. 
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iii. The deal value is equal to or greater than $1 million and must exceed 1% of acquirer’s 
market value of equity measured 11 trading days before the announcement. 
iv. The acquirer has accounting data in Compustat, stock return data in CRSP, and 
governance data in RiskMetrics. 47 
To compare acquisition efficiencies for the same set of firms, I also require that firms 
complete acquisitions both before and after the Rule. Moreover, I exclude any firm that changes 
its classified board status during the sample period, as it is difficult for this set of firms to identify 
whether the acquisition outcomes are different because of the Rule or whether they are different 
because of the changes in classified board status. These screening criteria yield a sample that 
includes 1,441 takeovers made by 326 U.S. acquirers. 
Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics by announcement year. Because I consider a 
more extended time period before the Rule to increase the likelihood of finding takeover 
decisions made by firms that acquire after the Rule, the number of acquisitions over the 2009 to 
2011 period is relatively high. The average market value of acquirers is $9.8 billion, which is 
higher than $5.6 billion over the 1990 to 2003 period in Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007) and $8.1 
billion over the 1992 to 2007 period in Yim (forthcoming). However, the median relative deal 
size (5%) is similar to that reported in Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007). 
 
4. Variables and summary statistics 
 
4.1. Classified board 
As discussed earlier, the Gantler decision improves a firm’s contracting environment by 
discouraging entrenched officers to undertake value-destroying activities. In this study, I consider  
                                                          
47Following Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) and Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007), the sample excludes firms with 
dual-class common stocks because governance structures of dual-class firms are not comparable with those of single-
class firms. 
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Table 2.1 
Acquisitions by announcement year 
The sample consists of 1,441 U.S. mergers and acquisitions between 2001 and 2011. Acquisitions are made 
by firms that complete transactions before and after the Rule, do not change classified board status, and are 
covered by the RiskMetrics database. 
Year 
Percentage of 
sample 
Number of 
acquisitions 
Mean acquirer market 
value ($mil) 
(Median) 
Mean deal value 
($mil) 
(Median) 
Mean relative size 
(Median) 
2001 4.7 68 5,546 
(2,407) 
938 
(213) 
0.20 
(0.08) 
2002 6.4 92 7,221 
(2,770) 
325 
(112) 
0.11 
(0.04) 
2003 6.0 86 11,514 
(2,184) 
553 
(134) 
0.09 
(0.05) 
2004 7.6 110 5,245 
(2,306) 
1,051 
(148) 
0.17 
(0.05) 
2005 7.4 107 7,381 
(3,106) 
750 
(150) 
0.12 
(0.05) 
2006 9.1 131 11,054 
(3,236) 
1,610 
(166) 
0.11 
(0.04) 
2007 13.1 189 13,203 
(2,350) 
640 
(125) 
0.11 
(0.04) 
2008 9.0 130 7,287 
(2,387) 
599 
(116) 
0.14 
(0.04) 
2009 9.2 132 13,262 
(3,049) 
892 
(248) 
0.14 
(0.05) 
2010 14.1 203 11,468 
(2,924) 
690 
(210) 
0.11 
(0.06) 
2011 13.4 193 8,937 
(3,166) 
849 
(205) 
0.13 
(0.05) 
Total 100.0 1,441 9,780 
(2,746) 
811 
(162) 
0.13 
(0.05) 
 
classified board, cboard, a measure of managerial entrenchment. With a classified board 
provision, the board is separated into usually three classes with successive board elections 
occurring only for a single class of directors. 
An established line of research shows that a classified board arrangement reduces firm 
value (see for example Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005). Faleye (2007) investigates the reason for this 
value reduction and finds that a classified board significantly insulates management from market 
discipline. Specifically, classified boards reduce the sensitivity of CEO turnover and 
compensation to firm performance, deter proxy contests, and reduce the likelihood of 
implementing shareholder proposals. A number of other studies find results consistent with 
Faleye (2007). For example, Kadyrzhanova and Rhodes-Kropf (2011) find that no other 
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governance provisions presents as significant of a takeover barrier as do a classified board, 
Bebchuk, Coates and Subramanian (2002) find that no hostile bid wins control of a firm that has 
an “effective” classified board, defined as a board that cannot be circumvented by a hostile 
takeover, Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007) document that firms with classified boards make value-
decreasing acquisitions, and Bereskin and Cicero (forthcoming) record that CEOs in Delaware-
incorporated firms with classified boards enjoy the highest increase in compensation following a 
case law that increases firms’ ability to resist hostile takeovers. 
Panel A of Table 2.2 shows that 58.6% of acquirers in the sample have classified boards. 
This statistic is similar to that reported in Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), Masulis, Wang and Xie 
(2007), and Bereskin and Cicero (forthcoming). 
 
4.2. Post: an indicator variable 
The Delaware Supreme Court decided the Gantler case on January 27, 2009. The post 
variable takes the value of one for all acquisitions initiated after this date and zero otherwise. 
However, the date when a firm initiates an acquisition process is not publicly available 
and must be estimated. Most M&A studies consider initial announcements as the beginning of a 
takeover process, but Boone and Mulherin (2007) report that a private takeover process precedes 
the public announcement. During the private takeover process, the target firm hires an investment 
bank as well as a legal counsel, and contacts potential buyers. Interested buyers then sign 
confidentiality, standstill and nonsolicitation agreements, place preliminary bids, and request a 
due diligence process. The deal is generally made public when the target’s board approves the 
agreement. Subsequently, a target shareholder vote is scheduled on the deal “effective date” 
(available in SDC) when the target shareholders approve the merger agreement. Betton, Eckbo 
and Thorburn (2007) report that “the target shareholder vote is typically scheduled three to six 
months following the signing of the initial merger proposal”. 
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Table 2.2 
Summary statistics 
The sample consists of 1,441 U.S. mergers and acquisitions between 2001 and 2011. Acquisitions are made by firms 
that complete transactions before and after the Rule, do not change classified board status, and are covered by the 
RiskMetrics database. Panel A presents summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis, and Panel B presents 
acquirer returns (CAR) conditional on target type and method of payment. Variable definitions are in the Appendix 2. 
  
Panel A 
  
   
Percentiles 
 Variable Mean Std Dev 25th 50th 75th N 
       Identification variables 
      Cboard (1/0) 0.586 0.493 0.000 1.000 1.000 1,441 
Post (1/0) 0.346 0.476 0.000 0.000 1.000 1,441 
Cboard x post 0.192 0.394 0.000 0.000 0.000 1,441 
       Acquirer returns 
CAR (%) 0.503 6.169 -2.097 0.514 3.234 1,441 
       Synergistic gains and acquisition premium 
Portfolio CAR (%) -0.874 5.207 -3.217 -0.592 1.779 237 
Premium (%) 48.833 83.237 23.030 35.450 56.410 266 
Proxy premium (%) 55.785 160.583 30.068 39.074 58.513 1,345 
       Deal characteristics 
Public (1/0) 0.204 0.403 0.000 0.000 0.000 1,441 
Private (1/0) 0.421 0.494 0.000 0.000 1.000 1,441 
Subsidiary (1/0) 0.375 0.484 0.000 0.000 1.000 1,441 
Friendly deal (1/0) 0.992 0.091 1.000 1.000 1.000 1,441 
All cash (1/0) 0.546 0.498 0.000 1.000 1.000 1,441 
All stock (1/0) 0.026 0.160 0.000 0.000 0.000 1,441 
Diversifying acquisition 
(1/0) 0.464 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 1,441 
Relative deal size  0.128 0.248 0.023 0.047 0.116 1,441 
High-tech (1/0) 0.218 0.413 0.000 0.000 0.000 1,441 
Industry M&A 0.088 0.277 0.010 0.030 0.075 1,441 
       Acquirer characteristics 
Assets (log) 7.910 1.526 6.858 7.801 8.697 1,441 
Tobin’s q 1.892 1.044 1.300 1.585 2.103 1,441 
Free cash flow 0.054 0.067 0.024 0.057 0.088 1,441 
Leverage 0.221 0.164 0.093 0.210 0.327 1,441 
Stock price run-up 0.074 0.299 -0.105 0.042 0.209 1,441 
Panel B 
Target’s status 
Public -1.429 6.996 -3.723 -0.791 2.103 294 
Private 0.495 5.895 -2.035 0.704 3.231 606 
Subsidiary 1.561 5.730 -1.434 0.834 3.819 541 
       
Deal consideration       
All cash 0.885 5.596 -1.742 0.689 3.130 787 
Non-cash 0.043 6.770 -2.559 0.091 3.395 654 
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In light of these timing characteristics, the post variable takes the value of one for all 
acquisitions with effective dates from July 1, 2009.48 Panel A of Table 2.2 shows that 34.6% of 
1,441 (or 499) acquisitions occur between July 1, 2009 and December 31, 2011. In these 499 
transactions, 277 acquirers (19.2% of the sample) have classified boards. 
 
4.3. Acquirer returns 
I examine the effect of OFDs on bidder’s market-model adjusted abnormal returns around 
the initial acquisition announcement date. I obtain the acquisition announcement data from SDC. 
Following recent studies (e.g., Harford, Humphery-Jenner and Powell, forthcoming, Lin, Officer 
and Zou, 2011 and Masulis, Wang and Xie, 2007), I compute cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
with a five-day window (-2, +2) where the event day zero is the initial announcement date. To be 
consistent with these studies, I use the CRSP equal-weighted portfolio returns to estimate the 
market model parameters over event period (-210, -11). 
Panel A of Table 2.2 shows that the average acquirer CAR for the 1,441 acquisitions is 
0.503%, which is significant at the 1% level. This result is consistent with existing studies (for 
example, Masulis, Wang and Xie, 2007 and Lin, Officer and Zou, 2011). 
 
4.4. Synergistic gains and acquisition premiums 
The analyses of synergistic gains and premiums paid in a merger are alternative ways to 
examine whether a firm’s acquisition efficiency improved after the Rule. The literature suggests 
that entrenched officers choose targets with low synergies (Harford, Humphery-Jenner and 
Powell, forthcoming) and overpay to reap personal benefits from acquisitions (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1988). 
                                                          
48I consider alternative cutoff points later in the paper to conduct sensitivity analysis. 
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Following Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991), Wang and Xie (2009) and Lin, Officer and 
Zou (2011), I measure synergistic gains by the weighted average cumulative abnormal returns of 
acquirers and targets (portfolio CAR), with the weights based on their respective market 
capitalizations on event day -11. Table 2.2 shows that the average portfolio CAR is -0.874% for 
237 acquisitions for which data is available on target returns. 
I retrieve acquisition premium data from SDC, which provides data on the ratio of the 
offer price to the target’s stock price four weeks prior to the acquisition announcement date minus 
one. Therefore, data on premium is available only for public targets. Following Harford, 
Humphery-Jenner and Powell (forthcoming), I also define a variable called proxy premium that 
estimates the premium paid for all companies regardless of their public status. Proxy premium is 
the average premium paid to the companies in the target’s industry in the year of acquisition. 
Panel A of Table 2.2 shows that the average premium (proxy premium) is 48.3% (55.79%) for 
266 (1,345) acquisitions. 
 
4.5. Deal characteristics 
I control for target’s ownership status, deal attitude, method of payment, industry 
relatedness of the acquisition, relative deal size, high-tech mergers, and M&A intensity in the 
target’s industry. The definitions of these variables are presented in the Appendix 2. 
Acquirers of public targets experience negative abnormal stock returns around initial 
acquisition announcements because target shareholders are able to free ride on the improvements 
implemented by acquirers (Grossman and Hart, 1980 and Zingales, 1995). On the other hand, 
acquirers of private or subsidiary targets experience positive abnormal stock returns because they 
provide the owners of such targets a liquidity service (Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2004; 
Officer, 2007). Consequently, I create public, private, and subsidiary indicator variables to 
identify targets’ ownership status. Following Harford, Humphery-Jenner and Powell 
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(forthcoming), who find that friendly deal attitude is relatively value destroying, I also define 
friendly as a variable that indicates the deal attitude reported in SDC.  
Existing research shows that acquirer returns around acquisition announcements vary 
with respect to the method of payment. Bidders experience negative abnormal returns for stock 
deals due to the adverse selection problem in equity issuance (Masulis, Wang and Xie, 2007). 
Therefore, I create all cash and all stock dummy variables to indicate whether the deal is paid 
absolutely by cash or stock. I also create the variable diversifying acquisition which indicates 
whether the acquirer and target firms share the same Fama-French 48 industry. However, the 
effect of diversification on firm value is ambiguous given conflicting results found in the 
literature (see for example Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990 and Campa and Kedia, 2002). 
Following Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004), Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007), and 
Lin, Officer and Zou (2011), I control for relative deal size, high-tech, and industry M&A. 
Relative deal size is the deal value scaled by bidder’s market value of equity determined on event 
day -11, high-tech is a variable that indicates whether the acquirer and the target are from high-
tech industries, and industry M&A measures the intensity of takeover transactions or liquidity in 
target’s industry. Following Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007), I measure this variable 1 year prior to 
the announcement of each deal to avoid potential look-ahead bias. 
Due to my sampling criteria, deal characteristics reported in Panel A of Table 2.2 are 
different from those reported in Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007) and Moeller, Schlingemann and 
Stulz (2004). For example, the percentages of public, private and subsidiary acquisitions in my 
sample are 20.4%, 42.1% and 37.5%, compared to 33%, 35% and 32%, respectively, in Masulis, 
Wang and Xie (2007). 
 
4.6. Acquirer characteristics 
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I control for bidder assets (log), Tobin’s q, free cash flow, leverage, and stock price run-
up (see Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2004; Lang, Stulz and Walkling, 1991; Betton, Eckbo 
and Thorburn, 2007). All of these variables are measured at the fiscal year end prior to the 
acquisition announcement (see the Appendix 2 for definitions). 
I present descriptive statistics of these variables in Panel A of Table 2.2. The median 
(average) acquirer has a book value of total assets of $2.4 ($2.7) billion, a Tobin’s q of 1.6 (1.9), 
a free cash flow ratio of 5.7% (5.4%), and a leverage ratio of 21% (22.1%). Comparing these 
median statistics with those reported in Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007), I find that my sample 
acquirers are bigger, have higher investment opportunities and free cash flow, and are more 
highly levered.  
Given that my sample is different from those used in existing M&A studies, I test 
whether my sample preserves established results. I categorize bidder CARs according to target 
type and deal consideration structure in Panel B of Table 2.2, and find results consistent with the 
literature. Specifically, I document that acquisitions of subsidiary targets are associated with the 
highest bidder returns, with an average CAR of 1.561% (p-value = 0.000), followed by 
acquisitions of private and public targets with average CARs of 0.495% (p-value = 0.039) and -
1.429% (p-value = 0.000), respectively. I also find that deals with all cash considerations are 
associated with positive bidder abnormal returns (average CAR = 0.885%, p-value = 0.000). 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
5.1. Methodology 
I use a difference-in-difference methodology to compare acquisition outcomes of firms 
with classified board status (treatment firms) to firms not having such board status (control firms) 
before and after the Rule. I present the results of a univariate estimate of this procedure in Table 
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2.3. The sample is based on subsidiary targets, for which existing research finds the highest 
bidder stock returns around acquisition announcements. 
 
Table 2.3 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of firms that acquire subsidiary targets before and after the 
legal event 
The sample consists of 1,441 U.S. mergers and acquisitions between 2001 and 2011. Acquisitions are made 
by firms that complete transactions before and after the Rule, do not change classified board status, and are 
covered by the RiskMetrics database. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. 
Acquirer CAR 
 Classified board Non-classified 
board 
Classified board – 
non-classified board 
Pre 1.455 
(5.725) 
1.783 
(5.758) 
-0.328 
(0.675) 
Post 2.106 
(5.532) 
0.685 
(6.013) 
1.421 
(0.839) 
Post – Pre 0.651 
(0.619) 
-1.098 
(0.881) 
1.749 
(0.079) 
 
I find that acquirers with classified boards have lower CARs than acquirers without such 
board status in the pre but not in the post period, yielding a difference-in-difference estimate of 
1.75% (p-value = 0.000) in treatment firms’ average CAR after the Rule. In untabulated results, I 
consider the full takeover sample and document a lower but positive difference-in-difference 
estimate of acquirers’ average abnormal return (CAR = 0.078%, p-value = 0.005). These results 
are consistent with the hypothesis that entrenched officers reduce value-decreasing investment 
decisions after the court ruling on OFDs.  
Although straightforward, the above technique does not control for deal characteristics 
that existing studies find significant when explaining acquirer abnormal returns. Also, as reported 
in Table 2.4, firms with classified boards differ from those without classified boards along 
different dimensions. For instance, acquirers with classified boards have lower assets (log) and 
Tobin’s q than firms without classified boards, similar to the results reported for “dictator” and  
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Table 2.4 
Deal and acquirer characteristics conditional on classified board status 
The sample consists of 1,441 U.S. mergers and acquisitions between 2001 and 2011. Acquisitions are made 
by firms that complete transactions before and after the Rule, do not change classified board status, and are 
covered by the RiskMetrics database. Variable definitions are in the Appendix 2. ***, **and * stand for 
statistical significance based on two-tailed tests at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Cboard = 0 Cboard = 1   
 Mean N Mean N Difference p-value 
       
Acquirer characteristics 
Assets (log) 8.203 596 7.703 845 -0.500*** 0.000 
Tobin’s q 1.972 596 1.835 845 -0.137** 0.015 
Free cash flow 0.054 596 0.054 845 0.000 0.931 
Leverage 0.213 596 0.226 845 0.013 0.131 
Stock price run-up 0.065 596 0.080 845 0.015 0.359 
       
Deal characteristics       
Public (1/0) 0.270 596 0.157 845 -0.113*** 0.000 
Private (1/0) 0.421 596 0.420 845 -0.001 0.969 
Subsidiary (1/0) 0.309 596 0.422 845 0.114*** 0.000 
Friendly deal (1/0) 0.992 596 0.992 845 0.000 0.983 
All cash (1/0) 0.549 596 0.544 845 -0.004 0.873 
All stock (1/0) 0.037 596 0.019 845 -0.018** 0.036 
Diversifying acquisition (1/0) 0.440 596 0.480 845 0.041 0.126 
Relative deal size  0.115 596 0.136 845 0.021 0.101 
High-tech (1/0) 0.265 596 0.185 845 -0.080*** 0.000 
Industry M&A 0.085 596 0.090 845 0.006 0.709 
 
“democracy” firms in Harford, Humphery-Jenner and Powell (forthcoming).49 I also find that 
treatment firms consider relatively larger deal size, more subsidiaries as targets, and fewer high-
tech acquisitions. Because of these differences, I control for acquirer and deal characteristics, 
industry fixed effects, and year fixed effects in multivariate regressions to isolate the incremental 
effect of the Rule on acquirer stock returns. The baseline regression model is: 
CAR = f(Cboard, post, cboard x post, deal characteristics, acquirer characteristics, industry 
fixed effects, year fixed effects).                (1) 
All variables, except industry effects, are as described earlier. I measure industry effects 
by the Fama-French 48 industry classification scheme. In this model, the main variable of interest 
                                                          
49Harford, Humphery-Jenner and Powell’s (forthcoming) classification of “dictator” and “democracy” firms are based 
on 24 takeover defenses. Firms with at least 10 takeover defenses are defined as dictator, whereas firms with fewer than 
10 takeover defenses, which does not include classified board, are classified as democracy firms. 
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is the interaction term cboard x post, whose coefficient estimates the Rule’s impact specific to 
firms with classified boards. 
 
5.2. Regression results 
Table 2.5 presents ordinary least square (OLS) estimates of equation (1). The first model 
controls for deal features, acquirer characteristics and the post indicator variable. The second 
model adds year fixed effects, the third model adds year and industry fixed effects, and the fourth 
model adds year, industry and firm fixed effects. Because model 4 controls for firm fixed effects, 
the coefficient of cboard, which is time invariant, cannot be estimated. For a similar reason of 
multicollinearity, I drop the post indicator variable in models 2-4 that control for year fixed 
effects. The last model is similar to model 3, but is based on a subsample of firms where CFOs 
are not board members and thus, do not have access to D&O insurance.50 Since CFOs play a 
major role in M&As, we expect a greater impact of the court law for this subsample. 
Model 1 shows that the post indicator variable is positive but not statistically significant, 
suggesting that performance of all acquisitions did not improve after the court ruling on OFDs. 
This is consistent with my hypothesis since it expects the Rule’s effect concentrated in firms 
where officers are insulated from market discipline. 
In regression specifications 2-4, the coefficient of cboard x post is positive and 
statistically significant. Specifically, the coefficient estimate is 1.52 (t-statistic = 2.18) for the 
baseline regression in model 3, indicating that acquisitions by firms with classified boards 
increased shareholder value by about 1.52% after the court ruling on officers’ fiduciary duties. 
For the average (median) bidder with classified board in the sample, this increased abnormal 
stock return translates into a gain of $77 ($40) million in shareholder value. Therefore, the effect 
of the Rule appears both economically and statistically significant.  
                                                          
50In my sample, about 95% of CFOs do not hold board memberships at their firms. 
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Table 2.5 
Effects of officers’ fiduciary duties on acquirers’ abnormal announcement returns 
The sample consists of 1,441 U.S. mergers and acquisitions between 2001 and 2011. Acquisitions are made 
by firms that complete transactions before and after the Rule, do not change classified board status, and are 
covered by the RiskMetrics database. The dependent variable is the acquirer 5-day cumulative abnormal 
returns (%). Variable definitions are in the Appendix 2. The coefficients of the constant, year, and industry 
(and firm) indicators are omitted for brevity. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. ***, **and * stand for statistical significance based 
on two-tailed tests at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Cboard x post  1.648** 
(2.370) 
1.521** 
(2.180) 
1.332* 
(1.840) 
1.627** 
(2.250) 
Cboard (1/0)  0.136 
(0.340) 
0.189 
(0.450)  
0.167 
(0.380) 
Post (1/0) 0.462 
(1.330)    
 
Private (1/0) 1.345*** 
(2.640) 
1.421*** 
(2.770) 
1.499*** 
(2.910) 
1.770*** 
(2.940) 
1.444*** 
(2.710) 
Subsidiary (1/0) 2.359*** 
(4.270) 
2.364*** 
(4.240) 
2.290*** 
(4.060) 
2.190*** 
(3.450) 
2.219*** 
(3.790) 
Friendly deal (1/0) -0.416 
(-0.240) 
-0.426 
(-0.240) 
-0.595 
(-0.310) 
-0.649 
(-0.340) 
-0.788 
(-0.370) 
All cash (1/0) 0.565* 
(1.740) 
0.639* 
(1.950) 
0.785** 
(2.330) 
0.426 
(1.000) 
0.815** 
(2.290) 
All stock (1/0) -1.711 
(-1.120) 
-1.522 
(-0.980) 
-1.624 
(-1.080) 
-1.739 
(-0.990) 
-1.573 
(-0.950) 
Diversifying acquisition (1/0) -0.965*** 
(-3.100) 
-0.989*** 
(-3.200) 
-1.265*** 
(-3.340) 
-1.019** 
(-2.080) 
-1.288*** 
(-3.210) 
Relative deal size  -0.348 
(-0.300) 
-0.487 
(-0.420) 
-0.709 
(-0.640) 
-0.125 
(-0.100) 
-0.354 
(-0.300) 
High-tech (1/0) -0.387 
(-0.960) 
-0.223 
(-0.520) 
-0.362 
(-0.610) 
0.191 
(0.240) 
0.367 
(-0.560) 
High-tech x relative deal size -4.585*** 
(-2.760) 
-4.720*** 
(-2.780) 
-4.696** 
(-2.570) 
-5.115** 
(-2.540) 
-4.861*** 
(-2.590) 
Industry M&A -0.012 
(-0.030) 
-0.159 
(-0.410) 
-0.342 
(-0.710) 
-0.523 
(-1.110) 
-0.424 
(-0.860) 
Assets (log) -0.211* 
(-1.770) 
-0.129 
(-1.070) 
-0.190 
(-1.470) 
-0.878 
(-1.380) 
-0.201 
(-1.470) 
Tobin’s q -0.093 
(-0.470) 
-0.174 
(-0.930) 
-0.036 
(-0.180) 
-0.157 
(-0.430) 
-0.062 
(-0.290) 
Free cash flow -0.155 
(-0.050) 
0.005 
(0.000) 
-0.217 
(-0.060) 
-6.629 
(-1.350) 
-0.015 
(-0.000) 
Leverage -0.258 
(-0.250) 
-0.335 
(-0.310) 
-1.078 
(-0.870) 
-1.639 
(-0.600) 
-1.558 
(-1.210) 
Stock price run-up -3.259*** 
(-3.980) 
-3.353*** 
(-4.140) 
-3.340*** 
(-4.120) 
-3.743*** 
(-4.040) 
-3.495*** 
(-3.850) 
      
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes No 
Adjusted R2 0.081 0.083 0.110 0.313 0.080 
Observations 1,441 1,441 1,441 1,441 1,373 
 
Model 4 shows that the effect of the court ruling is stronger in a subsample of firms 
where CFOs do not have access to liability insurance, consistent with our prediction. The 
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coefficients on control variables are largely consistent with those reported in Masulis, Wang and 
Xie (2007) and Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004). For example, I observe that bidder 
returns are (i) higher in acquisitions of private and subsidiary targets, (ii) higher in acquisitions 
that involve cash consideration, (iii) lower for acquisitions that are unrelated to acquirers’ 
industry, and (iv) lower for high-tech acquisitions that consider relatively large deal size. I also 
find that acquirer’s pre-announcement stock price run-up has a negative impact on its 
announcement-period abnormal returns. Further, the regression models 2, 3 and 5 fail to identify 
a reliable relation between acquirer returns and board classification status. This finding is not 
consistent with the results documented in Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007). One reason is that my 
sample period includes data after the court ruling on OFDs, which should reduce the adverse 
impacts of classified boards.51 I also find that the explanatory power (as measured by adjusted R2) 
of the models in Table 2.5 is higher than that found in the M&A literature. This is probably 
because I control for year, industry and firm fixed effects while most studies only consider year 
effects. 
I conduct sensitivity analysis by considering alternative definitions of the post variable. 
Specifically, I require that the post variable take the value of one for all acquisitions with 
effective dates starting from August 1, 2009 / September 1, 2009 / October 1, 2009 / November 1, 
2009 / December 1, 2009 / January 1, 2010, and then evaluate the impact of the Rule on acquirer 
CAR using the baseline regression model. For these alternative definitions, I find in untabulated 
regressions that the coefficients of cboard x post are 1.436 (t-statistic = 2.08) / 1.578 (t-statistic = 
2.28) / 1.277 (t-statistic = 1.83) / 1.331 (t-statistic = 1.89) / 1.255 (t-statistic = 1.75) / 0.773 (t-
statistic = 1.08), respectively.52 The January 1, 2010 cutoff point potentially misclassifies 65 deals 
(499 – 434) as pre-event transactions, and thus greatly reduces the average impact of the Rule. 
                                                          
51I am able to replicate the findings of Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007) for a sample of acquisitions during 1990-2000. 
52Thus, the coefficient of cboard x post monotonically decreases except in the months of September and October 2009. 
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I also investigate whether my results are a manifestation of the recent financial crisis. 
Several studies argue that the 2007 financial crisis created a negative shock to the supply of 
external finance (see Duchin, Ozbas and Sencoy, 2010). Thus, one could argue that firms with 
classified boards may profit from providing a liquidity service. To evaluate this argument, I re-
estimate the baseline regression by redefining the post variable as taking the value of one for all 
acquisitions completed after July 1, 2007. I find that the coefficient of cboard x post is slightly 
positive but statistically insignificant (0.346, t-statistic = 0.53). This finding is consistent with the 
results reported in Table 2.4, which shows that firms with and without classified boards hold 
similar free cash flows and therefore, firms with classified boards are not more likely to provide 
liquidity service during the financial crisis. 
Overall, the evidence reported in this section is consistent with the hypothesis that 
officers insulated from market discipline have fewer incentives to conduct value-decreasing 
acquisition decisions after the Rule, mainly because the Rule enhanced officers’ liability exposure 
by increasing the threat that officers’ personal wealth will be affected adversely by shareholder 
lawsuits. 
 
5.3. Synergistic gains and acquisition premiums 
In the previous section, I found that acquirers with entrenched boards experienced 
increased returns in the post period. In this section, I investigate whether the increase in acquirer 
returns can be attributed to synergistic gains that are due to officers’ enhanced due diligence on 
corporate investment decisions or whether it is a redistribution of wealth from targets to 
acquirers. In a completed merger or acquisition, the wealth effect of acquirer-shareholders 
depends on the combined value of the company (Bradley, Desai and Kim, 1988). In the context of 
this paper, one could expect the synergy generated by an acquisition to increase after the Rule 
because the court ruling on officers’ fiduciary duties improved a firm’s governance structure 
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(particularly by discouraging its officers to make value-decreasing acquisitions). Alternatively, 
one could also expect in the spirit of Roll (1986) that acquirers with entrenched management can 
no longer afford its hubris after the Rule, and therefore the increased acquirer returns reflect a 
wealth redistribution effect. I test these alternative explanations in Table 2.6. 
Following Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988), Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991), and Wang 
and Xie (2009), I estimate a regression predicting portfolio CAR to measure synergistic gains in 
model 1. The explanatory variables are the same as in Table 2.5. The table shows that the synergy 
generated by acquirers with classified boards increased by 2.55% in the post period (t-statistic = 
1.86). To ensure that my result does not reflect a redistribution of wealth between bidder and 
target shareholders, I analyze target CAR and acquisition premium in the next two models. These 
regression models are similar to those used by Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991), Officer (2003), 
Schwert (2000), and Wang and Xie (2009). If the increased portfolio abnormal returns resulted 
from wealth redistribution, we would expect target CAR and acquisition premium to decline 
significantly for acquirers with entrenched officers in the post period. 
The dependent variables in model 2 and 3 are target CAR and acquisition premium, 
respectively. I find that the coefficient estimates of cboard x post are statistically insignificant 
and unstable (changes sign) across these regression models, implying that acquirers with 
classified boards did not gain the increased returns by paying lower acquisition premiums in the 
post period. 
A shortcoming of models 2 and 3 is that they are based on acquisitions of public targets 
for which target stock price data are available. Following Harford, Humphery-Jenner and Powell 
(forthcoming), I address the missing data problem of private and subsidiary targets by considering 
proxy premium, which is the average premium paid to the companies in the target’s industry in 
the year of acquisition. Ceteris paribus, a higher proxy premium is considered value-reducing for 
the acquirer. In model 4, I re-estimate equation (1) with acquirers’ CAR as the dependent variable  
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Table 2.6 
Synergistic gains and acquisition premiums 
The sample consists of 1,441 U.S. mergers and acquisitions between 2001 and 2011. Acquisitions are made 
by firms that complete transactions before and after the Rule, do not change classified board status, and are 
covered by the RiskMetrics database. The dependent variable is the portfolio/target/acquirer 5-day 
cumulative abnormal returns (%) in model 1/2/4, respectively. In model 3, the dependent variable is 
premium. Variable definitions are in the Appendix 2. The coefficients of the constant, year, and industry 
indicators are omitted for brevity. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. ***, **and * stand for statistical significance based on two-
tailed tests at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Dependent variable (model) 
 Portfolio CAR (1) Target CAR (2) Premium (3) CAR (4) 
Cboard x post 2.545* 
(1.860) 
-0.011 
(-0.150) 
27.469 
(1.410) 
1.627** 
(2.070) 
Cboard (1/0) -0.865 
(-1.110) 
-0.076** 
(-1.980) 
-25.687* 
(-1.780) 
0.359 
(0.820) 
Proxy premium x cboard x post / 
102 
   -0.112 
(-0.240) 
Proxy premium x cboard /102    -0.045 
(-0.500) 
Proxy premium / 102    0.055 
(1.190) 
Private (1/0) 
   
1.492*** 
(2.850) 
Subsidiary (1/0) 
  
59.125*** 
(2.890) 
2.282*** 
(3.950) 
Friendly deal (1/0) -2.530 
(-0.880) 
0.062 
(0.850) 
16.607 
(1.000) 
-0.623 
(-0.320) 
All cash (1/0) 0.757 
(0.940) 
0.088** 
(2.350) 
19.789 
(1.640) 
0.783** 
(2.200) 
All stock (1/0) -1.704 
(-1.050) 
0.065 
(1.100) 
10.732 
(0.730) 
-1.607 
(-1.070) 
Diversifying acquisition (1/0) 0.225 
(0.330) 
0.026 
(0.740) 
4.001 
(0.400) 
-1.117*** 
(-2.780) 
Relative deal size  -1.690* 
(-1.680) 
-0.123*** 
(-3.120) 
-3.386 
(-0.290) 
-0.855 
(-0.750) 
High-tech (1/0) -0.332 
(-0.430) 
-0.030 
(-0.610) 
4.638 
(0.400) 
-0.478 
(-0.780) 
High-tech x relative deal size -1.786 
(-1.180) 
0.007 
(0.110) 
-15.702 
(-0.840) 
-4.520** 
(-2.440) 
Industry M&A -0.773 
(-0.500) 
-0.105* 
(-1.720) 
-19.877 
(-1.550) 
-0.447 
(-0.890) 
Assets (log) -0.197 
(-0.920) 
-0.018* 
(-1.760) 
-7.602* 
(-1.820) 
-0.173 
(-1.310) 
Tobin’s q -0.348 
(-0.990) 
-0.015 
(-1.570) 
-6.304 
(-1.500) 
-0.011 
(-0.050) 
Free cash flow 4.118 
(0.690) 
0.266 
(1.180) 
96.891* 
(1.700) 
-0.405 
(-0.120) 
Leverage 1.749 
(0.810) 
-0.122 
(-1.170) 
-57.210* 
(-1.690) 
-1.383 
(-1.070) 
Stock price run-up -2.805* 
(-1.810) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
3.374 
(0.210) 
-3.393*** 
(-3.960) 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.073 0.135 0.123 0.111 
Observations 237 237 266 1,345 
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and add proxy premium to the list of explanatory variables. If the coefficient on proxy premium is 
negative for firms with classified boards in the post period, it would suggest that acquirers with 
entrenched officers experienced increased returns by paying lower premiums (i.e., wealth 
redistribution). 
As reflected in Table 2.6, the coefficient of proxy premium x cboard x post is statistically 
insignificant. Therefore, the claim that acquirers gained through wealth redistribution is not 
supported for any type of target acquisitions. Overall, the wealth effect of acquirer-shareholders 
appears to result from synergistic gains that likely arise from officers’ heightened level of due 
diligence in the post period. 
 
5.4. The sources of value creation 
Thus far my results suggest that acquirers with classified boards (i) experience higher 
level of abnormal returns around initial acquisition announcements and (ii) make more synergistic 
acquisitions after the court ruling on officers’ fiduciary duties. In this section, I examine the 
source of this value creation by focusing on the method of payments. 
Harris and Raviv (1988) and Stulz (1988) offer an argument that financing policies are a 
function of corporate governance structure. Specifically, they argue that officers who hold a 
significant fraction of their firm’s ownership have incentives to preserve (or increase) control 
over the corporation, and therefore choose cash as a preferred means of payment. Because most 
bidders are cash constraint, cash payments are generally financed by debt (Faccio and Masulis, 
2005). The increased debt in turn reduces the fraction of stock owned by outside shareholders that 
a raider can acquire. Thus, cash financing deters the threat of future takeovers. To the extent that 
the court decision on officers’ fiduciary duties reduces private benefits of control by improving a 
firm’s governance structure, I expect entrenched officers to have fewer incentives to maintain 
corporate control, and therefore reduce acquisitions with cash financing. To test this proposition, I 
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use two approaches to analyze the method of payment decision in regression analyses. First, I 
classify transactions into cash deals if they pay entirely through cash. Second, I measure the 
proportion of cash used in each transaction. Table 2.7 presents regression results without 
controlling for deal characteristics since these characteristics are endogenously determined with 
the method of payment.53 
In the first regression model, I consider a Logit model to estimate the likelihood of deals 
entirely financed through cash. Because this model controls for firm fixed effects, it removes 
acquirers that do not change method of payments during the sample period. In model 2, I consider 
an OLS estimation of the proportion of cash used in acquisitions. Since cash proportion by 
definition lies in the interval [0, 100], I consider a two-boundary Tobit model in model 3. 
Table 2.7 shows that the coefficient of cboard x post is negative and significant in all 
three models. The marginal effect of cboard x post is -8.44 with a t-statistic of -2.18 in the Tobit 
model, indicating that firms with entrenched officers used 8.44% less cash to finance acquisitions 
in the post period. This result is consistent with the proposition that acquirers with entrenched 
officers reduce cash financing after the Rule, which is expected to reduce officers’ control 
benefits. Acquirer-specific control variables have little success in explaining the likelihood or the 
proportion of cash. 
Given the above evidence, there may be an effect of the interaction between the method 
of payment and officers’ fiduciary duties on bidders’ abnormal stock returns at the acquisition 
announcement. Model 4 shows that acquirers with classified boards experienced significantly 
positive abnormal stock returns for non-cash deals after the Rule, increasing the benefits of OFDs 
from 2.43% to 4.58% (2.43% + 2.15% = 4.58%). This finding suggests that shareholders perceive 
financing with some amount of stock as being consistent with firm value maximization after the 
court ruling on OFDs, consistent with control benefits being less valuable to entrenched officers 
                                                          
53However, my results are robust to the inclusion of deal characteristics. 
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after the Rule. Deal features and acquirer characteristics have similar explanatory power and 
statistical significance as in Table 2.5. 
 
Table 2.7 
Value creation by reducing cash acquisitions 
The sample consists of 1,441 U.S. mergers and acquisitions between 2001 and 2011. Acquisitions are made 
by firms that complete transactions before and after the Rule, do not change classified board status, and are 
covered by the RiskMetrics database. The dependent variable in model 1 is cash (an indicator variable), 
whereas it is percent of cash in model 2 and 3. The dependent variable in model 4 is the acquirer 5-day 
cumulative abnormal returns (%). Variable definitions are in the Appendix 2. The coefficients of the 
constant, year, and firm indicators are omitted for brevity. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on 
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. ***, **and * stand for statistical 
significance based on two-tailed tests at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
 Logit (1) OLS (2) Toibit (3) OLS (4) 
Cboard x all cash x post   
 
-2.147** 
(-2.260) 
Cboard x all cash   
 
0.773 
(0.830) 
Cboard x post -0.653** 
(-2.530) 
-6.171* 
(-1.870) 
-30.797** 
(-2.370) 
2.434*** 
(2.770) 
Cboard (1/0)   18.207** 
(2.130)  
Private (1/0)    1.759*** 
(2.990) 
Subsidiary (1/0)    2.180*** 
(3.470) 
Friendly deal (1/0)    -0.640 
(-0.330) 
All cash (1/0)    0.417 
(0.640) 
All stock (1/0)    -1.830 
(-1.070) 
Diversifying acquisition (1/0)    -1.017** 
(-2.160) 
Relative deal size     -0.062 
(-0.050) 
High-tech (1/0)    0.292 
(0.380) 
High-tech x relative deal size    -5.203*** 
(-2.640) 
Industry M&A    -0.350 
(-0.760) 
Assets (log) 0.021 
(0.100) 
6.019** 
(2.160) 
-3.017 
(-1.180) 
-0.734 
(-1.200) 
Tobin’s q -0.007 
(-0.060) 
-0.305 
(-0.190) 
-1.651 
(-0.430) 
-0.092 
(-0.250) 
Free cash flow -2.606 
(-1.290) 
-15.774 
(-0.700) 
205.082*** 
(3.430) 
-8.392* 
(-1.700) 
Leverage 0.263 
(0.280) 
-2.353 
(-0.220) 
28.353 
(1.220) 
-1.701 
(-0.640) 
Stock price run-up -0.287 
(-1.160) 
-1.678 
(-0.450) 
-11.782 
(-1.070) 
-3.847*** 
(-4.200) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No No No 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes 
Adjusted R2/log likelihood -436.941 0.405 -2,587.785 0.314 
Observations 1,087 1,441 1,441 1,441 
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5.5. The role of additional disciplinary mechanisms 
My research design allows me to isolate the impact of the court ruling on acquisition 
outcomes for a sample of firms that do not change an important antitakeover provision, namely 
the classified board status. There are however other antitakeover provisions and corporate 
governance mechanisms that might attenuate or intensify agency conflicts between officers and 
shareholders. Omitting these variables may be problematic because disciplinary mechanisms 
often interact with one another (Cremers and Nair, 2005 and Giroud and Mueller, 2011). In this 
section, I consider officers’ equity-based incentives, product market competition and the 
entrenchment index (Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell, 2009) to investigate whether officers’ fiduciary 
duties interact with other corporate governance mechanisms.54 
Equity-based compensation: It is argued that equity-based compensation aligns managerial 
interests with those of shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). The absence of equity-based 
compensation allows officers to reap private benefits from acquisitions, which are not value-
maximizing to acquirer-shareholders. In contrast, value-decreasing acquisitions are less of a 
concern in firms where officers’ wealth is tied to their companies. Consistent with these 
predictions, Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman (2001) record a strong positive relation between 
acquiring officers’ equity-based compensation and stock returns around acquisition 
announcements. I study this link by defining equity-based compensation (EBC) as the Black-
Scholes value of new options granted to the top five executives divided by their total 
compensation in the year preceding the acquisition.55 A firm is then categorized in the high (low) 
EBC group if the proportion of equity-based compensation offered to executives is greater 
(lower) than the median score in a year. Firms with high EBC should have officers with greater 
                                                          
54I do not consider board’s disciplinary role because my sample is based on the post-SOX period for which Duchin, 
Matsusaka and Ozbas (2010) find board independence across 94% of firms. When I add the percentage of board 
independence in the regression analysis, I find insignificant coefficient estimate for this variable. 
55Due to major changes in some Execucomp variables in 2006, I use fair value as the post-2006 equivalent of Black-
Scholes value. See, for example, Maug, Niessen-Ruenzi and Zhivotova (2012) for detail. 
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wealth risk, and as such, I expect these firms to engage in more value-enhancing deals in the post 
period. 
 I subdivide the sample conditional on EBC to be consistent with Datta, Iskandar-Datta 
and Raman (2001). The first two regression models in Table 2.8 present the results. While the 
coefficient on cboard x post is positive in both subsamples, it is statistically significant only in 
the high EBC subsample. These results suggest that the impact of the Rule is concentrated in 
samples of firms with classified boards where officers have the incentive to increase acquisition 
efficiencies, i.e., where officers’ future wealth is at risk. 
Product market competition: Industry competition also plays an important disciplinary role on 
managerial behavior that can eliminate inefficiency (Hart, 1983 and Shelifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Following Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007) and Lin, Officer and Zou (2011), I measure industry 
competitiveness using the Herfindahl index, which is calculated as the sum of squared market 
shares (sales) of all Compustat firms in each Fama-French 48 industry. Industries with lower 
values of Herfindahl index indicate more product market competition. For each year, I define an 
industry as competitive if the industry’s Herfindahl index is in the bottom quartile of all 48 Fama-
French industries, and noncompetitive otherwise. Since corporate governance problems are more 
intense for firms in noncompetitive industries (Giroud and Mueller, 2011), I expect acquirer-
shareholders of these industries to benefit more from the court ruling on officers’ fiduciary duties. 
Models 3 and 4 in Table 2.8 present the results. As expected, the coefficient of cboard x 
post is statistically significant only in the subsample of industries with less competition, although 
it is positive in both competitive and noncompetitive industries. These results suggest that 
shareholders of firms with entrenched officers, who also face less product market competition, 
benefit more from the court ruling on OFDs. 
Entrenchment index: Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009) measure the strength of a firm’s 
takeover defense by the entrenchment index. This index is based on six antitakeover provisions:  
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Table 2.8 
Officers’ fiduciary duties, equity-based compensation and product market competition  
The sample consists of 1,441 U.S. mergers and acquisitions between 2001 and 2011. Acquisitions are made 
by firms that complete transactions before and after the Rule, do not change classified board status, and are 
covered by the RiskMetrics database. The dependent variable in all subsample analyses is the acquirer 5-
day cumulative abnormal returns (%). Variable definitions are in the Appendix 2. The coefficients of the 
constant, year, and industry indicators are omitted for brevity. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on 
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. ***, **and * stand for statistical 
significance based on two-tailed tests at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 Subsample (model) 
 High ECB 
(1) 
Low ECB 
(2) 
Competitive 
(3) 
Noncompetitive 
(4) 
Cboard x post 2.225** 
(2.310) 
0.828 
(0.740) 
0.255 
(0.230) 
2.625*** 
(2.800) 
Cboard (1/0) -0.192 
(-0.340) 
0.477 
(0.780) 
1.115 
(1.610) 
-0.556 
(-0.990) 
Private (1/0) 1.887** 
(2.560) 
1.077 
(1.470) 
0.610 
(0.800) 
2.178*** 
(3.000) 
Subsidiary (1/0) 2.667*** 
(3.510) 
2.044*** 
(2.650) 
1.601* 
(1.900) 
2.901*** 
(3.890) 
Friendly deal (1/0) -0.247 
(-0.100) 
-0.918 
(-0.380) 
0.710 
(0.230) 
-2.346 
(-0.970) 
All cash (1/0) 1.207*** 
(2.640) 
0.338 
(0.680) 
0.472 
(0.890) 
0.858* 
(1.880) 
All stock (1/0) -2.994 
(-1.550) 
0.850 
(0.490) 
-2.221 
(-1.180) 
-1.665 
(-0.700) 
Diversifying acquisition 
(1/0) 
-1.308*** 
(-2.700) 
-0.975 
(-1.520) 
-1.079** 
(-2.140) 
-1.375*** 
(-2.600) 
Relative deal size  1.857 
(1.020) 
-2.851*** 
(-2.860) 
-0.035 
(-0.020) 
-1.039 
(-0.960) 
High-tech (1/0) 0.179 
(0.180) 
-0.562 
(-0.830) 
-0.558 
(-0.770) 
0.475 
(0.390) 
High-tech x relative deal 
size 
-8.693 
(-1.080) 
-2.585* 
(-1.940) 
-5.307** 
(-2.090) 
-6.575 
(-0.480) 
Industry M&A -0.091 
(-0.110) 
-0.202 
(-0.350) 
2.871 
(1.210) 
-0.511 
(-1.000) 
Assets (log) -0.237 
(-1.120) 
-0.187 
(-1.030) 
-0.270 
(-1.540) 
-0.135 
(-0.650) 
Tobin’s q -0.026 
(-0.100) 
-0.108 
(-0.250) 
0.079 
(0.260) 
-0.202 
(-0.820) 
Free cash flow 0.816 
(0.190) 
-3.190 
(-0.530) 
-3.290 
(-0.610) 
5.281 
(1.070) 
Leverage -1.495 
(-0.850) 
-0.521 
(-0.300) 
-1.897 
(-0.970) 
0.055 
(0.030) 
Stock price run-up -4.066*** 
(-3.510) 
-2.046* 
(-1.650) 
-3.011*** 
(-3.010) 
-3.489*** 
(-2.750) 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.120 0.130 0.088 0.146 
Observations 818 623 670 771 
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Table 2.8 (continued) 
 
 Subsample (model) 
 Mod. E-index < 2  
(5) 
Mod. E-index >= 2  
(6)  
High ODS 
(7) 
Low ODS 
(8) 
Cboard x post -0.807 
(-0.800) 
2.568*** 
(2.860) 
0.870 
(0.403) 
2.209** 
(0.024) 
Cboard (1/0) 0.884 
(1.320) 
-0.089 
(-0.170) 
0.539 
(0.382) 
-0.260 
(0.687) 
Private (1/0) 1.071 
(1.390) 
1.971*** 
(2.810) 
0.585 
(0.507) 
2.113*** 
(0.001) 
Subsidiary (1/0) 2.237*** 
(2.920) 
2.661*** 
(3.520) 
1.225 
(0.163) 
2.954*** 
(0.000) 
Friendly deal (1/0) -5.764* 
(-1.930) 
1.481 
(0.700) 
-2.278 
(0.353) 
1.147 
(0.612) 
All cash (1/0) 0.828* 
(1.750) 
0.869* 
(1.760) 
0.891* 
(0.078) 
0.641 
(0.162) 
All stock (1/0) -3.415 
(-1.420) 
-0.127 
(-0.080) 
-2.305 
(0.254) 
-1.482 
(0.501) 
Diversifying acquisition (1/0) -1.786*** 
(-3.550) 
-0.796 
(-1.460) 
-0.879** 
(0.040) 
-1.359** 
(0.019) 
Relative deal size  1.493 
(0.800) 
-1.559 
(-1.200) 
-0.810 
(0.572) 
-0.433 
(0.770) 
High-tech (1/0) 0.329 
(0.310) 
-0.179 
(-0.250) 
-1.225 
(0.152) 
-0.067 
(0.951) 
High-tech x relative deal size -12.634 
(-1.630) 
-3.228* 
(-1.800) 
1.883 
(0.783) 
-6.620*** 
(0.005) 
Industry M&A -0.435 
(-1.050) 
-0.009 
(-0.010) 
0.782 
(0.263) 
-0.886 
(0.113) 
Assets (log) -0.240 
(-1.420) 
-0.248 
(-1.370) 
-0.151 
(0.471) 
-0.263 
(0.230) 
Tobin’s q -0.267 
(-0.840) 
0.241 
(0.940) 
-0.030 
(0.917) 
-0.038 
(0.902) 
Free cash flow -2.032 
(-0.460) 
0.533 
(0.120) 
2.734 
(0.574) 
-3.499 
(0.460) 
Leverage -3.340** 
(-2.010) 
-0.347 
(-0.210) 
-2.419 
(0.159) 
-0.628 
(0.772) 
Stock price run-up -2.995** 
(-2.440) 
-3.742*** 
(-3.370) 
-2.045* 
(0.078) 
-4.290*** 
(0.000) 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.128 0.140 0.066 0.176 
Observations 617 824 720 721 
 
classified boards, poison pills, golden parachutes, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, limits 
to shareholder charter amendments, and supermajority requirements for mergers. Bebchuk, 
Cohen and Ferrell (2009) find that increases in the level of this index are associated with 
reductions in firm value while Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007) find such increases to be associated 
with acquisitions generating lower announcement-period stock returns. Because I consider 
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classified boards as a measure of managerial entrenchment, I define a modified E-index by 
deducting classified board status from the entrenchment index. I then partition acquirers 
according to their takeover vulnerability, i.e., whether a firm’s modified E-index is less than the 
sample median of 2. Since officers at firms with a high score are greatly insulated from market 
discipline, I expect the marginal impact of the court ruling to be more pronounced for this set of 
acquirers. 
Models 5 and 6 in Table 2.8 present the results. As expected, the coefficient of cboard x 
post is positive and statistically significant in the subsample of acquirers that are resistant to 
takeovers. On the other hand, the coefficient is negative, although statistically insignificant, in the 
subsample of acquirers that are vulnerable to corporate takeovers. These findings suggest that 
acquiring firms where officers had the greatest protection from the market for corporate control 
benefit more from the court ruling on officers’ fiduciary duties, probably because officers of these 
firms experience increased liability exposure in the post period. 
Shareholding of outside directors: Ownership of outside directors is also a well-established 
measure of corporate governance. Without adequate ownership, directors are not likely to monitor 
officers (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998), and this subsequently results in a broad range of agency 
problems. On the other hand, value-maximizing corporate decisions are often associated with 
large ownership of outside directors. For example, Shivdasani (1993) reports that outside 
directors with large ownership are able to negotiate a more favorable takeover deal, and Agrawal 
and Nasser (2012) find that independent director blockholders reduce agency costs by lowering 
firm cash holdings and increasing capital expenditures. To evaluate the importance of this 
disciplinary measure, I define outside director shareholding (ODS) as the total shareholding by 
directors who are not corporate insiders, do not have business relation with the firm, and/or are 
unrelated to corporate insiders. A firm is then categorized in the high (low) ODS group if the 
combined ownership of its outside directors is above (below) the sample median score. Since 
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officers at firms without significant ODS may evade board monitoring, I expect acquirer-
shareholders of these firms to benefit more from the court ruling on OFDs. 
 From models 7 and 8 in Table 2.8, I find results consistent with my prediction. Although 
the coefficient is positive in both subsamples, the coefficient of cboard x post is statistically 
significant only in the subsample of acquirers with low outside director ownership. This suggests 
that acquiring firms with entrenched officers, who are also able to avoid monitoring by outside 
directors, benefit more from the Gantler court ruling on OFDs. 
In all regression models in Table 2.8, the coefficients on acquirer characteristics and deal 
features are similar to those reported in Table 2.5. As a robustness check, I re-estimate the 
regressions reported in Table 2.8 with firm and industry fixed effects, and find similar results for 
the main variables of interest. In another robustness check, I consider the whole sample of 
acquisitions and add EBC, competitive, modified E-index, and ODS as additional control variables 
in the baseline regression model. I find that the coefficients of these variables are statistically 
insignificant. One explanation is that these governance variables are sticky over the sample 
period, and therefore their impact is hard to identify in a model with firm and industry fixed 
effects.56 
 
5.6. Diagnostic tests 
The analysis thus far follows the M&A literature and focuses on acquisition performance. 
In principle, if the Rule on OFDs increased officers’ liability exposure, we would expect to see (i) 
an increase in D&O liability insurance premiums for firms with entrenched officers and (ii) a 
decline in the frequency of value-decreasing acquisitions performed by firms with entrenched 
officers. 
                                                          
56Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007) do not find a significant relation between acquirer returns and EBC. They also report a 
statistically insignificant, albeit positive, relation between acquirer returns and industry competitiveness for a sample of 
firms that change antitakeover provisions between 1990 and 2003.  
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D&O liability insurance premiums: U.S. firms are not required to disclose information on D&O 
insurance. They also do not disclose such information voluntarily (Lin, Officer and Zou, 2011). 
The only available source of information is the merger agreement, which describes directors’ and 
officers’ liability coverage in target firms as a percentage of pre-merger D&O insurance premium 
amount.57 The SDC database reports this data item (D&O premium limit) from 2004. 
 Scaling the D&O insurance premium limit by the acquisition transaction value is 
necessary since the D&O insurance coverage is expected to be positively correlated with 
transaction value (see Baker and Griffith, 2007 for a discussion).58 Thus, Figure 2.1 presents 
difference-in-difference estimates (before vs. after the Rule and classified vs. non-classified board 
status) of the scaled D&O insurance premium limit. The graph shows that the liability insurance 
premium, which was statistically indistinguishable for firms with and without classified boards 
before the Gantler case, increased disproportionately among firms with classified boards after the 
Rule. This simple difference-in-difference produces a 41.6% increase in insurance premium, 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This result reasonably validates the identification strategy 
that officers’ liability exposure in some firms, but not all, increased at a greater pace after the 
Gantler case. 
Frequency of acquisitions: An established line of research documents that acquisitions of public 
targets are associated with the lowest announcement-period abnormal stock returns (see for 
example Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2005 and Masulis, Wang and Xie, 2007). Thus, the 
following analysis focuses on acquisitions of public targets. 
                                                          
57For example, the merger agreement between ZiLOG, Inc. and IXYS Corporation documents a 225% D&O insurance 
premium limit. The agreement states that “ZiLOG will purchase a director and officer “tail” policy prior to the effective 
time of the merger in respect of acts or omissions occurring prior to the effective time of the merger that covers each 
indemnified person currently covered by ZiLOG’s officers’ and directors’ liability insurance policy for six years after 
the effective time on terms with respect to coverage and amount at least as, but not materially more, favorable than 
those of such policy in effect on December 5, 2009 and with an aggregate premium not to exceed 225% of the amount 
per annum paid in respect of ZiLOG’s last annual policy period”. 
58My results are similar when not scaling the D&O insurance premium limit. 
95 
 
The graph in Figure 2.2 plots the frequency of acquisitions as a percentage of total 
number of firms for two categories formed on the basis of firms’ classified board statuses. 
Consistent with the implications of the court ruling, firms with entrenched officers completed 
56.7% fewer acquisitions of public targets semiannually (t-statistic = 17.31) than firms without 
entrenched officers during January 2009 – June 2011.59 In contrast, the parallel trend between the 
two categories is evident before the court ruling: Firms with entrenched officers performed 
merely 0.44% more acquisitions of public targets semiannually (t-statistic = 0.31) during 2001 – 
2008. Thus, significant differences in the frequency of value-decreasing acquisitions occur only 
after the court ruling on OFDs. These results further support the argument that the court ruling 
improved the governance structure of firms where entrenched officers benefit at the expense of 
shareholders. 
 
5.7. Propensity score matching 
The objective is to estimate an unbiased coefficient of cboard x post. However, it may 
not be unbiased if the impact of the court ruling on entrenched officers is not homogenous across 
firms, but varies as a function of firm characteristics. For example, the impact of the Rule may 
matter more for firms with excess cash and low investment opportunities. In this case, difference-
in-difference estimates may suffer from two sources of biases. The first arises if some firms 
affected by the Rule are not comparable with firms not affected by the Rule. The second bias 
arises from different distributions of observable firm characteristics that can affect acquisition 
outcomes of treatment and control firms. 
Matching methods eliminate these biases by pairing firms with classified boards with 
those without classified boards on the basis of observable firm characteristics. My matching 
                                                          
593.43% of firms with classified boards and 3.42% of firms without classified boards complete acquisitions of public 
targets before the Gantler court ruling. However, after the court ruling only 1.67% of firms with classified boards and 
2.62% of firms without classified boards complete acquisitions of public targets. Thus, the analysis suggests a 
difference-in-difference estimate of 27.4%. 
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procedure relies on propensity score matching, which was originally developed by Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1983) and later discussed in Smith and Todd (2005). The matching procedure begins 
with a Logit regression at the firm level of a binary variable indicating whether a specific firm has 
the classified board status. For explanatory variables, I rely on firm-level characteristics – assets, 
Tobin’s q, free cash flow, leverage and Delaware incorporation status, which Field and Karpoff 
(2002) use to predict the presence of takeover defenses in IPO firms. Because the objective is to 
create a sample of matched treatment and control firms both before and after the passage of 
Gantler v. Stephens, the Logit model is estimated on the whole sample of 845 treatment firms and 
596 control firms.60 
Using the propensity scores from the Logit estimation, I restrict my sample to the region 
of common support, i.e., discard from the sample of treatment group all firms to which control 
firms are not comparable. I then use the propensity scores to perform one-to-one matching 
without replacement where the difference of propensity scores between treatment and control 
firms does not exceed 1%.61 This procedure yields a sample of 533 control and 533 treatment 
firms. The accuracy of this matching procedure is presented in Panel A of Table 2.9, which shows 
that there are economically negligible and statistically insignificant differences across all firm 
characteristics after matching. In addition, when I re-estimate the Logit regression on the matched 
sample (unreported), all firm characteristics appear insignificant. 
Panel B of Table 2.9 presents results of the matched difference-in-difference estimation. 
As in Table 2.5, model 2 is the baseline regression model that is estimated with acquirer 
characteristics, deal features, and year and industry fixed effects. Compared to model 2, model 1 
omits industry fixed effects while model 3 adds firm fixed effects. 
                                                          
60The regression parameters (with p-values in parentheses) are as follows: 
Cboard = 2.593 – 0.268 (asset(log)) – 0.215 (Tobin’s q) + 0.927 (leverage) + 1.076 (free cash flow) + 0.045 (Delaware) 
               (0.000) (0.000)             (0.000)              (0.009)            (0.216)     (0.706).   
61When the maximal propensity score difference is set at high levels, e.g., 10%, the matching procedure yields a sample 
where treatment and control observations are still different in some of the firm characteristics, e.g., assets. 
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Table 2.9 
Difference-in-difference with propensity score matching 
The sample consists of 1,066 U.S. mergers and acquisitions between 2001 and 2011 that are comparable in 
propensity scores. The propensity of classified board is determined by acquirer’s assets, Tobin’s q, free 
cash flow, leverage, and Delaware incorporation status. The dependent variable in all subsample analyses 
in Panel B is the acquirer 5-day cumulative abnormal returns (%). All regression models in Panel B include 
all acquirer and deal characteristics as presented in Table 2.5. Variable definitions are in the Appendix 2. 
The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer 
clustering. ***, **and * stand for statistical significance based on two-tailed tests at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. 
Panel A: Mean differences after propensity score matching 
 Cboard = 0 Cboard = 1  
 Mean N Mean N Difference p-value 
Acquirer characteristics       
Assets (log) 7.898 533 7.918 533 -0.021 0.931 
Tobin’s q 1.900 533 1.870 533 0.030 0.950 
Free cash flow 0.053 533 0.051 533 0.002 0.997 
Leverage 0.218 533 0.220 533 -0.002 0.992 
Delaware 0.668 533 0.642 533 0.026 0.977 
Panel B: Difference-in-difference matching estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Cboard x post 
1.766** 
(2.250) 
1.589** 
(2.050) 
1.732** 
(2.000) 
Cboard (1/0) 
-0.062 
(-0.140) 
0.167 
(0.370)  
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.130 0.089 0.386 
Observations 1066 1066 1066 
 
Focusing on the coefficient of cboard x post, we see that it is positive and statistically 
significant across all specifications (p-values < 0.05). Furthermore, for all models the magnitude 
of the coefficient is greater than that reported in Table 2.5. This confirms my earlier finding that 
shareholders of firms with classified boards benefitted from acquisition activities due to the 
heightened level of officers’ fiduciary duties created by the court ruling. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Courts recognized officers’ distinct fiduciary duties in Gantler v. Stephens (2009). 
Because it did not affect firms with good governance, the Gantler case provides a natural 
98 
 
experiment for examining how agency conflicts between officers and shareholders affect major 
corporate investment decisions, namely mergers and acquisitions. In the empirical analysis, I use 
a difference-in-difference technique that eliminates changes that occur contemporaneously with 
the legal event by comparing M&A performance of acquirers with classified boards to M&A 
performance of acquirers not having such boards, both before and after the legal event. In 
addition, I control for deal attributes, time-varying acquirer characteristics, and year, industry and 
firm fixed effects to isolate the marginal impact of officers’ fiduciary duties on acquisition 
outcomes. 
I find that firms with classified boards experienced increased abnormal stock returns 
around acquisition announcements after the court ruling, consistent with the hypothesis that 
entrenched officers reduce value-decreasing acquisitions when exposed to increased personal 
liability that arises from breach of fiduciary duties. Firms appear to increase shareholder value 
after the legal event by increasing synergistic gains and paying targets with stocks, which is likely 
to dilute entrenched officers’ control and reduce private benefits. In further analysis, I investigate 
how officers’ fiduciary duties interact with other disciplinary mechanisms. I find that OFDs are 
more important in firms where officers are not directors (thus, they do not have access to D&O 
insurance), have wealth risk, are insulated from product market competition or from the market 
for corporate control, or are able to avoid active board monitoring. 
Overall, my results are consistent with the argument that officers’ fiduciary duties are an 
important corporate governance mechanism that works in tandem with other disciplinary 
mechanisms. Because courts failed to recognize officers’ fiduciary duties, earlier studies could 
not evaluate the hypothesis empirically. I take advantage of the 2009 Gantler case and establish a 
causal link that goes from officers’ fiduciary duties to shareholder value. 
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Appendix 2 
Definition of variables 
Identification variables  
Cboard (1/0) Equals one if a firm has classified board. 
Post (1/0) Equals one for all acquisitions with effective dates from July 1, 
2009. Effective date (source: SDC) refers to the date when 
shareholders vote on M&A agreement. 
  
Acquirer returns  
CAR (%) Five-day [-2, +2] cumulative abnormal return calculated using a 
market model (with CRSP equally-weighted return) estimated over 
the period [-210, -11] relative to the acquisition announcement 
date. 
  
Synergistic gains and acquisition 
premium 
 
Portfolio CAR (%) Five-day [-2, +2] weighted average cumulative abnormal returns of 
the acquirer and the target. The weights are based on their 
respective market capitalizations at the eleventh trading day prior 
to the announcement. 
Premium (%) ((Offer price/Target stock price 4 weeks before announcement) – 1) 
x 100. 
Proxy premium (%) The average premium paid to the acquired companies in the 
target’s industry in the year of acquisition. 
  
Deal characteristics  
Public (1/0) Equals one for public targets, zero otherwise. 
Private (1/0) Equals one for private targets, zero otherwise. 
Subsidiary (1/0) Equals one for subsidiary targets, zero otherwise. 
Friendly deal (1/0) Equals one for the friendly attitude or recommendation of the 
target’s management or board of directors toward the transaction. 
All cash (1/0) Equals one for solely cash-financed deals, zero otherwise. 
  
All stock (1/0) Equals one for solely stock-financed deals, zero otherwise. 
Diversifying acquisition (1/0) Equals one if bidder and target do not share the same Fama-French 
industry, zero otherwise. 
Relative deal size  Deal value/Acquirer’s market capitalization at the eleventh trading 
day prior to the announcement date. 
High-tech (1/0) Equals one for high-tech acquisitions, zero otherwise. High-tech 
industry classification follows Harford, Humphery-Jenner, and 
Powell (forthcoming). 
Industry M&A Aggregate value of corporate control transactions (exceeding $1 
million)/Aggregate book value of assets of all Compustat firms. 
This measure is calculated for each year and Fama-French industry. 
  
Acquirer characteristics  
Assets (log) Log of book value of total assets (item6). 
Tobin’s q Market value of assets over book value of assets: (item6 – item60 + 
item25 * item199)/item6. 
Free cash flow Operating income before depreciation – interest expenses – income 
taxes – capital expenditures, scaled by book value of total assets: 
(item13 – item15 – item16 – item128)/item6. 
Leverage Book value of debts over market value of total assets: (item34 + 
item9)/(item6 – item60 + item25 * item199). 
Stock price run-up Bidder’s buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) during over the 
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period [-210, -11] using the CRSP value-weighted index as the 
market portfolio. 
  
Other disciplinary variables  
ECB The Black-Scholes or fair value of new options granted to the top 
five executives divided by their total compensation, both in the 
year preceding the acquisition announcement. This calculation 
follows Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2001). 
Competitive Equals one if the acquirer’s industry is in the bottom quartile of 
Fama-French 48 industries’ Herfindahl index, zero otherwise. 
Mod. E-index Summation of five antitakeover provisions: limits to shareholder 
bylaw amendments + limits to shareholder charter amendments + 
supermajority requirements for mergers + poison pills + golden 
parachutes. 
ODS Summation of total ownership by outside directors. Outside 
directors are directors who are not corporate employees (insiders), 
do not have business relation with the company, and/or are not 
related to corporate employee. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
PROFIT SKIMMING, ASYMMETRIC BENCHMARKING OR THE EFFECTS 
OF IMPLICIT INCENTIVES? EVIDENCE FROM A NATURAL EXPERIMENT 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Academicians offer different perspectives on the relation between CEO compensation 
and “luck” (i.e. exogenous changes in firm performance).62 One set of studies posits that CEOs 
should not be compensated for observable luck. Under this view, any relation between 
compensation and luck is explained through the lens of weak governance structures. For example, 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) report findings consistent with a “skimming” model where 
CEOs are rewarded for favorable changes in macroeconomic variables, while Garvey and 
Milbourn (2006) document “asymmetric benchmarking” where CEOs enjoy stronger pay-for-
market-performance when the market is good. Because these results are more pronounced in 
firms with weaker governance, these authors indicate that CEOs have captured the pay-setting 
process. The other set of studies proposes a positive relation between compensation and luck by 
explicitly modeling the effects of luck on a CEO’s participation and incentive constraints. Oyer 
(2004) hypothesizes that compensation should be tied to industry measures as outside 
opportunities of managers correlate with industry performance. Feriozzi (2010) models a CEO’s 
“implicit incentives” (i.e. the treat of being fired or being able to extract no private benefits) in 
the incentive compatibility constraint and argues that implicit incentives should substantially 
motivate CEOs to work in the best interest of shareholders. Because implicit incentives have 
pronounced impacts after negative shocks and vanish after positive shocks, these incentives can 
induce asymmetric sensitivity in pay-for-performance in Feriozzi (2010). 
                                                          
62Both views consider optimal contracting. The difference is in the extent of modeling luck into a principal-agent 
model. 
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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relation between CEO compensation and 
luck, where luck is defined by the impact of natural disasters on firm performance. In doing so, I 
evaluate competing hypotheses on profit skimming, asymmetric benchmarking and the effects of 
implicit incentives and find evidence more consistent with the hypothesis that asymmetric 
sensitivity in pay-for-luck is due to the effects of implicit incentives. I also rule out explanations 
related to profit skimming or asymmetric benchmarking. First, I find that asymmetric sensitivity 
in pay-for-luck can result from firm specific changes in performance. Early research, in contrast, 
documents asymmetric sensitivity in pay for market-wide movements as an indication of possible 
corporate governance failures. Second, I show that results on asymmetric sensitivity do not vary 
with respect to different corporate governance measures. Third, I document asymmetric 
sensitivity in pay-for-luck not only for CEOs but also for non-CEO executives, suggesting that 
this company-wide phenomenon is less likely to be a corporate governance problem. Lastly, 
asymmetric pay sensitivity is present in subsamples of firms where CEOs are less likely to 
capture the pay-setting process, e.g. firms with newly appointed CEOs. 
Natural disasters offer a unique opportunity to measure the luck component of firm 
performance. First, disasters are unanticipated natural occurrences that may cause financial, 
environmental and human losses. For example, hurricane Katrina caused damages of around $2 
billion to Northrop Grumman Corporation and $1.55 billion to Allstate Corporation. Although 
such damages capture public and media attention, natural disasters also create opportunities for 
some industries. For example, firms in the construction and building materials industries are very 
likely to have increased profit opportunities after storms affect certain areas. 
Second, natural disasters impose a great deal of uncertainty and are less likely to be fully 
insurable. Consider, for example, how Northrop Grumman insured its business before hurricane 
Katrina. It purchased dual-layered property insurance from Factory Mutual Insurance Company. 
The primary layer covered 15% of “all risk including earthquake, flood, boiler and machinery” up 
107 
 
to the first $100 million while the excess layer covered all additional losses above $500 million to 
$19.80 billion for “risks including boiler and machinery (excluding earthquake and flood)”. After 
hurricane Katrina, Factory Mutual paid $15 million and informed Northrop Grumman that it 
would investigate the damage in two categories: damage caused by wind, under which there is no 
limit of coverage, and damage caused by flood, under which there is no coverage. Northrop 
Grumman filed suit against Factory Mutual on November 4, 2005 over disagreement for the 
eligible claim. Although the district court ruled in favor of Northrop Grumman, the federal 
appellate court reversed the decision on August 14, 2008 based on the finding that flood was not 
covered under the excess layer.63 Added to this type of unpredicted event is the risk of business 
interruption after natural disasters, making the compensation contracts incomplete and providing 
us with an opportunity to investigate how sensitive pay is to observable luck or misfortune. Third, 
the adverse effects of natural disasters on firm performance are likely to increase a CEO’s 
implicit incentives. Other shocks, e.g. oil prices and exchange rates, are less likely to detect this 
aspect of incentive and may bias result against finding asymmetric sensitivity in pay-for-luck. 
Using the heterogeneous impact of natural disasters on firm performance as the 
identification strategy, I evaluate how firm-level shocks affect pay arrangements of CEOs and 
other top executives. Specifically, I first conduct event studies for each type of natural disaster 
and record how the market value of industries respond. I then label industries in the first (last) 
quartile with the lowest (highest) cumulative abnormal returns as adversely (favorably) affected. 
Next, I consider a firm’s return-on-asset (ROA) as another dimension of differentiation. After 
specifying natural disasters and ROA as two probable identification variables, I use a difference-
in-difference (DID) procedure to measure how affected firms change pay-for-performance 
sensitivities of CEOs and other top non-CEO executives. The latter analysis with non-CEO 
executives is motivated by Acharya, Myers and Rajan (2011), who view non-CEO executives as 
                                                          
63http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2009/04/02/0756760.pdf. 
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an internal governance mechanism that can force CEOs to act in a “more public-spirited” and 
“far-sighted” way. 
I begin the analysis with a two-way sorting procedure that uses industry reactions to 
natural disasters and ROA as sorting variables. For both sets of executives, I document that pay-
for-performance sensitivity is lower in firms that were adversely affected by natural disasters, but 
is higher in those that were positively affected. In regression analyses that consider CEO pay and 
other executive pay separately, I find asymmetric sensitivity in pay for exogenous changes in 
firm-specific performance for both groups of executives. My findings can be explained by 
Feriozzi (2010). Since the effect of implicit incentives is more (less) pronounced after adverse 
(favorable) effects of natural disasters, the pay-for-performance sensitivity is relaxed 
(intensified). Because CEOs should not be penalized when firm performance is exogenously 
worsened by natural disasters, this result suggests loosening the pay-for-performance relation. On 
the other hand, a tighter pay-for-performance relation is required when firms face increased profit 
opportunities in the industry. In such situations, a CEO is motivated to act in the best interest of 
shareholders when her pay is closely tied to the firm’s upside gains. 
The results on asymmetric pay-for-performance sensitivity are robust to the inclusion of 
industry-wide performance measures. Although I find some evidence of pay for industry-wide 
performance, I doubt that this reflects a failure in governance since non-CEO executives are also 
paid for industry-wide luck. Given career concerns, limited power, and resource constraints over 
particular divisions, these non-CEO executives are less likely to influence the pay-setting process 
of their firms. My result, however, supports Oyer (2004) who argues that executive outside 
opportunities correlate with industry performances and therefore executive pay should be 
optimally tied to industry measures. 
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In further analyses, I incorporate several measures of corporate governance and find that 
independent boards are instrumental in reducing the CEO’s pay-for-performance sensitivity in 
firms that are adversely affected by disasters. This result is inconsistent with studies that explain 
asymmetric sensitivity in pay-for-luck through weak corporate governance. I also use the CEO 
and the set of top non-CEO executives as another source of difference in the pay-for-performance 
relation. This is intended to detect whether the pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO is 
differentially adjusted relative to other non-CEO executives after firm performance is affected by 
natural disasters. In this triple difference (DIDID) setting, I find that pay sensitivities of CEOs 
and other non-CEO executives are adjusted similarly. This result suggests that asymmetric pay-
for-performance sensitivity is a contracting mechanism that is used across all top executives and 
is less likely a corporate governance deficiency. Lastly, I find asymmetric pay-for-performance 
sensitivity in firms that are less likely to have corporate governance problems, i.e. firms with new 
CEO appointments and younger CEOs. 
 This paper provides a number of contributions to the current literature. First, it considers 
a unique type of shock that has a material impact on different industries. Second, I document 
asymmetric sensitivity in pay for firm specific changes in performance. This result is different 
from early research that finds asymmetric sensitivity in pay for market (or industry) performance. 
Third, I compare pay-for-performance sensitivities of CEOs and other non-CEO top executives. 
This analysis gives us a clear picture of whether asymmetry in pay-for-performance sensitivity is 
unique to CEOs. 
I organize the paper in the following way. In Section 2, I provide a brief literature review 
on research relevant to pay-for-luck. In Section 3, I explain how natural disasters may have 
heterogeneous effects on industry prospects and can affect firm performances differently. I also 
explain how natural disasters and their effects on firm performance can be used as identification 
strategies to explain CEO and non-CEO compensation. Section 4 details the major regression 
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variables and data sources. The analyses of two-way sorting (on the basis of industry responses to 
natural disasters and ROA) and fixed effect regression models follow in Section 5. Section 6 
highlights the findings and then concludes. 
 
2. Theories of pay-for-luck 
 
A compensation contract is a governance mechanism that is intended to align managers’ 
incentives with shareholder welfare. An optimal compensation contract depends either on the 
efficient outcome of a market mechanism or on the arms length bargaining between the board and 
managers (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). The market-based explanation relies on competitive 
assignment models, managerial skills, and corporate governance structures to explain CEO pay 
levels. For example, Rosen (1981, 1982) argues that larger firms should offer higher 
compensation since talented CEOs are relatively more valuable to them. Frydman (2007) 
observes that there is a shift in the type of skills demanded from firm-specific to general 
managerial skills. This shift improves CEO opportunities across industries, intensifies 
competition and explains the recent boost in top executive compensation. Hermalin (2005) argues 
that increased monitoring by more independent boards not only calls for more CEO effort and 
outside recruitment but also increases the probability of firing, which ultimately places an upward 
pressure on CEO compensation. However, Bebchuk, Fried and Walker (2002) criticize the 
market-based explanation by arguing that market constraints, which are far from adequate, allows 
substantial deviations from optimal contracting. 
Alternatively, in the arm’s length bargain, board members monitor and assess the CEO’s 
ability over time and set a competitive compensation plan. In Hermalin and Weisbach’s (1998) 
model, the extent of board monitoring is a function of its independence, which is measured by 
directors’ financial incentives and aversion to confront managers. If the firm is profitable, the 
111 
 
CEO gains bargaining power and the board becomes less effective as board appointments are 
jointly negotiated by the existing board and the CEO. Therefore, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) 
predict a gradual erosion of board independence where arm’s length bargaining is no longer 
feasible. 
The shortcomings in the optimal contracting mechanism raise concerns of whether a 
purely competitive pay arrangement exists. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argue that incentive 
arrangements are independent of firm performance, mainly because CEOs capture the board and 
set their own compensation plans, leading to the popularly known managerial power hypothesis. 
Fundamentally, the studies on pay-for-luck are based on this theory. 
Since optimal contracting is intended to solve agency problems, industry- or market- 
wide shocks should be adequately filtered out from compensation arrangements (Holmstrom, 
1982). Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) hinges on this idea and demands performance 
adjustment with respect to a benchmark. Empirically, there is little evidence supporting industry-
RPE (e.g. Gibbons and Murphy, 1990 and Rosen, 1992), motivating arguments for pay-for-luck. 
In fact, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) show that CEOs pay is tied to luck, where luck is 
associated with oil prices, industry specific exchange rates, etc. They argue that managers are 
able to skim from company profits, mainly in the absence of large shareholders. Garvey and 
Milbourn (2006) refine Bertrand and Mullainathan’s (2001) idea by arguing that pay-for-luck is 
valid if pay sensitivity is symmetric with respect to good and bad luck. If managers are 
opportunistic, they are likely to skim profits in lucky states of the world and insulate their pay in 
the unlucky states. They find results supporting asymmetric benchmarking in compensation – 
managers are rewarded for good market performance, but are not equally penalized for bad 
market outcomes.  
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Although Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Garvey and Milbourn (2006) shed light 
on the managerial power hypothesis, the finance literature offers an alternative explanation, 
which is more consistent with optimal compensation contracting, to their results. For example, 
Oyer (2004) and Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000) argue that managers’ outside opportunities are 
positively related to industry or market movements, suggesting that executive pay should reflect 
the changing nature of managers’ participation constraints. Rajgopal, Shevlin and Zamora (2006) 
also argue that economic booms raise the demand for scarce CEO talent because booming periods 
reflect positive shocks to demand and productivity. They use several measures of CEO talent as 
proxies for outside opportunities and find that more talented CEOs face less RPE and enjoy more 
pay-for-luck. In a separate study, Feriozzi (2010) points out that asymmetric pay-for-performance 
sensitivity exists simply because managers have added incentives after bad luck, but not after 
good luck. The principal-agent model of Feriozzi (2010) imposes a personal cost on the agent 
when the firm goes into bankruptcy. The agent’s cost in the model essentially corresponds to an 
implicit incentive mechanism that reduces the need for explicit incentives to induce a given level 
of effort only after bad news. After good news, the probability of financial distress decreases and 
so does the effectiveness of implicit incentives. Thus, the lack of implicit incentives explains why 
a tighter relation in pay-for-performance sensitivity is required after good luck. 
Gopalan, Milbourn and Song (2010) also relate CEO compensation to the firm’s 
systematic exposure to its industry stock return. Specifically, they set the CEO wage as a function 
of firm’s stock return, Ri. Since Ri = β iRs + εi, where Rs corresponds to sector performance, 
compensation based on equity returns is directly related to the firm’s systematic exposure to its 
sector performance. Because the CEO endogenously changes her firm’s strategy on the exposure 
of its sector performance, she is rewarded for sector movements (βiRs). Moreover, the 
asymmetric sensitivity in pay for sector-performance is induced by offering the CEO a piecewise 
linear contract. The CEO is rewarded more when sector performance is good since her pay loads 
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differently on good and bad luck. Though theoretically plausible, the basic predictions are 
difficult to verify empirically because β  is time varying and endogenously determined by the 
CEO. 
 In short, once believed to be an arrangement set by CEOs themselves, the evidence of 
(asymmetric) pay-for-luck is now argued to be an outcome of optimal contracting. Although 
Gopalan et al (2010) present empirical evidence consistent with pay for industry performance, it 
remains an empirical question whether compensation contracts of managers are tied to exogenous 
changes in firm-specific performance. In this paper, I use natural disasters as a shock that has 
firm-specific impacts on performance.64 
 
3. Natural disasters, firm performance and identification strategy 
 
My identification strategy hinges on the effects of natural disasters on CEO compensation 
via its impact on company performance. I utilize difference-in-difference (DID) and triple 
difference (DIDID) methods where firm performance is either positively or negatively affected by 
natural disasters in some years, but not in other years. An industry’s response to natural disasters 
and a firm’s operating performance are two identification variables to gauge how the firm’s 
performance has changed due to natural disasters. I then evaluate how these exogenous changes 
in operating performance induce changes in CEO compensation. 
Control groups in this experiment correspond to firms in industries that were not affected 
by natural disasters. I recognize that the incentive mechanisms for the control and treatment 
groups are not perfect. Therefore, in the next step, I introduce the average compensation of top 
non-CEO executives with the assumption that incentive mechanisms of CEOs and non-CEO 
                                                          
64Consider, for example, a local oil and gas company in the northern US. This company is likely to have benefited from 
jumps in oil prices after hurricane Katrina without any operational shutdowns following the devastating storm. 
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managers do not differ systematically after natural disasters. This DIDID procedure analyzes 
whether asymmetric pay-for-performance sensitivity in the DID method is unique to CEOs or an 
optimal contracting phenomenon that is observed for all top executives. 
To formally analyze the nonlinear structure of explicit incentives (Feriozzi, 2010), I 
consider heterogeneous effects of natural disasters on firm performance. The idea is best 
understood with an example. After extreme cold temperatures, companies in the airline and 
amusement industries are likely to suffer while firms in the coal industry flourish. I assume that 
the stock price reaction after the disaster correctly detects whether and how an industry is likely 
to be affected. 
My tests first use event studies separately for each type of natural disaster using the 
Fama-French 48 industry classifications to measure the immediate price impact. I use the Fama-
French-Carhart four factor model to calculate abnormal returns at the industry level. The 
coefficient estimates are based on at least 225 trading days that end five days before the event 
date. Data on daily equal-weighted industry returns, risk-free rates, excess market returns, small 
minus big (SMB), high minus low (HML) and momentum (UMD) factors are retrieved from 
Professor French’s website.65 The abnormal return calculation is based on (0, +3) event window 
where event day 0 corresponds to the date when the disaster occurred (or more specifically, when 
the disaster makes the first landfall). I do not consider days before 0 because some disasters (e.g. 
earthquake, wildfire) are completely unexpected while it is difficult to predict the path of other 
disasters (e.g. storms). This uncertainty therefore does not allow us to measure industry reaction 
before event day 0. 
After calculating cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over the event window, I sort 
them in descending order, divide them into quartiles, and classify the lowest and highest quartiles 
                                                          
65http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french.  
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as negatively and positively impacted industries, respectively. The second and third quartiles are 
subsequently defined as the control group. In the next step, I update the industry impact in each 
year by measuring the frequency of the particular shock in my sample years. For example, for my 
sample that runs from 2001 to 2009, I do not identify any industry impact from extreme 
temperatures between 2001 and 2008 since the USA was not significantly affected by such 
disasters during these years. Next, firms are distributed across sample years and assigned to 
industry quartiles based on their exposure to natural disasters. In the DID procedure, I expect to 
have two sources of identification. The first source identifies how an average firm that is affected 
(either positively or negatively) by extreme temperature in 2009 sets its pay-performance 
sensitivity relative to non-affected years (i.e. 2001-2008) while the second source measures cross 
sectional differences in pay-performance sensitivity among affected and unaffected firms. I 
estimate the following DID model: 
log(compensationijt) = α + β(firm performanceijt) + γ1(positive treatmentjt) + γ2(negative 
treatmentjt) + δ1(firm performanceijt * positive treatmentjt) + δ2(firm performanceijt * negative 
treatmentjt) + Xijt * θ + f i + yt + є ijt ,              (1) 
where compensationijt refers to the CEO’s pay or the average pay of top non-CEO executives at 
firm i, industry j and year t, positive treatmentjt and negative treatmentjt indicate whether industry 
j was favorably or adversely affected by any type of natural disasters in year t, firm performanceijt 
is the company i’s one-year operating (return-on-assets) and stock market performance measures 
in year t, Xijt is a vector of control variables (firm assets, one-year stock return volatility, CEO 
age and tenure) in year t and fi, yt are firm and year fixed effects, respectively. I consider the 
natural logarithm of compensation to reduce right skewness and to be consistent with models 
where executive’s effort or talent is proportional to firm size (see Baker and Hall, 2004 and 
Gabaix and Landier, 2008). 
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The coefficients δ1 and δ2 capture the relative difference in a CEO’s (or in a top non-
CEO executive’s) pay-for-performance sensitivity caused by disaster-induced firm performance. 
In addition, H0: δ1 = δ2 is the appropriate test of whether executives are symmetrically 
incentivized during good and bad times. 
I also formally analyze the DIDID procedure in a regression setting. The specification is 
similar to equation (1) but adds a CEO indicator variable, which is also interacted with (firm 
performanceijt*positive treatmentjt) and (firm performanceijt*negative treatmentjt). The main 
variables are (CEOijt*positive treatmentjt*firm performanceijt) and (CEOijt*negative 
treatmentjt*firm performanceijt) where coefficients test whether CEO’s pay-for-performance 
sensitivity is adjusted differently from that of non-CEO executives after exogenous shocks 
change firm performance. Evidence in favor of the null is inconsistent with rent seeking 
arguments. Given future career concerns, resource constraints and limited power over certain 
divisions, it is unrealistic that top non-CEO executives could capture their firm’s pay setting 
process. The evidence is also at odds with the argument offered in Gopalan et al (2010) since 
non-CEO executives cannot alter firm’s exposure to sector performance. 
 
4. Data 
 
4.1. Summary statistics 
Data on top executive compensation and CEO attributes are obtained from Execucomp. I 
retrieve information on total compensation (TDC1) for all top executives reported in Execucomp 
during 2001-2009. TDC1 is the summation of salary, bonus, total value of restricted stock 
granted, total Black-Scholes value of stock options granted, long-term incentive payouts and all 
other. Execucomp also provides data on CEO age and date of appointment as CEO. CEO tenure 
is calculated as the difference between the current year and the year when the manager was 
117 
 
appointed as CEO. I also consider quadratic forms of age and CEO tenure (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 2001). For non-CEO executives, data on age and tenure is very sparse. Therefore, I 
estimate regressions without these two variables whenever compensation of non-CEO executives 
is included as a dependent variable. 
I use both one-year ROA and stock return as measures of firm performance. Accounting 
return data is obtained from Compustat and the cumulative stock return data is retrieved from 
CRSP. Lambert and Larcker (1987), Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Hall and Liebman (1998) 
argue for the use of stock returns to calculate pay-for-performance sensitivity. However, the 
literature on pay-for-luck considers both types of performance measures, e.g. Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2001) use ROA and shareholder wealth while Garvey and Milbourn (2006) and 
Gopalan, Milbourn and Song (2010) use stock returns. Consistent with these studies, Core, Guay 
and Verrecchia (2003) document that ROA and stock returns mainly drive the pay-for-
performance sensitivity. 
I follow the compensation literature to control for different firm- and CEO- level 
characteristics. As argued by Rosen (1982), Gabaix and Landier (2008), and Baker and Hall 
(2004), I control for firm size to measure CEO effort and talent. I also control for one-year stock 
return volatility since it has been argued that a risk-averse manager has to be compensated for 
cross-sectional volatility. Milbourn (2003) argues that CEO tenure is one of the metrics 
contributing to her reputation. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) use CEO age, tenure and their 
squared terms to control for unobservable CEO effects. I therefore add these two CEO attributes 
as potential source of CEO ability. 
I present summary statistics of top executive compensation, firm performance and other 
control variables in Panel A of Table 3.1. The average firm has approximately $3.36 billion in 
assets and around 11.5% operating and stock performance. The average total CEO compensation  
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics 
Panel A: Summary statistics of CEO compensation, CEO attributes and firm characteristics 
 N 10th 25th Mean Std Dev Median 75th 90th 
CEO attributes         
Compensation (log, in 
thousands) 15240 6.629 7.234 7.978 1.047 7.983 8.708 9.343 
Age 14669 46 50 55.258 7.151 55 60 64 
Tenure  14912 1 2 6.858 6.822 5 9 16 
Non-CEO executives         
Average 
compensation (log, in 
thousands) 15240 6.023 6.472 7.099 0.854 7.037 7.676 8.246 
Firm characteristics   
Firms assets (log, in 
millions) 15240 6.106 6.939 8.121 1.665 8.004 9.195 10.348 
ROA 15240 0.004 0.057 0.115 0.101 0.113 0.170 0.234 
Stock return 15240 -0.445 -0.178 0.114 0.492 0.072 0.320 0.653 
Stock return volatility 15240 0.002 0.004 0.019 0.028 0.009 0.021 0.043 
Panel B: Statistics on natural disaster during 2001-2009 
Year Type Frequency No. of affected people Total damage (in '000,000) 
2001 Earthquake, storm 2 172400 8000 
2002 Flood, storm 4 144000 5200 
2003 Storm, wildfire 5 240571 17970 
2004 Storm 5 5070337 54100 
2005 Storm 4 830000 157530 
2006 Flood, storm 3 65667 3800 
2007 Storm, wildfire 3 641192 5500 
2008 Flood, storm, wildfire 9 13355388 55200 
2009 Extreme temperature, storm 6 899 10900 
 
is $2.92 million. The average total payment to non-CEO executives is $1.21 million. The typical 
CEO is 55 years old and stays approximately 7 years in the firm as the head of company. In my 
sample period, I have data on a total of 2,343 unique firms. 
For data on natural disasters, I rely on the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of 
Disasters (CRED) at the Université Catholique de Louvain. This database provides information 
on disaster type and location, its start and end dates, and its intensity. The intensity of damage is 
defined as the total number of people affected and total amount of damage in US dollars. As my 
objective is to estimate how natural disasters affect industries economically, I require that 
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damages exceed $500 million. Panel B of Table 3.1 presents information on five types of 
disasters, namely earthquake, extreme temperature, flood, storm and wildfire. Strom is the most 
frequent type of disaster occurring at least once a year. The most significant damage of over 
$157.53 billion occurred in 2005 when hurricane Katrina affected the Gulf Coast. The effects of 
disasters on firm performance can be both short- and long- term. To balance between capturing 
some long-term effects and adequate identification, I consider the effects of natural disasters in 
the fourth quarter to carry over the next fiscal year.66 
 
Table 3.1 (continued) 
Panel C: Industry stock market response to natural disasters 
Low, medium and high categories are based on lowest, middle two and highest quartiles of industry CARs, 
respectively. CAR is based on (0, 3) event window where event day 0 refers to the day when natural disaster first hits 
the land. 
  Industry cumulative abnormal 
returns (in %) 
Disaster type Category Average 
Standard 
deviation 
Earthquake 
Low -1.394 0.419 
Medium 0.023 0.572 
High 2.625 1.373 
Extreme 
temperature 
Low -2.517 0.684 
Medium -0.262 0.838 
High 3.024 1.563 
Flood 
Low -1.363 0.537 
Medium -0.423 0.240 
High 0.337 0.472 
Storm 
Low -0.346 0.249 
Medium 0.012 0.067 
High 0.314 0.164 
Wildfire 
Low -2.521 1.443 
Medium -0.771 0.316 
High 0.809 0.823 
 
 
Panel C of Table 3.1 presents the mean and standard deviation of cumulative abnormal 
returns at the industry level, conditional on the type of natural disaster. I sort industry CARs in 
                                                          
66For some firms, it may be reasonable to consider the effects of natural disasters over more than one year (for example, 
the effects of hurricane Katrina on the performance of Northrop Grumman). However, this limits identification through 
time, i.e. executive pay-for-performance sensitivity in a firm may not be compared across time. 
120 
 
ascending order and classify the lowest (highest) quartile as the most adversely (favorably) 
affected by a specific type of natural disaster. Industry responses to the five types of disasters 
range from -2.52% to 2.62% over the four day event window. This classification shows that 
industries that are expected to be negatively affected indeed experience negative average CARs. 
 
4.2. Difference-in-difference with two-way sorting 
To identify whether industries are positively or negatively affected by natural disasters, I 
conduct event studies at the Fama-French 48 industry classifications. Since this industry 
classification is an incomplete measure of how firms within particular industries were affected, I 
also consider the firm’s operating performance, ROA. 
In Panel A of Table 3.2, I perform a two-way sort on CEO compensation to gauge how 
pay sensitivity changes in relation to exogenous shocks and operating performance. The first 
dimension of sorting is based on industry CARs following disasters. The second dimension is 
based on ROA. Since ROA is a continuous variable, I divide this into quartiles. The pay-for-
performance sensitivity for firms in the adversely affected industry is 0.58 while it is 1.20 (0.58 + 
0.39 + 0.23) for firms in the favorably affected industries. 
Panel B of Table 3.2 duplicates the two-way sorting procedure for the average 
compensation of top non-CEO executives. The results are very similar to Panel A. Taken 
together, I find common patterns in pay sensitivity for all top executives after exogenous shocks 
have impacted the firm operating performance. Since non-CEO executives are less likely to 
influence the pay process, the findings of Table 3.2 call into question that the asymmetric pay-
for-luck stems from weak governance arguments. The two-way sorting, however, does not 
control for firm-level observable and unobservable characteristics. Therefore, in the next section, 
I implement difference-in-difference and triple difference methods.  
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Table 3.2: CEO compensation across firm-years when firms are favorably/adversely affected by natural 
disasters 
Two-way sort of total compensation. I use natural logarithm of total compensation while the total compensation 
variable, TDC1, is in thousands. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Low, medium and high categories are based 
on lowest, middle two and highest quartiles of industry CARs and ROA. ∆ln(wage) equates high minus low. 
Panel A: CEO total compensation 
  Industry CAR  
  Low Medium High ∆ln(wage) 
ROA 
Low 7.635 7.686 7.870 0.235 
 (1.117) (1.097) (1.105) (0.043) 
Medium 8.001 8.020 8.061 0.060 
 (1.006) (1.014) (0.953) (0.028) 
High 8.213 8.072 8.104 -0.109 
  (1.044) (1.042) (1.033) (0.044) 
     
∆ln(wage) 0.577 0.386 0.233 -0.344 (0.040) (0.042) (0.047) (0.002) 
Panel B: Average of top non-CEO executive total compensation 
  Industry CAR  
  Low Medium High ∆ln(wage) 
ROA 
Low 6.916 6.916 7.031 0.115 
 (0.903) (0.943) (0.934) (0.036) 
Medium 7.080 7.133 7.095 0.015 
 (0.821) (0.808) (0.799) (0.023) 
High 7.328 7.187 7.173 -0.155 
  (0.847) (0.822) (0.850) (0.036) 
     
∆ln(wage) 0.412 0.271 0.142 -0.269 (0.032) (0.035) (0.039) (0.002) 
 
5. Empirical results 
 
In this section, I first analyze whether CEO and top non-CEO pay is sensitive to disaster-
induced firm performance. I use regression specifications that are similar to Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2001) and identify asymmetric pay-for-performance sensitivity for both CEO and 
non-CEO top executives. In the second step, I investigate the source of this asymmetry. Using 
regressions that control for industry and year effects, I find that asymmetric sensitivity is mainly 
due to the idiosyncratic effects of natural disasters on firm performance. Third, I find that the 
result on asymmetric pay-for-performance is unlikely to be driven by governance problems. I 
implement a triple difference in the last step and show that pay-for-performance sensitivities of 
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CEO and other executives are similarly adjusted after exogenous shocks have changed firm 
performances. 
 
5.1. Results with difference-in-difference method 
5.1.A. Asymmetric pay-for-performance 
Panels A and B of Table 3.3 present estimates of regression specification (1) for CEO and 
top non-CEO compensation separately. That is, these models are DID regressions that control for 
firm and year fixed effects. Moreover, I employ robust standard errors clustered at the firm level 
to infer statistical significance. Following controversies based on the effect of outliers in 
compensation literature (see Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009, and Guthrie, Sokolowsky and 
Wan, forthcoming), I choose to winsorize all Execucomp, Compustat and CRSP data at the 1% 
and 99% level. The first regression specification uses determinants motivated by the existing 
literature to explain executive compensation. The next two specifications add exogenous shocks 
and their interaction terms with firm performance measures to measure the incremental 
adjustments in pay-performance sensitivity. 
Before discussing the effect of natural disasters on CEO compensation via its effects on 
firm performance, I briefly discuss the coefficient estimates of the other determinants. Morse, 
Nanda and Seru (2010) document an elasticity of CEO compensation with respect to (log) firm 
assets of between 0.32 and 0.37. I document a slightly higher elasticity of 0.41 across the 
regression specifications in Panel A of Table 3.3. This may be due to the different sample period 
considered in the study, as Frydman and Saks (2010) argue that the relation between CEO pay 
and firm size is sensitive to the time period chosen. The coefficient estimate of ROA falls 
between 1.00 and 1.03, which is also slightly higher than the result in Bertrand and Mullainathan 
(2001). My results imply that there is almost a one-to-one relation between executive 
compensation and firm operating performance as a 1% increase in ROA is associated with around  
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Table 3.3: Effects of natural disasters on CEO compensation 
Difference-in-difference regressions where the dependent variable is natural logarithm of compensation. Panel A 
considers CEO compensation whereas panel B consider the average compensation of top non-CEO executives. The 
sample period spans from 2001 to 2009. All regressions control for firm and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level. ***, ** and * refer statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Panel A Dependent variable: log(CEO compensation) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Estimates p-value Estimates p-value Estimates p-value 
Positive treatment   -0.018 0.519 -0.018 0.519 
Negative treatment   0.078** 0.031 0.078** 0.031 
Pay-for-performance 
adjustments       
Positive treatment * 
ROA   0.531*** 0.005 0.531*** 0.005 
Positive treatment * 
Stock return   0.015 0.514 0.015 0.514 
Negative treatment 
* ROA   -0.417** 0.031 -0.417** 0.031 
Negative treatment 
* Stock return   -0.042* 0.068 -0.042* 0.068 
Firm Characteristics       
Firm assets (log, in 
millions) 0.415*** 0.000 0.415*** 0.000 0.415*** 0.000 
ROA 1.004*** 0.000 1.030*** 0.000 1.030*** 0.000 
Stock return -0.016 0.266 -0.005 0.824 -0.005 0.824 
Volatility -0.706* 0.068 -0.714* 0.065 -0.714* 0.065 
CEO attributes       
Age -0.014 0.597 -0.013 0.616 -0.013 0.616 
Age2 0.000 0.643 0.000 0.661 0.000 0.661 
CEO tenure 0.004 0.376 0.004 0.383 0.004 0.383 
CEO tenure2 0.000* 0.061 0.000* 0.062 0.000* 0.062 
Pre-SOX     0.102*** 0.000 
Financial Crisis     0.257*** 0.000 
       
Firm effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 75.19% 75.26% 75.26% 
Observations 14358 14358 14358 
    
  H0: δ1 = δ2 (ROA and stock return, respectively) 
F-test  20.79 (p-value = 0.000) 20.79 (p-value = 0.000) 
 
1.02% increase in CEO pay. Except for firm operating performance, I do not identify a 
statistically significant relation between CEO compensation and stock return in the fixed effect 
regressions. Also, I find a statistically significant and negative relation between CEO 
compensation and one-year stock return volatility. Note that all of the specifications in Panel A 
consider firm fixed effects, therefore the negative relation between CEO pay and return volatility 
implies that CEO pay is lower when the firm’s stock return volatility is higher. To test whether 
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risk-averse managers are compensated more for idiosyncratic risk, I estimate the same regression 
specification using Fama-MacBeth procedure (results are not tabulated in the paper). I find a 
positive coefficient of 2.18 between volatility and compensation that is significant at better than 
the 6% level. 
Models 2 and 3 of Panel A include exogenous variables to formally analyze asymmetric 
pay-for-performance. Model 3 also controls for two indicator variables; pre-SOX takes a value of 
1 before 2003 and financial crisis takes a value of 1 after 2006. The results of these two 
specifications are surprisingly similar. I focus on the interaction terms of specification (1) that 
isolate the impact of natural disasters on firm performance to assess the positive and negative 
effects of exogenous shocks on pay-for-performance in the last regression specification. 
On average, firms that are favorably affected by disasters increase their pay sensitivity to 
operating performance by 51.6% (0.53/1.03), whereas adversely affected firms reduce this 
sensitivity by 40.5% (0.42/1.03). The experiment, therefore, records an 11% difference in pay 
sensitivity adjustment based on whether disasters favorably or adversely affect firms’ operating 
performance. For a CEO receiving an average compensation, this asymmetric adjustment in pay 
sensitivity corresponds to $322,752. I also test whether the asymmetry in pay-for-performance 
elasticity is statistically significant. The F test strongly rejects the null hypothesis at better than 
1% significance level. 
Panel B of Table 3.3 replicates the above analysis but includes the average pay of non-
CEO executives. Pay-for-performance is less elastic for this set of executives – a 1% increase in 
ROA is associated with a 0.70% increase in total compensation. Based on how disasters shape the 
firm’s fortune, I also document an 18.7% asymmetric pay-for-performance sensitivity that is 
equivalent to $226,205 for an average top non-CEO executive. In favorably affected firms, pay- 
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Table 3.3: Effects of natural disasters on CEO compensation (Continued) 
Panel B Dependent variable: log(average of top non-CEO executive compensation) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Estimates p-value Estimates p-value Estimates p-value 
Positive treatment   -0.025 0.164 -0.025 0.164 
Negative treatment   0.081*** 0.000 0.081*** 0.000 
Pay-for-performance 
adjustments       
Positive treatment * 
ROA   0.482*** 0.000 0.482*** 0.000 
Positive treatment * 
Stock return   0.010 0.528 0.010 0.528 
Negative treatment 
* ROA   -0.360*** 0.002 -0.360*** 0.002 
Negative treatment 
* Stock return   -0.019 0.241 -0.019 0.241 
Firm Characteristics       
Firm assets (log, in 
millions) 0.382*** 0.000 0.381*** 0.000 0.381*** 0.000 
ROA 0.639*** 0.000 0.653*** 0.000 0.653*** 0.000 
Stock return -0.043*** 0.000 -0.039*** 0.004 -0.039*** 0.004 
Volatility 0.355 0.118 0.336 0.136 0.336 0.136 
Pre-SOX     -0.009 0.604 
Financial Crisis     0.050*** 0.002 
       
Firm effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 82.19% 82.26% 82.26% 
Observations 15240 15240 15240 
    
  H0: δ1 = δ2 (ROA and stock return, respectively) 
F-test  33.70 (p-value = 0.000) 33.70 (p-value = 0.000) 
 
performance elasticity is raised by 73.8% whereas in adversely affected firms, it is reduced by 
55.1%. 
 
5.1.B. Industry luck or firm idiosyncratic effect? 
A finding of asymmetric adjustment in pay-performance sensitivity is not sufficient to 
conclude that managers skim profits from and shield themselves against industry-wide events. 
Natural disasters likely have firm-specific impacts that can increase implicit incentives (Feriozzi, 
2010). As a consequence, manager pay is made less sensitive under optimal contracting. To 
isolate the effects of industry-induced lucky and unlucky events on pay, I estimate regressions by 
adding industry-wide returns and their interactions with a dummy variable that indicates whether 
126 
 
and how the industry was affected by natural disasters. I also investigate other top executives’ 
average pay to assess whether pay for (industry) luck phenomenon is unique to the CEO. The 
model is: 
log(compensationijt) = α + β(firm performanceijt) + γ1(positive treatmentjt) + γ2(negative 
treatmentjt) + δ1(firm performanceijt * positive treatmentjt) + δ2(firm performanceit * negative 
treatmentjt) + η(industry performance jt) + κ1(industry performancejt * positive treatmentjt) + 
κ2(industry performancejt * negative treatmentjt) + Xijt * θ + f i + yt + є ijt ,         (2) 
where industry performance is calculated at Fama-French 48 classifications and other variables 
are as described earlier. Effectively, this difference-in-difference method with industry-level 
returns is similar to an instrumental variable approach where the identification requires 
performance measures to be predicted by the natural disaster. Therefore, it is similar to the two 
stage regressions in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001). If firms reward CEOs and other 
executives for lucky events, the coefficient κ1 should be positive. 
I present regression results for the above specification in Panels A and B of Table 3.4. 
The first model considers industry level operating and stock market performances. The 
coefficients for these performance measures are insignificant, implying that firms do not adjust 
CEO pay based on industry performance (Gibbons and Murphy, 1990 and Rosen, 1992). Unlike 
the first model, the second considers interaction terms between annual industry performance and 
how industries respond to natural disasters. The following discussion focuses on the coefficient 
estimates of the second model. Consistent with earlier studies, I find the coefficients of industry 
performance to be insignificant in Panel A and therefore, I do not document relative performance 
evaluation at the industry level.  
Controlling for industry level performance, I can interpret the interaction terms between 
firm performance and natural disasters as capturing the idiosyncratic effects of natural disasters  
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Table 3.4: Effects of natural disasters on CEO compensation after controlling for industry performance 
Difference-in-difference regressions where the dependent variable is natural logarithm of compensation. Panel A 
considers CEO compensation whereas panel B consider the average compensation of top non-CEO executives. Industry 
is defined at Fama-French’s 48 classifications. The sample period spans from 2001 to 2009. All regressions control for 
firm and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, ** and * refer statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Panel A Dependent variable: log(CEO compensation) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Estimates p-value Estimates p-value Estimates p-value 
Positive treatment -0.020 0.476 -0.043 0.308 0.040** 0.032 
Negative treatment 0.077** 0.031 0.055 0.344 0.018 0.419 
Pay for industry performance       
Industry ROA 0.154 0.420 -0.076 0.842   
Industry stock return 0.014 0.648 -0.004 0.927   
Positive treatment *  
industry ROA   0.160 0.653   
Positive treatment *  
industry stock return   0.096** 0.011   
Negative treatment * 
 industry ROA   0.304 0.430   
Negative treatment *  
industry stock return   -0.036 0.388   
Pay-for-performance 
adjustments       
Positive treatment * ROA 0.526*** 0.006 0.501** 0.015   
Positive treatment *  
stock return 0.015 0.509 -0.022 0.439   
Negative treatment * ROA -0.417** 0.031 -0.469** 0.019   
Negative treatment *  
stock return -0.044* 0.059 -0.028 0.356   
Positive treatment *  
industry adjusted ROA     0.532*** 0.010 
Positive treatment * industry 
adjusted stock return     -0.030 0.300 
Negative treatment * 
 industry adjusted ROA     -0.449** 0.018 
Negative treatment * industry 
adjusted stock return     -0.025 0.404 
Firm characteristics       
Firm assets (log, in millions) 0.415*** 0.000 0.416*** 0.000 0.421*** 0.000 
ROA (or excess ROA) 1.017*** 0.000 1.040*** 0.000 0.884*** 0.000 
Stock return (or excess stock 
return) -0.006 0.769 0.001 0.952 0.004 0.876 
Volatility -0.702* 0.069 -0.749* 0.053 -0.849** 0.028 
CEO attributes       
Age -0.013 0.618 -0.013 0.614 -0.013 0.621 
Age2 0.000 0.662 0.000 0.658 0.000 0.668 
CEO tenure 0.004 0.386 0.004 0.386 0.004 0.368 
CEO tenure2 0.000* 0.062 0.000* 0.060 0.000* 0.061 
Pre-SOX 0.107*** 0.000 0.106*** 0.000 0.106*** 0.000 
Financial Crisis 0.268*** 0.000 0.272*** 0.000 0.263*** 0.000 
Firm effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 75.26% 75.27% 75.18% 
Observations 14358 14358 14358 
  H0: δ1 = δ2 (ROA and stock return, respectively) 
F-test   16.30 (p-value = 0.000) 17.71 (p-value = 0.000) 
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Panel B Dependent variable: log(average of top non-CEO executive compensation) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Estimates p-value Estimates p-value Estimates p-value 
Positive treatment -0.022 0.211 -0.021 0.420 0.025** 0.042 
Negative treatment 0.083*** 0.000 0.090*** 0.009 0.031** 0.026 
Pay for industry performance       
Industry ROA 0.150 0.222 0.195 0.427   
Industry stock return -0.041** 0.035 -0.056** 0.020   
Positive treatment *  
industry ROA   -0.081 0.740   
Positive treatment *  
industry stock return   0.055** 0.034   
Negative treatment * 
 industry ROA   -0.038 0.880   
Negative treatment *  
industry stock return   -0.009 0.727   
Pay-for-performance adjustments       
Positive treatment * ROA 0.472*** 0.000 0.498*** 0.000   
Positive treatment *  
stock return 0.009 0.563 -0.013 0.513   
Negative treatment * ROA -0.362*** 0.002 -0.360*** 0.003   
Negative treatment *  
stock return -0.017 0.274 -0.013 0.487   
Positive treatment *  
industry adjusted ROA     0.524*** 0.000 
Positive treatment * industry 
adjusted stock return     -0.018 0.361 
Negative treatment * 
 industry adjusted ROA     -0.338*** 0.004 
Negative treatment * industry 
adjusted stock return     -0.014 0.454 
Firm characteristics       
Firm assets (log, in millions) 0.380*** 0.000 0.380*** 0.000 0.383*** 0.000 
ROA (or excess ROA) 0.641*** 0.000 0.628*** 0.000 0.523*** 0.000 
Stock return (or excess stock 
return) -0.034** 0.017 -0.027* 0.076 -0.024 0.118 
Volatility 0.334 0.138 0.315 0.163 0.239 0.289 
Pre-SOX 0.086*** 0.000 0.085*** 0.000 -0.002 0.927 
Financial Crisis 0.129*** 0.000 0.130*** 0.000 0.076*** 0.000 
Firm effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 82.27% 82.27% 82.20% 
Observations 15240 15240 15240 
    
  H0: δ1 = δ2 (ROA and stock returns, respectively) 
F-test   30.12 (p-value = 0.000) 34.08 (p-value = 0.000) 
 
on firm performance. Firms favorably affected by disasters increase their pay sensitivity by 
48.2% (0.50/1.04) whereas those affected adversely reduce this sensitivity by 45.1% (0.47/1.04). 
This asymmetric adjustment is statistically significant at better than the 1% level. In order to 
assess whether my results are robust to different specifications, I regress compensation on excess 
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firm performance, their interactions with positive and negative treatment indicators, and other 
control variables in the last model of Panel A. Similar results carry over to this specification.  
Overall, the results of this section are consistent with optimal contracting where 
shareholders use asymmetric sensitivity in pay for firm specific performances (Feriozzi, 2010). 
Since CEOs and other top executives are adequately motivated by the fear of potential 
bankruptcy, optimal contracts offer lower pay-performance sensitivity after natural disasters 
adversely affect firm performance. 
 
5.1.C. The effects of corporate governance 
Thus far, I have established results indicating asymmetric pay-for-performance sensitivity 
that is consistent with the optimal contracting hypothesis. This section considers alternative tests 
of the role of corporate governance. Specifically, I consider managerial entrenchment (as 
measured by firm antitakeover defenses), board independence and total shareholdings of 
independent directors as possible corporate governance mechanisms. Garvey and Milbourn 
(2006) use Gompers, Ishii and Metrick’s (2003) governance index based on 24 antitakeover 
defenses. Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009) show that staggered boards, limits to shareholder 
bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, supermajority and charter amendments are 
the six main antitakeover provisions that are related to economically significant reductions in firm 
value. Following this, I use Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell’s (2004) entrenchment index as a 
measure of managerial entrenchment. 
The importance of board independence cannot be overemphasized in the corporate 
governance literature (see, for example, Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). Under the firm value 
optimization theory, Raheja (2005), Adams and Ferreira (2007), and Harris and Raviv (2008) 
show that boards can be optimally designed to make the best use of information. Duchin, 
Matsusaka and Ozbas (2010) document that the effectiveness of independent directors depends on 
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the cost of acquiring firm-specific information. By using SOX (which requires firms to increase 
the number of independent directors) as an exogenous intervention, they show that independent 
directors only add value to the firm when the cost of acquiring information is low. Considering 
the increase in board independence after SOX, I add an indicator variable that equals 1 if at least 
70% of the board is independent.67 To gauge whether independent directors are adequately 
incentivized to monitor the CEO, I also consider shareholdings of independent directors as 
another source of board effectiveness. The variable independent board block takes the value of 1 
if all independent directors in a firm with an independent board jointly hold at least 5% of the 
company shares and 0 otherwise. 
Data on the entrenchment index and independent directors is obtained from RiskMetrics. 
This database provides data on antitakeover defenses for alternate years and shares held by 
directors on a yearly basis. For missing years, I interpolate data on antitakeover defenses by 
information in the latest year. A director is classified as independent if he does not have any 
material connection to the company other than the board. This definition of independence is taken 
directly from RiskMetrics, and it excludes inside directors, affiliated/gray outside directors and 
directors having material connections with the company from the list of independent directors. 
Like Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Garvey and Milbourn (2006), I interact 
different governance mechanisms with performance variables in three regression models in Table 
3.5. Panels A and B of Table 3.5 consider CEO and other executive pay separately. For all types 
of governance measures, I do not find any statistically significant results that would suggest 
managers have captured the pay setting process. In addition, Model 2 shows that independent 
boards in adversely affected firms reduce the CEO pay-performance elasticity by approximately 
33.9%. The fact that the coefficient of (negative treatment*ROA) is insignificant in model 2  
  
                                                          
67In an attempt to avoid possible social ties not conventionally captured by RiskMetrics database, I consider 70% board 
independence (see Hwang and Kim, 2009). 
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Table 3.5: Controlling for corporate governance 
Difference-in-difference regressions where the dependent variable is natural logarithm of CEO compensation. Panel A 
considers CEO compensation whereas panel B consider the average compensation of top non-CEO executives. 
Entrenchment index (e-index) is based on six antitakeover defenses (Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell, 2009). Weak (strong) 
entrenchment index is an indicator value with value 1 if a firm has at best 2 (at least 4) of the six antitakeover defenses. 
Independent board dummy takes the value of 1 if at least 70% of the board is independent and independent board block 
takes the value of 1 if all independent directors jointly hold more than 5% of the company share. The sample period 
spans from 2001 to 2009. All regressions control for firm and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level. ***, ** and * refer statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Panel A Dependent variable: log(CEO compensation) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Estimates p-value Estimates p-value Estimates p-value 
Positive treatment -0.026 0.461 -0.022 0.510 -0.022 0.514 
Negative treatment 0.135*** 0.002 0.118*** 0.004 0.118*** 0.004 
Pay-for-performance adjustments       
Positive treatment * ROA 0.353 0.228 0.458 0.063 0.557 0.017 
Positive treatment * Stock return 0.044 0.164 0.043 0.134 0.042 0.139 
Negative treatment * ROA -0.677** 0.020 -0.277 0.310 -0.530** 0.024 
Negative treatment * Stock return -0.056* 0.075 -0.065** 0.021 -0.064** 0.023 
Governance       
Positive treatment * ROA * weak e-index -0.027 0.904     
Positive treatment * ROA * strong e-index 0.257 0.308     
Negative treatment * ROA * weak e-index -0.012 0.952     
Negative treatment * ROA * strong e-index 0.185 0.452     
E-index -0.005 0.681     
Positive treatment * ROA * independent board 
dummy 
  
0.145 0.478 
  
Negative treatment * ROA * independent board 
dummy   -0.426** 0.036   
Independent board dummy   0.039 0.132   
Positive treatment * ROA * independent board 
block 
    
-0.472 0.227 
Negative treatment * ROA * independent board 
block     -0.006 0.984 
Independent board block     0.041 0.469 
Firm characteristics       
Firm assets (log, in millions) 0.399*** 0.000 0.364*** 0.000 0.364*** 0.000 
ROA (or excess ROA) 1.196*** 0.000 1.257*** 0.000 1.253*** 0.000 
Stock return (or excess stock return) 0.004 0.887 0.015 0.556 0.015 0.556 
Volatility 0.303 0.566 -1.030** 0.044 -1.038** 0.043 
CEO attributes       
Age -0.006 0.852 -0.014 0.616 -0.014 0.627 
Age2 0.000 0.806 0.000 0.564 0.000 0.572 
CEO tenure 0.003 0.655 0.005 0.322 0.005 0.330 
CEO tenure2 0.000* 0.077 0.000** 0.020 0.000** 0.019 
Pre-SOX -0.086*** 0.002 
-
0.079*** 0.007 
-
0.083*** 0.005 
Financial Crisis 0.185*** 0.004 0.119*** 0.000 0.123*** 0.000 
       
Firm effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 77.85% 76.96% 76.94% 
Observations 10767 11123 11123 
 
implies that independent boards are instrumental in reducing the pay sensitivity in bad states. This 
finding supports Feriozzi’s (2010) argument because independent directors know when implicit  
132 
 
Table 5: Controlling for corporate governance (Continued) 
Panel B Dependent variable: log(average of top non-CEO executive 
compensation) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Estimates p-value Estimates p-value Estimates p-value 
Positive treatment -0.042* 0.056 -0.012 0.585 -0.011 0.598 
Negative treatment 0.116*** 0.000 0.117*** 0.000 0.118*** 0.000 
Pay-for-performance adjustments       
Positive treatment * ROA 0.471** 0.019 0.406** 0.020 0.383** 0.013 
Positive treatment * Stock return 0.027 0.194 0.025 0.212 0.025 0.213 
Negative treatment * ROA -0.548*** 0.004 
-
0.537*** 0.006 
-
0.585*** 0.000 
Negative treatment * Stock return -0.015 0.486 -0.042** 0.036 -0.042** 0.036 
Governance       
Positive treatment * ROA * weak e-index -0.131 0.466     
Positive treatment * ROA * strong e-index 0.219 0.254     
Negative treatment * ROA * weak e-index 0.029 0.838     
Negative treatment * ROA * strong e-index 0.003 0.985     
E-index -0.007 0.453     
Positive treatment * ROA * independent board 
dummy 
  
-0.027 0.846 
  
Negative treatment * ROA * independent board 
dummy   -0.034 0.804   
Independent board dummy   0.007 0.650   
Positive treatment * ROA * independent board block 
    
0.099 0.784 
Negative treatment * ROA * independent board 
block     0.273 0.273 
Independent board block     -0.022 0.559 
Firm characteristics       
Firm assets (log, in millions) 0.380*** 0.000 0.366*** 0.000 0.366*** 0.000 
ROA (or excess ROA) 0.843*** 0.000 0.923*** 0.000 0.928*** 0.000 
Stock return (or excess stock return) -0.031 0.067 -0.011 0.513 -0.011 0.521 
Volatility 1.168*** 0.000 0.739** 0.011 0.744*** 0.010 
Pre-SOX -0.040** 0.048 -0.022 0.299 -0.022 0.286 
Financial Crisis 0.018 0.266 0.023 0.182 0.024 0.147 
       
Firm effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 83.77% 83.10% 83.10% 
Observations 11458 11804 11804 
 
 
incentives are an effective motivating tool. Panel B also shows that other corporate governance 
measures are not important determinants of non-CEO executive compensation. 
 
5.2. Results with a triple difference method 
Table 3.6 presents regression results using triple differences. The first difference 
classifies how industries are affected by certain natural disasters, the second difference evaluates 
how a firm’s operating performance is affected in a catastrophic year and the third difference 
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analyzes whether CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity is set differently from that of top non-
CEO executives. 
The profit skimming and asymmetric benchmarking arguments that are based on weak 
corporate governance indicate CEO rent extraction. However, it is unlikely that all top executives 
 
Table 3.6: DIDID regression results 
Triple difference regressions where the dependent variable is natural logarithm of compensation of CEOs and other 
executives. The sample period spans from 2001 to 2009. All regressions control for firm and year fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, ** and * refer statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 Dependent variable: log(compensation) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Estimates p-value Estimates p-value 
CEO indicator and its 
interactions     
CEO * positive treatment * 
ROA 0.030 0.853 0.030 0.853 
CEO * positive treatment * 
stock return 0.021 0.353 0.021 0.353 
CEO * negative treatment * 
ROA 0.115 0.442 0.115 0.442 
CEO * negative treatment * 
stock return 0.004 0.855 0.004 0.855 
CEO * ROA 0.328*** 0.005 0.328*** 0.005 
CEO * stock return 0.000 0.991 0.000 0.991 
CEO * positive treatment 0.058** 0.011 0.058** 0.011 
CEO * negative treatment -0.029 0.212 -0.029 0.212 
CEO 0.823*** 0.000 0.823*** 0.000 
Positive treatment -0.050** 0.014 -0.050** 0.014 
Negative treatment 0.095*** 0.000 0.095*** 0.000 
Pay-for-performance 
adjustments     
Positive treatment * ROA 0.507*** 0.000 0.507*** 0.000 
Positive treatment * Stock 
return 0.004 0.797 0.004 0.797 
Negative treatment * ROA -0.472*** 0.000 -0.472*** 0.000 
Negative treatment * Stock 
return -0.033** 0.048 -0.033** 0.048 
Firm Characteristics     
Firm assets (log, in 
millions) 0.388*** 0.000 0.388*** 0.000 
ROA 0.680*** 0.000 0.680*** 0.000 
Stock return -0.021 0.138 -0.021 0.138 
Volatility -0.142 0.598 -0.142 0.598 
Pre-SOX   0.091*** 0.000 
Financial Crisis   0.203*** 0.000 
     
Firm effects Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 78.02% 78.02% 
Observations 30480 30480 
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are involved with such rent seeking behavior. Top non-CEO executives are competitors in 
tournament-like games, have career concerns and often have limited resources and power over 
certain divisions. Therefore, if pay-performance sensitivities of CEOs and non-CEO executives 
face similar adjustments after natural disasters, then this result may best be explained by the 
optimal contracting mechanism. The similar pay-performance adjustments would run counter to 
the argument made by Gopalan et al (2010), as non-CEO executives are less likely to change the 
risk exposure of their firm.  
In Table 3.6, I find that the first four coefficients that consider triple interaction terms are 
insignificant. These results suggest that implicit incentives trigger during bad events and vanish 
during good events. Therefore, all top managers require less (more) sensitive pay-for-
performance relation to exert a certain level of effort during bad (good) events (Feriozzi, 2010). 
 
5.3. Robustness 
5.3.A. Different event windows 
The research design of this study considers industry responses to natural disasters as an 
identification variable. Industry responses are measured by CARs based on (0, 3) event window. 
In this section, I consider alternate specifications of CARs based on (0, 2) and (0, 5) event 
windows to analyze the robustness of my earlier findings. Panel A and B of Table 3.7 present 
results on CEO and top non-CEO executives, respectively. The results of this table support 
asymmetric adjustment in the pay-for-performance sensitivity that I document earlier. 
After conducting event studies at the Fama-French 48 industry classifications, I label industries in 
the first (last) quartile with the lowest (highest) CARs. I then analyze whether any industry in the 
first (last) quarter that is expected to be affected adversely (favorably) experiences positive 
(negative) CAR. After re-categorizing a few industries and re-estimating the regression models, I 
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find more robust results on asymmetric pay-for-luck sensitivity. This indicates that any 
misclassification only reduces the power of the regression analyses. 
 
5.3.B. Subsample analyses 
 Acharya, Myers and Rajan (2011) consider the set of non-CEO top managers as a 
potential governance mechanism. Considering their argument, I analyze the set of non-CEO  
 
Table 3.7: Different event windows 
Difference-in-difference regressions where the dependent variable is natural logarithm of compensation. Panel A 
considers CEO compensation whereas panel B consider the average compensation of top non-CEO executives. Model 1 
and 2 consider industry response to natural disasters with [0, 5] and [0, 2] windows, respectively. Event day 0 refers to 
the day when natural disaster first occurs (or makes the landfall). The sample period spans from 2001 to 2009. All 
regressions control for firm and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, ** and * 
refer statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Panel A Dependent variable: log(CEO compensations) 
 Model 1: [0, 5] window Model 2: [0, 2] window 
 Estimates p-value Estimates p-value 
Positive treatment 0.007 0.658 0.022 0.236 
Negative treatment 0.003 0.894 0.015 0.421 
Pay-for-performance 
adjustment     
Positive treatment * 
industry adjusted ROA 0.402** 0.020 0.233 0.214 
Positive treatment * 
industry adjusted stock 
return -0.024 0.426 -0.002 0.949 
Negative treatment * 
industry adjusted ROA -0.429** 0.021 -0.505*** 0.010 
Negative treatment * 
industry adjusted stock 
return 0.002 0.942 -0.069** 0.022 
Firm characteristics     
Firm assets (log, in 
millions) 0.423*** 0.000 0.426*** 0.000 
Industry adjusted ROA 0.851*** 0.000 1.023*** 0.000 
Industry adjusted stock 
return -0.003 0.898 0.028 0.327 
Volatile -0.819** 0.033 -0.815** 0.036 
CEO attributes     
Age -0.012 0.656 -0.010 0.686 
Age2 0.000 0.709 0.000 0.742 
CEO tenure 0.004 0.391 0.004 0.384 
CEO tenure2 0.000* 0.073 0.000* 0.074 
Pre-SOX 0.110*** 0.000 0.110*** 0.000 
Financial crisis 0.265*** 0.000 0.260*** 0.000 
Firm effects Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 75.08% 75.08 
Observations 14375 14,375 
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Panel B Dependent variable: log(average of top non-CEO executive compensations) 
 Model 1: [0, 5] window Model 2: [0, 2] window 
 Estimates p-value Estimates p-value 
Positive treatment 0.007 0.505 -0.010 0.423 
Negative treatment 0.007 0.637 0.008 0.512 
Pay-for-performance 
adjustment     
Positive treatment * industry 
adjusted ROA 0.270** 0.016 0.387*** 0.006 
Positive treatment * industry 
adjusted stock return -0.014 0.485 0.009 0.660 
Negative treatment * industry 
adjusted ROA -0.283** 0.014 -0.235** 0.040 
Negative treatment * industry 
adjusted stock return 0.018 0.371 -0.044** 0.025 
Firm characteristics     
Firm assets (log, in millions) 0.383*** 0.000 0.385*** 0.000 
Industry adjusted ROA 0.540*** 0.000 0.497*** 0.000 
Industry adjusted stock return -0.035** 0.049 -0.012 0.519 
Volatile 0.292 0.196 0.302 0.179 
Pre-SOX -0.008 0.676 -0.001 0.957 
Financial crisis 0.067*** 0.000 0.075*** 0.000 
Firm effects Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 82.12% 82.13% 
Observations 15248 15248 
 
executives and find asymmetric pay-for-performance sensitivity. Because asymmetric pay 
sensitivity is present for both CEO and non-CEO executives, I argue that asymmetric pay-for-
performance sensitivity is more likely an optimal contracting phenomenon. However, it can be 
argued that CEOs and non-CEO executives are collectively involved in the opportunistic pay-
setting process. I evaluate this hypothesis using two different subsamples in Table 3.8 where CEO 
power is less of a concern and then estimate pay-for-performance sensitivities of non-CEO 
executives. 
 The initial subsample considers first two years after the appointments of new CEOs. In 
this sample, non-CEO executives are less likely to capture the pay-setting process collectively 
with new CEOs. In the second subsample, I exclude CEOs above the retirement age of 65. Elder 
CEOs have fewer career concerns and may entrench themselves by providing top executives 
similar pay arrangements. For these two sampling criteria, I find asymmetric pay-for-performance 
sensitivity for the set of non-CEO executives. These results further strengthen my earlier 
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conclusion that asymmetric pay-for-performance sensitivity is more likely an optimal contracting 
phenomenon that is observed across all executives in a company. 
 
Table 3.8: Samples of firms where optimal contracting is more likely 
Difference-in-difference regressions where the dependent variable is natural logarithm of compensation. In Model 1, I 
consider the first two years after CEO appointments whereas in Model 2, I consider firms with CEOs not exceeding 65 
years of age (i.e. retirement age). The sample period spans from 2001 to 2009. All regressions control for firm and year 
fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, ** and * refer statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level. 
 Dependent variable: log(average of top non-CEO compensations) 
 Model 1: New CEO appointment Model 2: CEO below 65 
 Estimates p-value Estimates p-value 
Positive treatment 0.026 0.219 0.029** 0.025 
Negative treatment 0.032 0.187 0.031** 0.034 
Pay-for-performance 
adjustment     
Positive treatment * 
industry adjusted ROA 0.422* 0.055 0.442*** 0.002 
Positive treatment * 
industry adjusted stock 
return -0.026 0.419 -0.016 0.429 
Negative treatment * 
industry adjusted ROA -0.360* 0.095 -0.370*** 0.002 
Negative treatment * 
industry adjusted stock 
return 0.020 0.556 -0.022 0.270 
Firm characteristics     
Firm assets (log, in 
millions) 0.348*** 0.000 0.397*** 0.000 
Industry adjusted ROA 0.489** 0.026 0.583*** 0.000 
Industry adjusted stock 
return -0.040 0.104 -0.026 0.111 
Volatile -0.056 0.869 0.390* 0.100 
Pre-SOX 0.133*** 0.000 0.123*** 0.000 
Financial crisis 0.129*** 0.000 0.192*** 0.000 
Firm effects Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 84.78% 82.64% 
Observations 5914 13619 
 
6. Summary and conclusion 
 
Feriozzi (2010) argues that the effectiveness of implicit incentives is most apparent 
during bad events since managers are threatened by the increased probability of bankruptcy. On 
the other hand, implicit incentives are not effective motivating tools during good economic 
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conditions since the firm is less likely to be in financial distress. As a result, top managers need 
more sensitive pay-performance relation to exert a certain effort level when the economy 
prospers.  
By considering the heterogeneous and idiosyncratic impact of natural disasters on firm 
performance, I show that the compensation of CEOs and other top executives reflects asymmetric 
pay sensitivity, consistent with Feriozzi (2010). I use natural disasters because unlike other 
exogenous shocks, natural disasters are likely to favor some industries, adversely affect others 
and not have any economic effect on the rest. Moreover, the infrequent occurrence of natural 
disasters allows us to compare pay arrangements of the same firm across different years. 
 When CEO compensation is sorted based on the industry reaction to natural disasters and 
firm operating performance (ROA), I document lower pay-for-performance sensitivity for firms 
that are adversely affected by natural disasters. In a more systematic difference-in-difference 
procedure that controls for several time-varying variables and firm and year fixed effects, I 
document that favorably affected firms increase their pay sensitivity by 51.6% while adversely 
affected firms reduce this sensitivity by 40.5%, equivalent to $322,752. I also find similar 
asymmetry in pay-for-performance sensitivity for non-CEO executives. Moreover, the asymmetry 
in CEO pay-for-performance is not statistically different from that in non-CEO executive pay. 
This particular finding helps us reject rent seeking arguments on asymmetric pay-for-performance 
sensitivity. 
 I show that my results are robust to the inclusion of industry-wide luck. The effect of 
natural disasters on firm performance is largely idiosyncratic and extends beyond industry-wide 
performance. To verify that my results are consistent with optimal contracting and not a 
governance problem, I use the entrenchment index, independent board dummy and shareholdings 
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of independent directors as corporate governance measures. From this experiment, I confirm that 
asymmetric pay-for-performance is not merely a weak governance problem. 
Overall, this paper considers a particular set of exogenous shocks that firms may find 
difficult to insure against. This uncertainty makes compensation contracts incomplete and 
provides us an opportunity to investigate how executive pay is adjusted for exogenous changes. 
By finding results consistent with the optimal contracting theory, this study justifies revisions of 
our views on pay-for-luck, which is currently assumed to be the outcome of corporate governance 
problems. 
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